JAPAN: Constitutional plans focus on security role

Analysis

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Research Commission on the Constitution this month presented a draft outline for constitutional revision. A final version will probably be released in November 2005. The draft has attracted media attention because it contains a number of radical proposals. However, it is one of several initiatives by political parties on the issue of constitutional reform:

• Since January 2000, both the upper and lower houses of parliament have conducted investigations into constitutional revision.
• The two houses' Constitutional Research Commissions released a mid-term report in 2002 and are due to release their final report in May 2005.
• The main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will release a report on constitutional revision by 2006.

Radical proposals. The effect of the LDP draft is to put down an extreme outer marker by proposing a number of bold changes to the constitution. Its more radical proposals are unlikely to be implemented. However, the draft touches on each of the key issues that will be addressed by all sides involved in the process of revision.

The military. The most controversial areas relate to security and defence policy and the role of the military (see JAPAN: Koizumi creates space for larger security role - January 6, 2004). On Article 9 of the constitution, which contains key provisions relating to the military, the LDP draft retains the opening paragraph renouncing war. However, it proposes that, for the first time, Japan should acknowledge explicitly:

• the right to individual and collective self-defence;
• the existence of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) as a military for these purposes; and
• that the SDF may contribute to international security, involving the use of weapons.

In this respect, the draft is a radical manifesto, and will be viewed by its neighbours as a sign that Tokyo intends to strengthen its security posture. Japan's cautious articulation of the right to self-defence and the role of the SDF under the constitution have limited its post-war security role. The LDP draft also proposes that the prime minister be granted executive power (currently invested in the cabinet), in order to bolster Tokyo's ability to respond to military threats. Furthermore, it enshrines the duty of Japanese citizens to protect the independence of the state.

However, the draft also reaffirms limits in security and defence matters. For example:

• military actions would be subject to parliamentary approval;
• constitutional measures preventing conscription would remain in place; and
• the possession of nuclear weapons would be prohibited, a principle that would be enshrined in the constitution.

International role. Japan has to date held the position that, as a sovereign state, it possesses the right of collective self-defence, but cannot exercise this right owing to the constitutional mandate limiting the use of force to defensive purposes. This complex constitutional constraint has been a principal obstacle to its support for the United States in the security sphere (see JAPAN/US: Tokyo faces key alliance decisions next year - October 29, 2004).

Finessed interpretations have allowed Tokyo to justify some security cooperation with Washington and involvement in overseas peace-keeping activities (see JAPAN: Troops despatch reflects shift but poses risks - January 5, 2004). However, under the LDP draft, explicit recognition of the right to collective self-defence and duty to participate in international security operations could facilitate the provision, not only of Japanese logistical, but also combat support for US and UN operations globally.

Resurgent nationalism? Tokyo's clear movement towards greater international involvement and a more robust security posture has been a source of concern for some of Japan's neighbours for some time. China is particularly sensitive to this trend (see CHINA/JAPAN: Nationalism halts moves to improve ties - May 24, 2004), and unease among regional governments is exacerbated by a perceived resurgence in national sentiment in Japan. This perception will be reinforced by LDP proposals that:

• the emperor assume the position of head of state (he is currently designated the "symbol of the state"); and
• the Kimigayo and the Hinomaru be stipulated as the official national anthem and flag respectively -- both are symbols of imperial Japan.

These proposals are controversial owing to the historical, militaristic associations of such moves.

Party positions. Sections of the LDP are clearly eager to establish a broader, more 'normal' military role for Japan in support of the United States. However, many parts of the party's draft may prove too radical for those in other parties, and the DPJ's is likely to oppose some of the changes relating to nationalist symbols and loyalty to the state. Moreover, the bulk of those DPJ members drawn from the former Social Democratic Party will hold out against revision of Article 9. However, the interim reports by the parliamentary research committees suggest relatively strong overall support for revisions relating to security, including the revision of Article 9 to clarify the right to collective self-defence.

Parliamentary prospects. If proposals similar to those of the LDP come before parliament in 2005-2006, they will face a tough political test. Constitutional revision will require a two-thirds majority, as well as the creation of a law to enable a public referendum on the issue. However, subject to 'watering down' during the party and parliamentary process, the majority of proposals will probably be accepted, particularly given factors such as:

• the trend of bipartisan cooperation on security policy;
• the substantial skill of the government and LDP in passing controversial security legislation; and
• a new public acceptance of a more far-reaching security role for Japan.

Indeed, the main source opposition will not be the DPJ, but the LDP's own coalition partner, the traditionally dovish Komeito, which is opposed in principle to constitutional revision.

Impact. Despite the highly controversial nature of constitutional revision, it is not likely to usher any new departure in security policy. Instead, it will be primarily an exercise in squaring constitutional provisions with the de facto reality of the SDF's expanding military role; the practical relevance of Article 9 has already declined substantially. The despatch of the SDF to support US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, the introduction of a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, and the related integration of Japanese and US command and control operations, have stretched reinterpretation of restrictions on collective self defence almost to breaking point (see JAPAN: Missile defence could spark arms race - February 10, 2004, and see JAPAN: Policymakers duck security dilemmas - October 14, 2004).