IRAQ: Terrorism threat increases risks for foreigners

Analysis

US Central Command chief General John Abizaid recently signalled US alarm over the new incidence of large-scale urban bombings in Iraq, stating that terrorism "is emerging as the number one security threat" in Iraq. While dozens of small criminal and guerrilla incidents are launched daily in Iraq, resulting in regular casualties and a trickle of deaths, the emergence of larger-scale terrorist-type attacks marks a serious deterioration in the security environment in Iraq (see IRAQ: Escalating violence hampers reconstruction - June 26, 2003).

For international organisations and potential foreign investors, the new trend in attacks points to the growing risk of engagement with the country. For the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the attacks will complicate defensive planning by introducing a new range of vulnerable targets to defend, and by increasing the level of fortification required to protect major fixed installations. Until the identity of attackers and potential links between the Jordanian embassy, UN building, and Najaf bombings can be unravelled, the CPA will not be able to assess the threat of future attacks, or develop law enforcement and counter-terrorism counter-measures (see IRAQ: Hakim assassination dims stability prospects - September 2, 2003). Early indications suggest that the car bomb attack on a US intelligence facility in Irbil this week is the fourth example of the new trend.

FBI investigation. The appointment last week of a senior FBI official to the investigation of the recent large-scale bombings signalled the beginning of an intensified effort to establish the identities and affiliations of the attackers. No credible claims of responsibility for the individual bombings have surfaced, and separate communications attributed to Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida have denied involvement in the Najaf bombing. Using a combination of crime scene investigation and interrogations, the FBI stands a good chance of identifying the factions responsible within weeks, although incomplete forensic evidence will complicate the enquiries. The UN bombing differed substantially from both the Jordanian embassy attack and the Najaf bombing. This more ambitious attack was far larger than either of the other two and may have involved a suicide rather than remote detonation. Suicide bombings have not hitherto been part of Ba'athist modus operandi. Even so, the methods of attack and the target chosen in the bombings do not yet provide clear indicators of the motives or identifies of the perpetrators.

Foreign jihadists. Until information comes to light indicating that all three bombings represent an evolution of the activities of domestic Ba'athist insurgents, the FBI must consider the possibility that foreign Wahhabi extremists or close al-Qaida affiliates, such as Ansar al-Islam, were involved in one or more of the strikes. Documents recently found on captured former vice-president Taha Yassin Ramadan add to a slowly accumulating body of evidence pointing to a phased Ba'athist resistance effort that has sought to integrate any potential sources of resistance into a loose network. Rightly or wrongly, attention is now focusing on the role of foreign fighters in the new attacks.

Of the suspects detained after the Najaf bombing, two were Saudis and eight (two of Kuwaiti and six of Palestinian birth) held Jordanian passports. Following the attacks, US officials suggested that 15 'Saudi jihadists' were in US custody in Iraq and that up to 100 foreign extremists were believed to have recently entered the country from Syria, Sudan, Yemen, and Iran, bringing the estimated total of foreign terrorist suspects in the country up to at least 200 (see IRAQ: Resistance will continue after fall of Baghdad - April 3, 2003). In response to growing concern that Iraq could develop into a magnet for foreign jihadists, the CPA has fast-tracked the development of Iraqi border guard units. Three classes have so far graduated from US Initial Border Guard Training programmes, with each class readying roughly 100 new guards. CPA administrator Paul Bremer has suggested that the force will eventually total 25,000 troops.

New trend in attacks.. Whoever is responsible, large-scale bombings represent a troubling new trend in the pattern of attacks. Previously, guerrilla attacks were largely community-based, and thus localised. High-profile military targets represented the vast majority of targets engaged. Defended locations were relatively safe, and the majority of attacks focused on targets in transit or that were posted at exposed urban checkpoints. Attacks primarily displayed rudimentary planning and caused relatively small numbers of casualties.

The spate of large-scale bombings has introduced a new threat. The theatre of these recent attacks has spanned Baghdad, south-central Iraq and now the Kurdish north. A diplomatic mission, an international organisation, a pivotal community figure and now a US intelligence facility were targeted, indicating the diversity of new targets that will require key point defences. Fixed sites were struck with precision, regardless of the risk of discovery or the presence of protective militia forces or cordon defences at the site. The attacks were meticulously planned and intended to cause mass casualties.

Threat outlook. There is no reason to expect that periodic large-scale bombings will cease in the near term. In spite of US attempts to secure large military arsenals, there is no shortage of unexploded ordinance and other unsecured munitions that can be converted into large improvised explosive devices. US officials in Iraq say 50 munitions sites still have only light security and are poorly guarded. Although US and Iraqi forces are concentrating increasing resources on border control, Iraq's long and rugged borders with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria cannot be hermetically sealed to foreign volunteers. Although leads are likely to emerge quickly from the FBI investigation, the development of a fuller intelligence picture and the interdiction of terrorist cells will be a slow process.

Coalition counter-measures will also adapt during the coming weeks and months. US forces will seek to hand over much of their static defensive role to international allies and Iraqi paramilitaries, while shifting to a more "precision intelligence-led approach", as US military spokesmen have described their evolving counter-insurgency posture. Broadening US intelligence capabilities will become even more important now that the range of perpetrators has expanded beyond the well-known Ba'athist leaders, who were relatively easy to identify, resulting in the apprehension or killing of 42 of the 55 most wanted regime figures by early September. Generating early warning intelligence and carrying out selective, intelligence-led counter-insurgency operations will reduce, but not extinguish, the impact of new large-scale bombing tactics in Iraq.

Implications. The implications of this new trend are significant for the CPA, international organisations, and businesses operating in Iraq. For international organisations and businesses, it is clear that efforts to distance or differentiate themselves from the CPA and the occupying armed forces will not preclude their deliberate selection as 'soft targets'. For the CPA, the attacks are a clear sign that personnel can only be safely housed within segregated and specially fortified compounds. At present, many CPA personnel are still housed in semi-secure accommodation in central Baghdad. Further segregation from the population will hobble CPA efforts to obtain assessments from outside its headquarters compounds and to win hearts and minds.