SAUDI ARABIA/US: Al-Saud disenchanted with Bush

Analysis

In recent weeks, journalist Bob Woodward has made two claims about US-Saudi relations as part of a promotional tour for his book 'Plan of Attack':

• the Saudi government promised to boost oil production and drop prices in the run-up to the US presidential election in November; and
• President George Bush informed Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan of the US decision to invade Iraq before he informed his secretary of state, Colin Powell.

A closer examination suggest that these claims provide more clues about Saudi internal politics than they do about Saudi government intentions.

Bush/al-Saud ties. On the face of it, the idea of a deal between the Saudi royal family and the Bush administration is plausible. During his own presidency, Bush's father came to the Saudis' aid when Saddam Hussein invaded Iraq in 1990. Bush senior not only saved the kingdom, he also repelled Saddam's troops from Kuwait and led an international effort to isolate Iraq. The Saudi government repaid the US Treasury most of the costs associated with the 1991 Gulf War, and the Saudi royal family has remained personally close to Bush senior.

In addition, the current president and Vice-President Dick Cheney both come from the oil industry. As such, they would be presumed to share much with their Saudi colleagues, from orientation on Middle East politics to an appreciation for both geology and deal making.

Bush policy complaints. However, for the Saudis, the current Bush administration has been a deep disappointment:

1. Arab-Israel. Chief among their complaints has been US inaction on the Arab-Israeli peace process. In August 2001, Crown Prince Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz sent a letter to the president complaining about his passivity on this issue and darkly hinting that the time may have come to change the nature of the US-Saudi relationship. Bush did not respond swiftly, but he did give a speech in November 2001 in which he used the world "Palestine", becoming the first president since Truman to do so.

   The gesture was insufficient for Abdallah, who in February 2002 unveiled his own Arab-Israeli peace initiative (adopted by the Arab League in March), and then followed up in April with a trip to the president's ranch in Crawford, Texas (see SAUDIA ARABIA: Riyadh ill-placed to lead Arab world - May 16, 2002). While there, Abdallah showed Bush photographs of Palestinian victims of Israeli violence, and a ten-minute video. Senior Saudis have complained that Bush was unmoved.

   Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal complained to the 'New York Times' in November 2001 that US inaction on the peace process was "enough to drive a sane man mad". In January 2002, Abdallah complained to the same newspaper: "In the current environment, we find it very difficult to defend America, and so we keep our silence. Because, to be very frank with you, how can we defend America?" Matters have recently been made worse by Bush's support for the Sharon Plan to withdraw from Gaza but not all the West Bank settlements.

2. Iraq. Riyadh also complains about the US failure to provide stability in Iraq, thereby destabilising its neighbourhood. Before the war, Saudis were sceptical of the effort, telling private audiences that their first preference would be a coup, and their second would be a relatively swift military action followed by a quick US withdrawal (see SAUDIA ARABIA/US: Saudi Iraq policy could backfire - October 15, 2002). The current environment is precisely what they had hoped to avoid; yet it is right on their doorstep.
3. War on terror. The third line of complaint is that Riyadh feels unjustly accused in the 'war on terror'. Bush was forthright in the weeks following the September 11 attacks, saying that it would be intolerable-and even un-patriotic to attack US Muslims or to blame them for the terrorist attacks. However, after January 2002, such protestations grew more faint, perhaps due to the concerns of US law enforcement officials or to the president's conservative Christian base.

Furthermore, the president was silent in the face of what Saudis viewed as slanderous attacks on the kingdom, on Saudi understandings of Islam and on Islam itself. Many of those attacks came from those close to the administration, and sometimes from the administration itself. Prominent among these was General William "Jerry" Boykin, the deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence, who gave anti-Muslim speeches to evangelical audiences in uniform, but was not disciplined for doing so. Saudis noticed the president's silence and were displeased.

It is true that Riyadh has grown more reliant on Washington in counter-terrorism work. The May 2003 bombing in Riyadh, and subsequent attacks throughout the kingdom, have convinced many Saudi officials that they need US help as much as the United States needs Saudi help. Technical cooperation has improved immensely, and is likely to continue further. However, this will happen regardless of who is president.

Saudi interests? Therefore, the question arises what interest the Saudis have in keeping this president in office. Loyalty to his father alone would not be sufficient. On most issues that really matter to Riyadh -- the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and its international status -- this president has done the al-Saud no favours. On other issues, and particularly security and defence issues, he has been no better and no worse than any successor is likely to be. Indeed, senior Saudi princes not only express deep dissatisfaction with the president's actions, but also sheer incredulity about them.

Secret deals? In these circumstances, claims of a secret deal to ensure Bush's survival seem difficult to explain. The answer may come from the most likely source of such stories: elements close to the long-time Saudi ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan.

Bandar built the US-Saudi relationship in its heyday, when Saudi money and materiel supported freedom fighters from Afghanistan to Nicaragua. He was on the front line in the Cold War, was a frequent guest in the White House and eschewed meetings with mere State Department officials. The relationship continued during the 1991 Gulf War, in which Washington provided vital security assistance to Saudi Arabia.

However, in recent years, Bandar and his entourage have kept a lower profile in Washington, and they appear to spend less time in the city than in years past. At the same time, the rise of the smart and fluent adviser to Abdallah, Adel Jubeir, who is often in Washington, suggests that the Saudi royal family may sometimes speak with two different voices in Washington.

The account in Woodward's book serves the Bandar camp in many ways. Most importantly, it reasserts him as a central player in Washington and as a close confidant of the president. It also suggests that he holds the key to the president's re-election, giving him vital leverage in the capital.

However, it does not disprove the claims of those who say that it is impossible to grasp the totality of the Saudi royal family's views by listening to the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Indeed, Bandar's assurances seem at odds with what senior princes are saying and apparently feeling in Riyadh.