UNITED STATES: Sense of drift puts Bush on defensive

Analysis

President George Bush began his second term almost five months ago in what appeared to be an advantageous position, especially by the standards of his re-elected predecessors (see UNITED STATES: 'Second termism' may not constrain Bush - November 18, 2004).

Bush's assets then seemed to be three-fold:

1. 2004 election result. Bush's margin of victory over Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry was not large by historical standards (see UNITED STATES: Bush on cusp of all-round victory - November 3, 2004). However, it coincided with a strong Republican overall performance, with that party gaining seats in the Senate and House of Representatives. This was an unusual outcome: all other presidents who have obtained a second term in the post-1945 era suffered setbacks in their party's congressional position during their re-election year. The last president to win re-election himself and simultaneously witness his party advance its control in each chamber of Congress was Franklin Roosevelt in 1936.

2. Initial legislative success.This favourable backdrop was echoed by initial legislative success. In the early weeks of the new Congress, Bush won backing for legislation that made it considerably more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in class action lawsuits (see UNITED STATES: Class action breakthrough - February 11, 2005); and a bill that revamps the rules for filing for bankruptcy protection (see UNITED STATES: Bill raises cost of personal bankruptcy - March 11, 2005). Congress also passed a formal budget resolution and provided 82 billion dollars in supplemental spending that Bush requested (76 billion dollars of this money has been directed to the Pentagon). This suggested that the pattern of the last half of the first Bush term, when a Republican Congress had been unusually sympathetic to his agenda, might repeat itself in his second period in office.

3. Iraq optimism. The upbeat mood was reinforced by the relative success of elections in Iraq at the end of January (see IRAQ: Election turnout boosts transition prospects - January 31, 2005). At that point, a number of Democrats, and even foreign leaders who had been hostile to the intervention in Iraq, appeared to be seeking to reposition themselves. Moreover, there were further signs of 'pro-democracy' sentiment in places as varied as the Ukraine and the Palestinian Authority (see MIDDLE EAST: Obstacles ahead on road to democracy - April 18, 2005).

Political reversal.This situation has deteriorated quite sharply since Easter, weakening Bush's standing in the polls and in the estimation of political elites. The latest Washington Post/ABC survey, published on June 7, showed his job approval at 48% (low by the standards of a second term president at this stage), while an AP/Ipsos survey also taken this month puts this figure at 43%. In the Post/ABC poll, 58% believe the administration is focusing on issues that are unimportant to them; and barely 40% approve of the job Bush is doing in Iraq. While these are not catastrophic numbers, they have added to the perception that Bush's presidency is running out of steam. There are several reasons for this:

1. Social Security reform unease. The president's efforts have been largely ineffective to persuade the electorate about his proposed Social Security reforms (see UNITED STATES: Bush legacy at stake on social security - February 2, 2005). The White House settled on a strategy in which it would first attempt to convince voters that there was a 'crisis' that needed to be fixed and then advance broad principles for reform. Once accomplished, and thus having secured the political territory to his advantage, Bush had aimed to place before Congress detailed legislation for a comprehensive reform package. Congress, impressed by the backing that had been mobilised, would enact it with comparatively modest amendments.

   However, despite a major public relations effort, this enterprise has not made much (if any) progress. The June 7 Washington Post/ABC poll found that 56% believed the president's plan to combine new personal retirement accounts, with a reduction in guaranteed benefits for most US citizens, would cut overall retirement income. Moreover, only about one-third said the plans would result in future retirees receiving more money. In total, 62% (an increase of seven percentage points since the beginning of the year) disapproved of Bush's handling of the Social Security issue.

2. Deteriorating relationship with Congress. In the past three months, Senate Democrats have held firm against Republican proposals to allow a simple majority to get a vote on judicial nominations (see UNITED STATES: Stakes are high in filibuster fight - May 13, 2005). Moreover, they have stalled the nomination of John Bolton as US Ambassador to the UN. The Senate has also passed a lavish transportation bill with expenditure in excess of that which the White House publicly deems prudent.

   Meanwhile, the House passed a measure that would ease some of the restrictions applying to stem cell research in the United States despite an explicit Bush veto threat. Neither chamber is currently expressing much enthusiasm for either the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) or the Bush proposal to institute a guest worker immigration scheme. Delay on the latter is particularly frustrating to a White House that would like to employ each measure to assist its medium-term plan to tilt Hispanic voters towards the Republicans.

3. Iraq disappointment. The situation in Iraq has deteriorated -- from the White House's view, rather unexpectedly. The 'honeymoon period' that the interim administration might have enjoyed after January's elections has been squandered while various factions argued over their relative authority in Baghdad and an insurgency movement has revived (see IRAQ: No improvement in short-term security outlook - April 26, 2005). The numbers of US military casualties has increased again after a lull and the timetable for the full transition of power looks fragile.

