KYRGYZSTAN: Risk of instability remains acute

Analysis

After a period of growing instability following parliamentary elections on February 27 and March 13 (see KYRGYZSTAN: Election results spark opposition anger - March 16, 2005), the opposition moved decisively to assert control first over the south of the country and then over Bishkek. Within a matter of hours on March 24, an opposition rally in the capital led to the storming of the main government building. The speed with which President Askar Akayev's regime melted away was unexpected, including to the opposition leadership. With the police and the army unprepared to defend the regime, the government lost control and the president was forced to flee the country.

The opposition leaders moved to consolidate control. An interim government was established and measures introduced that have had considerable success in restoring order and stopping looting and violence. The opposition announced that parliamentary and presidential elections would be held on June 26.

Crucial challenges. Considerable challenges now lie before Kyrgyzstan if it is to avoid a prolonged period of social and political unrest (see KYRGYZSTAN: Instability a risk as transition beckons - July 7, 2004). Three particular issues will need to be addressed:

• All parties (including the former Akayev loyalists) will have to commit themselves to the parliamentary and presidential election process.
• The opposition will have to come to terms with the variety of interests and figures within its ranks.
• Steps to reassure the different regions and ethnic communities about their place in the country's future will have to be introduced.

Sources of revolution. The catalyst for the regime's collapse was the parliamentary elections. Many in the opposition were convinced of systematic electoral fraud by the authorities to secure a pro-Akayev majority in the new parliament ahead of presidential elections due in October. While Akayev had repeatedly pledged to step down in October, there was a widespread belief among opposition supporters that he was planning to promote a replacement, possibly from his family, or even stand again himself.

However, the sources of discontent ran far deeper. Akayev had become viewed as a symbol of corruption and nepotism. His family and a close group of cronies were, in particular, singled out for criticism. The shooting of demonstrators in the southern region of Aksy in 2002 caused considerable anger. Beyond these concerns were deep-seated political and economic problems that Akayev failed to address during his tenure and which ultimately led to his downfall.

Akayev's ascendancy to the presidency in 1990 shifted the traditional balance of power from the south to the north. His tenure saw continual subterranean struggles between northerners and southerners in his regime for power and its spoils. Akayev sought to manipulate these struggles to maintain his position, but this strengthened clan politics and the fragmentation of power, weakening the state's ability to govern. Divisions in the country were exacerbated by the desperate poverty that emerged during independence. While Akayev's powerbase in Bishkek enjoyed a degree of relative prosperity, southern districts experienced chronic poverty and steadily deteriorating education and public health, especially in predominately ethnically Kyrgyz rural areas. The rural northern regions had similar difficulties.

At the same time, despite a shift towards authoritarianism in the final years of Akayev's rule, Kyrgyzstan was far more politically liberal than its neighbours. Opposition parties and publications were permitted, and Kyrgyzstan hosted a wide variety of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It was the government's preparedness to allow this diversity of organisations that allowed the emergence of a political movement to challenge Akayev.

Nature of opposition. Prior to the events of the past week the opposition was characterised by a lack of organisation and a clear leadership. During the elections, a variety of organisations and individuals campaigned in loose coalitions. The main factor binding the members together was opposition to the regime rather than a strong set of common ideological principles. As a result, the opposition has been dominated by a number of powerful individuals and their followers. This personalisation of politics raises questions whether there are fundamental differences on policy between Akayev and opposition leaders.

The interim government includes many who once served under Akayev but fell out with him:

• Kurmanbek Bakiev, a former prime minister, became acting president. He has announced that he will stand in the forthcoming elections for president.
• Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister, and Ishengul Boljurova, a former education minister, took up their earlier posts.
• The leader of one of the main opposition parties, Feliks Kulov, a former vice president and interior minister jailed by Akayev for alleged fraud, was released and made interim head of national security.

However, important parts of society are not represented. The significant ethnic Russian and Uzbek minorities were marginalised in the confrontation between the government and opposition. Indeed, much of Kyrgyzstan's population was passive during the revolution, with crowds of a few thousand proving strong enough to topple the incumbent powers. Steps to build broad support for political change and include a wide diversity of the population in this process will now be vital. Although Akayev has not yet formally resigned, he seems unlikely to return.

With very little preparation for government by the opposition, the new administration has faced frictions. A particular issue has been which parliament is legitimate. While Bakiev and the Supreme Court have supported the old parliament, Kulov and the Central Election Commission have said that the new parliament is legitimate, and the former parliament should disband. Today's decision by the lower house of the outgoing parliament to suspect itself suggests that the latter may be the most likely outcome. However, frictions between opposition leaders risk creating instability.

International implications. Developments in Kyrgyzstan prompted alarm in neighbouring states. Central Asia's authoritarian rulers are concerned about the implications for their powerbases. They may well opt for further repression, arguing that 'managed democracy' is unviable and hardline authoritarian rule is required to prevent instability.

The events in Kyrgyzstan have called into question its relationship to the international community, notably Russia and the United States, which both have military bases in the country (see KYRGZSTAN/RUSSIA: Moscow bolsters military presence - December 9, 2002). US Ambassador Stephen Young pursued a policy of strong public criticism of the election process and the authorities' actions. The United States is therefore viewed by some in the former government as playing a leading role in Akayev's overthrow. There is no 'European option' for Kyrgyzstan, however distant, so western influence is unlikely to make such dramatic advances. Moreover, the Kremlin sought to position itself as a neutral force during the elections, even cultivating links with opposition leaders, and seems likely to offer assistance to the new authorities.