NORTH AMERICA: Security fears spur cooperation

Analysis

Unlike the EU, which began as an economic agreement but has evolved into a political community governed by common institutions, NAFTA's purpose and activities have remained largely confined to trade and investment liberalisation (see NORTH AMERICA: New boost for economic integration - January 26, 2004). Indeed, the drafters of NAFTA explicitly avoided any formal institutionalisation of the continent along the lines of the EU, leaving North America without a central focus like Brussels to promote community interests.

Moreover, public opinion surveys show little evidence of continental attachment among the peoples of North America. While citizens of Canada, Mexico and the United States support increased access to each other's markets, they remain strongly attached to their own values and institutions. In the case of Canada and the United States, recent research demonstrates that after 15 years of free trade between the two countries, the social values of Canadians and US citizens have actually become more dissimilar.

NAFTA drivers.While the creation of the original European Economic Community was driven by politicians and civil servants, NAFTA was largely the product of business and market forces. The latter's institutional footprint remains light. It consists of a Free Trade Commission (FTC) -- composed of cabinet-level representatives from the three member states who are responsible for overseeing implementation of the agreement; trilateral working groups on specific topics; an arbitration panel which hears trade disputes; and an Environmental Commission (based in Montreal) which oversees NAFTA's so-called side agreement on environmental standards. There are currently no provisions for the participation of national parliaments or the wider public in decision-making. Nor is there any regional legal regime that extends beyond existing measures for resolving disputes over trade and investment.

There are two main reasons why formal political cooperation, along the lines of the EU, is unlikely to unfold in North America:

1. Power imbalance. There is a massive imbalance of power on the continent. The United States significantly outweighs Canada and Mexico in terms of population, economic strength, military capability, cultural power and diplomatic influence. This reality, combined with the historical sensitivities in Canada and the Mexico about US encroachments on their sovereignty, has led to suspicions that any common institutions to govern North America would be housed in Washington and dominated by the United States.
2. US sovereignty concerns. The second is US wariness about submitting to any inter-governmental institutions, whether regional or international. This reluctance is not merely a temporary bout of unilateralism, limited to the Bush administration. Historically, Congress has been sensitive to any decision-making arrangements that would dilute or minimise the influence of the US populace: pooling sovereignty is perceived as anti-democratic.

Decentralised arrangements. While centralised mechanisms are unlikely to emerge to govern the continent, treaties, arrangements and joint organisations already exist between the NAFTA partners. These decentralised arrangements are much older and denser in the case of the Canada-US relationship, and reflect the fact that power is diffuse in both countries, with states/provinces and municipalities having jurisdiction over important issues.

They also reflect a tendency on the part of Canada and Mexico to prefer an 'administrative approach' to dealing with the United States, which treats issues as they emerge and avoids any articulation of a grand common purpose. Traditionally, both countries have tried to avoid linkage -- ie tying results in one area to success in another -- in order to minimise the danger that the full weight of US power will be brought to bear on negotiations.

Security perimeter. In contrast to the limited potential for institutionalised political cooperation, the field of security offers greater opportunities for the creation of permanent mechanisms to foster collaboration. Even prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, concepts such as 'security community' or 'security perimeter' were used to describe the potential evolution of security cooperation between the three countries. After September 11, concrete measures were instituted to enhance the security of the continent.

Border focus. The rationale for pursuing trilateral security in the realm of borders is clear: given the increased levels of trade between the three countries it has become essential to improve controls in order to accommodate the dramatic increase in North American commercial activity. Efforts to upgrade border infrastructure and reform border procedures pre-date September 2001, and have had particular support from the business communities in all three countries. The long-term vision is to enhance the security of the North America perimeter, and push the border 'outward' to address potential threats in their countries of origin. Meanwhile, the two sub-regional borders are to be transformed into 'zones of confidence'.

The New York and Washington terrorist attacks provided the political momentum to put these ideas into practice, and resulted in two bilateral border agreements. In the case of Canada and the United States, the 30-Point Smart Border Agreement includes a series of measures to secure infrastructure, flows of people and flows of goods. These measures include: five new integrated cross-border enforcement teams (including police, immigration and customs officers); a project to 'fast track' the crossing of trucks carrying commercial cargo into either the United States or Canada; a series of fast lanes for low-risk, pre-cleared travellers who display digitally imprinted 'smart cards'; and the sharing of information on airline passengers. The 22-Point Smart Border Agreement between the United States and Mexico includes similar kinds of measures (President George Bush also announced last month a new scheme to offer temporary work permits to illegal immigrants living in the United States which will benefit many Mexican nationals). However, prior to this month's Organization of American States summit in Monterrey, the two Smart Border accords were not linked in any way.

Post-Monterrey agenda. With the announcement at Monterrey of a new regional security framework, efforts are underway on 'second generation' Smart Border issues. Some of the measures under discussion include: enhanced cooperation between embassies overseas on visa applications; greater sharing of information on immigration issues (including refugee/asylum claims); common standards for biometrics and the development of compatible technologies to read them; and joint planning for the protection of critical infrastructure (such as railroads, communication and energy lines).

While there is strong political momentum behind these moves to secure the flow of goods and people across borders, they are also controversial. For example, domestic critics in Canada are challenging Prime Minister Paul Martin to retain the country's traditionally open and liberal approach to immigrants and refugees. Martin's task has become more difficult in light of the case of a Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, who was detained as a suspected terrorist at New York's JFK Airport in September 2002. Although never charged with an offence, he was deported to Syria (without the knowledge of Canadian officials), where he faced the possibility of torture and solitary confinement. Bush and Martin agreed at Monterrey to new rules pledging Washington to inform Ottawa immediately after a Canadian national is detained on security grounds in the future.