CYPRUS/TURKEY/GREECE: Settlement is 'closer than ever'

Analysis

After three days of talks, Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash accepted the procedure proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, based on a formula devised by Ankara and then put forward by Denktash. It has three stages:

• Between February 19 and March 22, delegations of the two communities will try to agree changes which they want to make to the settlement plan originally proposed by Annan in February 2003, and modified several times since then.
• If they do not agree, they will be joined by representatives of Greece and Turkey, which with the United Kingdom guaranteed the constitution of the independent Cyprus republic in 1960.
• If there is still no agreement by March 29, Annan will himself finalise a text, based on his original plan, which will be submitted to two separate referenda before May 1.

Referendum commitment .Agreement on a referendum provides the crucial difference from previous attempts at a settlement. On March 1, negotiations broke down at The Hague when Denktash refused to submit to a referendum the Annan Plan for a united Cyprus republic made up of two constituent states, Greek and Turkish, with a rotating presidency and a single international identity (see TURKEY/CYPRUS: Divisions to deepen as peace plan fails - March 12, 2003). Denktash's refusal suited Papadopoulos, who had his own objections to the plan. As it was, the Turkish side took the blame. However, Denktash argues that his tactics have paid off. At The Hague, he had not been allowed to seek any amendments to the plan before submitting it to a referendum. Since then, some amendments have been made to meet Turkish objections and more will be sought.

EU imperative. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was determined to demonstrate Turkey's will for a Cyprus settlement, and thus deprive the European Council of an excuse to delay naming a date for the start of Turkey's accession negotiations at its meeting next December (see TURKEY/EU: Cyprus factor haunts convergence - November 10, 2003). The elections in Northern Cyprus on December 14, when advocates of a settlement won a wafer-thin majority, led to the formation of a new coalition government, in which Denktash's main political opponent Mehmet Ali Talat became prime minister, with Denktash's son, Serdar, as deputy prime minister and foreign minister (see TURKEY/CYPRUS: Settlement remote after election tie - December 18, 2003). This made it easier for Erdogan to wear down the opposition of Denktash and his supporters in Turkey, who were particularly prominent among the military.

Turkish initiative. After Annan had accepted the Turkish call to re-activate the talks, Denktash went to New York armed with a road map agreed at a meeting of the Turkish National Security Council. The position of the two protagonists was reversed, and the three sessions were spent largely in persuading the Greek Cypriots to agree to a referendum on a text finalised by Annan at his own discretion.

EU role. A Greek attempt to involve the EU in the second stage of negotiations failed, while its demand that the procedural formula should specify that the settlement should be in conformity with the EU acquis proved counter-productive. Accommodating a settlement which limits the proportion of Greeks allowed to settle in the Turkish constituent state to 21% of the population -- and that after 15 years -- requires a derogation from the EU acquis on the freedom of movement and of establishment of EU citizens. However, the EU Commission had earlier let it be known that it would grant such a derogation provided the two communities in Cyprus agreed on it before accession.

Talks outlook. The deal has had a much better press in Turkey than in Greece. Its favourable reception by Turkish educated opinion is bound to have been noted by the military. Nevertheless, agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot delegations in the first stage of negotiations remains highly unlikely. While the Greek side wants ideally all its refugees to be able to return to the north and to reclaim their property, if possible right away, the Turks want to reduce the proportion of returning Greeks further to 10%. They also want a straight demarcation line between the two constituent states instead of the zigzagging border originally proposed by Annan. This would make the Turkish state more self-sufficient.

The outlook for the second stage is more hopeful, since Greece and Turkey would try to avoid leaving the final text to Annan. Indeed, the 1960 settlement was first agreed bilaterally between Greece and Turkey, then accepted by London as the colonial power, and finally imposed by Athens on the Greek Cypriots. However, the breakdown of the 1960 constitution within three years of promulgation raises doubts about the longevity of a new settlement dictated by outsiders. This is why the referenda are of crucial importance. The referenda will first have to be allowed by the guarantor powers. Annan has noted their "commitment to this procedure". In the Turkish case, this commitment can be acted upon only if parliament, which has the final say on all international treaties, approves. Given that Erdogan has an absolute majority, there should be no difficulty on this score.

EU linkage . As far as Erdogan is concerned, whether or not a settlement is reached, his Cyprus policy has already earned him the high moral ground, and, more concretely, the approval of the US administration. In his statement on February 13, Annan looked forward to the assistance of the EU and "others". There is little doubt, particularly in Greek minds, that the "others" are Americans. In the event of a settlement, Erdogan will look to Washington to keep it on the rails and counter-balance Greece's greater influence in Brussels as a member of the EU.

Erdogan's policy does not, of course, guarantee that he will obtain from the EU a date for the start of accession negotiations. However, even if a Cyprus settlement is sealed and signed, key provisions concerning the cession of some territory to the Greeks and the reduction in the number of Turkish troops will take time to implement. Should the EU create difficulties over accession negotiations, Turkey would be in a position to do the same over the implementation of the Cyprus settlement. EU heads of government will be aware of this when they meet in December.

Referendum prospects . While there is little doubt that Turkish Cypriots will be invited to vote on the settlement, whether it emerges bilaterally or from Annan's arbitration, the question has already been asked whether the Greek Cypriot National Council would recommend a referendum if the final text represents "a bad solution". Greek Cypriots would certainly prefer the referendum to be held, if at all, after May 1, when membership of the EU will put them in a stronger position to insist on the acquis, with as few derogations as possible. However, they would put themselves in the wrong if they evaded their commitment to Annan. Moreover, not only the PASOK government, but, importantly on the eve of parliamentary elections, the New Democracy opposition, support the Annan plan as the best Cyprus settlement currently available, particularly since, by general consent, this would facilitate agreement on other problems between Greece and Turkey, notably on the Aegean.

In Turkish Northern Cyprus a 'yes' vote can be expected in the referendum. The result on the Greek side is more uncertain, with general lack of enthusiasm for the deal tempered by a feeling that this represents the ideal time to settle the issue. In the short term, one can expect manoeuvres to delay a referendum. In the long term, even if the settlement is approved in the referendum, there will be attempts, nominally by individual Greek Cypriots, to test the validity of the derogations before the European Court of Justice. The best grounds for hoping that the Annan settlement will stick are to be found in the growing realisation that the attempt to undermine the first Cyprus constitution in 1963 has had baleful results for the Greek Cypriot community.