RUSSIA: Putin still aims at US strategic partnership

Analysis

Under President Boris Yeltsin, the Kremlin regarded NATO expansion to the states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as Russia's most serious immediate security threat. Yeltsin went so far as to threaten that nuclear weapons would be retargeted against a country deciding to join NATO, but achieved nothing. NATO's enlargement continued and, the more Moscow threatened, the more it encouraged the alliance to expand its membership. From the moment of his election four years ago, President Vladimir Putin changed tack: he accepted NATO expansion as more or less unstoppable, and decided to dilute its strategic significance.

Putin's achievement. Putin avoided public humiliation by refusing to involve himself directly in a dispute with the West when NATO formally admitted seven additional former communist countries into its membership (see NATO/EASTERN EUROPE: Larger NATO benefits Washington - April 2, 2004). Meanwhile, Russian representatives have been instructed to be reasonable in their dealings with the alliance; a specially created 'consultation council' now operates reasonably well with NATO, deciding nothing in particular, but still preventing political show-downs between the Kremlin and the alliance's military command (see RUSSIA/NATO: Divergent interests undermine relations - April 28, 2004).

When NATO holds its summit in Istanbul in June, for the first time since its creation in 1949, the question of Russia will hardly feature on the agenda. Instead, the alliance will be busy with its military transformation, which is proceeding extremely slowly, and the possibility of involvement in Iraq, on top of Afghanistan.

Putin's failure. However, Putin is aware that he has failed in his pre-eminent objective: the creation of a strategic partnership with the United States. Most of the tensions with Washington have gone; even the National Missile Defence issue, which threatened to create a major confrontation when President George Bush came to office nearly four years ago, has been resolved. The dispute over Iraq belongs to the past, too (see RUSSIA: Moscow does not want US failure in Iraq - May 10, 2004). Outwardly, therefore, the Moscow-Washington link is cordial. Yet Putin has not persuaded the United States that Russia is a significant player on the strategic stage. Washington sometimes needs Moscow -- US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice lobbied Moscow's cooperation over an Iraqi UN resolution in mid-May -- but this remains ad hoc, and Russia is not high on the US administration's agenda. Putin has no problems with Washington, but does not have much influence either.

More seriously still, Russian negotiators have failed to blunt the strategic impact of NATO's enlargement. When the alliance expanded to 19 members, Moscow extracted a promise that this would not entail US-led forces moving nearer its border. The situation has since changed radically. The war against international terrorism brought US troops into Central Asian republics that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union. The numbers were small, but the significance was not lost on Moscow. Subsequent friction between Europeans and Americans over policy in Iraq has also prompted a rethink of the US defence posture in Europe and a decision in the Pentagon that military bases in Germany should be moved, eventually, to the more welcoming CEE. Furthermore, whereas Moscow assumed that the new NATO countries in CEE would be mere spectators, Poland is taking a leading role in Iraq, where other former Soviet satellites are also contributing troops. The defence expenditure of the new members continues to rise faster than the European average and almost all are currently being re-equipped with US weapons.

Putin's fears. Three further developments appear even more ominous:

• Reorganisation. NATO is undergoing a major reorganisation, to produce highly flexible smaller forces for deployment anywhere in the world. Moscow assumed that the alliance would remain a European structure, hobbled by its many squabbling members. In future, NATO may be able to operate with a smaller number of members (those who oppose an operation will merely not contribute troops) as an organisation with a remit outside Europe.
• Bases. Washington is not only thinking about re-positioning existing bases in Europe, but creating new bases for world-wide operations, particularly in the Balkans. US military giant Northrop Grumman recently signed a contract with Bucharest for a US base on the Black Sea, and upgrading two Romanian airfields. Similar approaches are being made to Bulgaria. This will provide the Pentagon with 'virtual' bases, staging posts to airlift US troops and materiel to the Middle East and Central Asia, if and when required. Russia knows that the United States is only just beginning to reform its global pattern of deployment. It also knows that virtual bases are cheap to build and maintain, and provide maximum operational flexibility, at minimum political cost.
• Caucasus. The United States has extended its presence into the Caucasus, the last remaining area of Europe which Russia could reasonably regard as its 'backyard'. Washington was directly implicated in the peaceful overthrow of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and the installation of President Mikheil Saakashvili. US troops have just finished training four crack Georgian units, supposedly in order to fight terrorism in the region. US diplomacy is heavily engaged in Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia, hitherto a Russian political ally. From the Russian perspective, US involvement in the Caucasus is ominous: although NATO does not propose to embrace its states in the near future, once the alliance becomes engaged, the prospect of full membership will slowly become a reality, following the Balkan pattern. Smaller NATO member states as far afield as the Baltic are being encouraged by NATO to provide technical assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Putin's policy. Putin has resolved to prevent what his military sees as a worsening strategic position. For years, the Russians have encouraged separatism in Georgia, largely in order to keep the country under control. However, Putin recently abandoned Adjara to Georgia's central government, liquidating Batumi's secession bid (see GEORGIA: Tbilisi regains control of unruly region - May 7, 2004). The gesture signalled to Tbilisi that it did not need to turn to the West for help, and was a veiled hint to Washington that it need not be drawn any further into the region. Russia and Georgia have also agreed on joint patrols along their border against terrorist incursions, in yet another sign of a political thaw. Putin can be safely expected to do everything possible in order to prevent the Caucasus following the Balkans into the Western ambit.

However, with an economy the size of the Netherlands, and an anti-Western instinct that periodically comes to the fore in Moscow (see RUSSIA: Military intelligence still watching the West - February 28, 2003), more is needed than a Putin speech to persuade Washington of the strategic benefits of a new partnership with the Kremlin. In addition, the Russian leader has little influence over NATO's internal transformation.

Nevertheless, Putin still believes that it is worth trying. Washington has trouble elsewhere, and no interest in annoying Moscow. NATO's transformation is likely to take years, a period during which the alliance will have little appetite for new major security initiatives and NATO itself may prove amenable to a more durable relationship with Russia.