IRAQ/UN: Transition report leaves open key question

Analysis

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, in his report published this week adheres to the deadline of June 30 for a transfer of sovereignty, but scraps the elaborate system of caucuses in Iraq's 18 governorates that was supposed to select the transitional government under the November 15 agreement between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) (see IRAQ/US: Strategy switches to provisional government - November 19, 2003).

Instead, the UN report recommends that an independent election commission be set up immediately, raising the prospect of elections by the end of this year or early next if the "security environment" permits. It leaves open how the transitional government should be established, other than that it should come about through an "Iraqi consensus". It further suggests that the elections for the constitutional convention and government could be combined in a single vote. The CPA and most members of the IGC welcomed the report. The IGC is likely to request a "formal role" for the UN in preparation of elections and perhaps in the formation of the transitional government.

Further U-turn. The UN report abandons most elements of the November 15 agreement and as such marks a defeat for the US-controlled process outlined within it. That Washington has conceded readily to the changes confirms the widely-held suspicion that US policy is now overshadowed by President George Bush's domestic need to have some form of Iraqi sovereignty in place prior to November's US elections -- but to delay suffrage for that sovereignty until after them in case this returns an Islamist/nationalist majority inimical to the US presence.

The report marks a return to the transitional policy outlined by the Iraqi opposition parties both before and after the war in Iraq: the establishment of a provisional government whose main remit will be to prepare for elections. The task now, as then, is to agree "the choice of a transitional mechanism that would enjoy the broadest support among Iraqi constituencies and how to implement such a mechanism," according to Annan.

Transition options. Among the "mechanisms" under discussion and listed in the UN report are:

• a government of "technocrats", laced with diplomats but leaving existing ministers in place;
• expanding the 25-member IGC to 150-200, which would then elect a transitional government; and
• a national and political conference -- made up of Iraq's main political, religious and tribal groups -- that would seek a "consensus" on a caretaker government.

The danger is that none of these mechanisms as such are likely to bridge the rifts that have emerged among Iraq's former opposition parties and current political leadership, which have also dogged the discussions on the Fundamental Law, due to be finalised under the November 15 agreement by tomorrow. On the contrary, they may entrench them.

Shia response. The response of the Shia religious parties to the report has so far been one of grudging acceptance, angered by the election postponement it licenses but unwilling to repulse a UN 're-engagement' in Iraq they have long sought. They will almost certainly take their main cue from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani (see IRAQ: Shia Islamists seek key transition role - February 19, 2004).

Sistani yesterday accepted the UN's deferral of elections but said he wanted "clear guarantees through a resolution of the UN Security Council on the organisation of elections by the end of 2004". He averred that "the un-elected entity that will take sovereignty on June 30 is considered as an interim administration with clear and limited authority, and prepares the country for free elections without being allowed to take major decisions that could be binding on the elected government".

Sunni and Kurdish concerns. Iraq's main Sunni religious and Kurdish parties will almost certainly resist such a timetable and restriction. For the Kurds, the essential condition for elections is a census, not only to determine their demographic strength in the areas they claim for their federal Kurdish region, but also to enable the return of Kurds expelled from cities such as Kirkuk as part of Saddam Hussein's ethnic cleansing policies (see IRAQ: Kurdish political demands are set too high - February 9, 2004). They also want up-front guarantees that any future Iraqi constitution will recognise a Kurdish region in northern Iraq and enable a Kurdish veto on decisions connected with its defence, resources and culture. They fear that otherwise such matters will be left to a constitutional convention and government dominated by a Shia majority and led by its main religious parties, once more leaving their fate in the hands of an Arab government in Baghdad.

The Sunni religious parties too want a census since they rigorously contest the view that their confession now makes up only 20% of Iraq's population. They would prefer an extended interim period to increase their representation in government, strengthen their political and civil organisation and enable a fuller withdrawal of the US army from their areas (see IRAQ: Sunni Arabs struggle to find political voice - February 5, 2004).

Impasse risk.For precisely these reasons, the Shia religious parties have little incentive to concede on anything until elections are held. Much depends on whether an agreement can be reached on the Fundamental Law by tomorrow's deadline or soon thereafter. The Kurdish parties say agreement is close on federalism with only the make-up of a presidential council left to decide. The Shia religious parties have insisted that questions of federalism and the role of Islam should be deferred to an elected constitutional convention. Their obduracy is likely to be reinforced by Sistani's response. There is also little sign yet of a consensus settling on a transition mechanism that would satisfy the main parties.

Should no agreement be reached on the Fundamental Law and transition mechanism, the June 30 deadline may be reached without an Iraqi government to implement it, pushing back the prospect of elections still further, and leaving the United States in its current role of occupier. The UN may step in but this is far from certain. Annan has made clear he would prefer the UN not only to deal with a sovereign government but one that has a solid Iraqi consensus behind it. In this crisis scenario he would have neither, and would risk the charge of intervening to solve Bush's domestic travails.

Security agreement delay. One immediate casualty of the new order has been the planned bilateral security agreements between the CPA and IGC governing the nature and duration of the US and foreign military presence in Iraq. Under the November 15 agreement these were to have been signed by March 30. This week, the IGC announced that such agreements would have to be delayed until after the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty on June 30. The CPA has accepted the delay, with Pentagon officials saying they would seek a document that would endorse the status quo, with the details being worked out after the new government is formed.

They may not get it. Sistani has long insisted that agreements over the presence of foreign military forces must await an elected Iraqi government. Since neither the Shia religious nor the Kurdish parties are likely to call for a withdrawal of the foreign military forces -- but would be less keen to be seen approving their stay -- the most likely scenario is a continuing presence but without an agreement. For many Iraqis, this would be seen as occupation in all but name.

Outlook. The UN report has tried to kick-start a transition process in Iraq that had proved immovable under US control. Re-engagement of the UN -- particularly after the establishment of a sovereign government -- will be welcomed by most of Iraq's main political forces, as will its commitment to elections. However, the vague formulae it proposes are unlikely to resolve the divisions over the pace and nature of the transition that have opened up between Iraq's main Islamist and Kurdish parties, signalling the likely need for Brahimi's intense involvement.