IVORY COAST: Procrastination dogs peacekeeping

Analysis

On January 6, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Ivory Coast, supported by 6,240 UN troops, incorporating 1,400 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeepers already in the country. Annan proposed that a separate assessment would seek to establish the requirement for UN police forces, possibly including strong riot units. France drafted a proposal backing the force on January 16, but it was opposed by the United States -- which would prefer to see a peacekeeping mission in Sudan later this year -- on grounds of the composition, size and cost of the force.

The mandate of the UN observation mission in Ivory Coast (MINUCI) expired on February 4, but resolution 1527 extends UN authority of current French and ECOWAS forces for less than one month. During this time, the Security Council will consider Annan's proposal and prepare for a deployment in Ivory Coast starting as early as April. However, while vital for the stabilisation of Ivory Coast, the new UN mission is not assured as it may struggle to secure troop contributions and Security Council support.

Increased demand. Since December, UN officials have been warning that the demand for peacekeeping missions in Africa will grow sharply in 2004. Though the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has deactivated almost all its personnel, the UN began 2004 committed to two large missions in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia. In Burundi, a UN mission may be required to bolster an African Union attempt to supervise a fragile peace. In Ivory Coast, the UN has recommended a 6,240-strong peacekeeper force and may require substantial UN police forces. Following US-UK-Norwegian initiatives at the UN on October 8, the Security Council is evaluating a draft plan for a UN mission in Sudan in 2004.

Global peacekeeping capacity. Since the decline of the Cold War, global military manpower has been reduced sharply. In 1985, an estimated 29.9 million military personnel were under arms but by 2002 this total had fallen to 20.4 million. Though several military forces are attempting to develop lighter and more easily deployable forces, only a few Western and Asian countries have developed high-quality, all-professional forces that can quickly conduct operations in distant regions, including Africa.

Military forces of advanced Western nations offer the strongest capabilities for peacekeeping but are constrained by resource pressures:

• NATO forces declined from 5.8 million in 1985 to 3.7 million in 2002, even though the alliance gained extra members during this period.
• US forces declined from 780,000 in 1991 to around 480,000 currently. With approximately 110,000 US troops likely to stay in Iraq throughout 2004 and further US forces stationed in Afghanistan, Korea and the Balkans, the US military is probably overstretched before consideration of contributions to African peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the United States is generally a small troop contributor to UN missions (currently supplying around 700 observer personnel) and is concerned that the International Criminal Court may prosecute US troops under UN command.
• Approximately 2.4 million Europeans are under arms but US estimates suggest that European peacekeeping contributions of around 55,000 troops on UN and non-UN missions have exhausted resources of most peacekeepers in that region.
• Other advanced military nations have cut their military forces and require greater flexibility in deployment of large numbers of personnel in missions overseas.

Furthermore, advanced military nations, including the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, do not appear to be in agreement on the priority of African peacekeeping operations and of individual missions within the continent. Franco-US differences are likely to affect the development of peacekeeping attempts in Ivory Coast and Sudan. Paris is clearly focused on reducing its military burden in West Africa at the same time as the United States and United Kingdom envisage a large UN-mandated force in Ivory Coast as a potential drain on resources for an operation in Sudan, which France has so far opposed. While Berlin has indicated its enthusiasm for the deployment of German troops in Sudan, its resources will remain stretched by NATO operations in Afghanistan. UN officials noted the tendency of Western nations to overlook African emergencies while supporting interventions with more direct strategic relevance to the countries involved.

Other countries. Africa's embryonic domestic peacekeeping capacity remains limited, although it is expanding (see AFRICA: AU promotes regional peacekeeping force - January 22, 2004 and AFRICA: Pan-African peacekeeping capacity improves - July 3, 2003). On January 28, the South African government stated that it could not deploy additional troops for the UN mission in DRC because of the current resource constraint resulting from its existing 2,800 peacekeepers in DRC and Burundi. Nigeria, the other key peacekeeping contributor in Africa, has also indicated that its capacity will not be able to underpin additional missions. UN operations in Africa are strongly reliant on contingents from developing countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, rather than advanced Western forces or local African peacekeepers. Although they are often very effective in UN missions, developing countries are reliant on realisation of UN funding to make contributions and they do not currently possess rapid reaction capabilities:

1. Funding. Reduced funding in 2004, in combination with current UN arrears, could limit the programme of proposed peacekeeping activities in Africa. UN peacekeeping operations are budgeted to cost 2.2 billion dollars from July 2003 to June 2004, compared with 2.6 billion dollars in 2002-03 and 3.0 billion dollars in 2001-02. Reduction in US contributions to the peacekeeping fund is a significant factor for the decrease. US Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) funding for UN missions has declined from 867 million dollars in 2002 to 667 million dollars in 2003. In 2004, the US government has proposed only 550 million dollars. As a result of differences in UN and US positions on the percentage of UN costs that should be borne by Washington, the UN peacekeeping fund adds around 70 million dollars to US arrears on an annual basis.
2. Rapid reaction. Undermanned operations and a reliance on second-tier military forces in African operations have also had a direct effect on the speed with which UN forces are assembled and can carry out their mandates, particularly outside major cities. On December 17, the UN warned states that had pledged forces to Africa to expedite their deployment:
   • In DRC, the MONUC force began disarmament on September 7, but has been delayed by the build-up of the mandated 10,500 troops and 103 police officers.
   • In Liberia, a slower than anticipated build-up of the UN force has caused major delays in the disarmament and demobilisation programme. Mandated to reach 15,000 troops by February 28, the force was only 5,900-strong by December 18. When delayed Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Ukrainian, and Namibian troops arrive, the force will probably not exceed 9,000 and will lack key engineering components. Similarly, the start of the planned five-month disarmament campaign by UN was delayed from early December to mid-January.
   • The disarmament and demobilisation campaign in Ivory Coast may also be delayed by shortages of peacekeeping forces.