Key drivers. Three key factors account for Bush's troubles:

1. Uncertain priorities. There has been uncertainty within his administration and in Congress about his priorities. He started with an inaugural address in late January that, by its expansive emphasis on freedom as a global ideal, suggested a strong emphasis on foreign policy (see UNITED STATES: Why 'freedom' only goes so far - January 28, 2005). However, he followed this in early February with a State-of-the-Union address that focused on Social Security reform as the centrepiece of an ambitious blueprint for domestic policy (see UNITED STATES: Bush outlines expansive agenda - February 3, 2005).

   In the absence of even a skeleton legislative proposal for Social Security, Bush's opponents have been able to 'define' what he intended before he could. Furthermore, it has been hard to convince the electorate of an imminent crisis when the forecast date of any financial meltdown is many years in the future and the recent volatility of the stock market has made the idea of part-privatisation less appealing.

2. Republican distraction. The Republican Party has allowed itself to be distracted by a series of issues, many of which had not been anticipated, and which are of immense concern to its conservative base but of far less interest elsewhere:
   • In the Terri Schiavo affair, Republicans were perceived as willing to travel to extreme lengths in a right to live/right to die drama.
   • The prolonged dispute over the internal Senate mechanism for deciding judicial nominations dominated Washington politics for weeks before ending in a blurred compromise. Although the composition of the federal bench is of immense medium-term and long-term importance, it is not a matter that occupies the attention of the average voter. That this row ended on terms less than satisfactory to the president (and was brokered by his sometime rival Republican Senator John McCain) compounded the difficulty.
   • The argument about whether or not Bolton should serve as US Ambassador to the UN has become further protracted. Bush has been obliged to stick with this nomination (using valuable political capital in the process), not least because Bolton is widely acclaimed by conservative Republicans. However, even if Bolton is ultimately confirmed, the episode has damaged his standing.
   • The clash between Bush and numerous House Republicans over stem cell research was as much the consequence of Bush wishing to avoid the charge of 'betrayal' from the Christian Right as any more considered policy. This drove a wedge between him and House Republicans from congressional districts in which the Christian Right is not an especially significant influence.
   • The White House has been drawn into the ethical controversies surrounding Tom DeLay, the highly polarising House majority leader. Instinctively, many Bush aides are wary of the staunchly ideological DeLay and regard the idea that he might be the next House speaker with great concern. However, DeLay is a hero to many conservative activists and groups. This has meant that Bush cannot abandon him even though his ethical woes could tarnish the wider Republican Party.
3. 2008 nomination fight.Washington is already witnessing the early skirmishes in the 2008 Republican presidential nomination race. Bush cannot seek a third term, and Vice-President Dick Cheney has ruled himself out of contention (see UNITED STATES: Republican race could prove divisive - March 11, 2005). At least six Republican senators are exploring the possibility of a run for the Oval Office and are thus proving much harder for the White House to steer. For instance, the clash over judicial nominations was widely reported as a trial of strength between McCain and Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist, both aspirants for 2008. By contrast, the Democrats have a clear early frontrunner for the 2008 race, Senator Hillary Clinton.

Fortunes restored? While Bush is under pressure, it is possible that the current awkward period could be ended (or at least eased) by new events breaking in his favour. For example, Bush's presidency appeared to have been severely damaged in May-June 2001 after the defection of Republican Senator Jim Jeffords to become an Independent turned control of the Senate over to the Democrats. However, the White House went on to regain control of the political agenda and Republicans regained control of the Senate in November 2002.

One of the key factors for Bush over the next several months will be the performance of the economy. Perceptions of a patchy recovery (see INTERNATIONAL: Global economy may need new motor - June 8, 2005) over the past several months have softened his job approval ratings. If the economy were inspiring more confidence, the administration's troubles would probably be regarded by many voters as less consequential than is currently the case. A stronger economic outlook (and particularly a fall in high gasoline prices) would thus produce a somewhat more favourable context in which Bush could operate.

Key assets. Bush still has key assets on which to base a political recovery:

• There remain Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress. While Democrats have counter-punched more forcefully of late, many of the president's difficulties have flowed from Republican miscalculations that could potentially be corrected.
• Bush's core team within the White House, based around Cheney, Chief-of-Staff Andrew Card, and his deputy, Karl Rove, remains relatively cohesive and strong. There have been complaints about this team's centralising tendencies, but this may prove a better organisational model than the fragmentation that other administrations frequently endured.
• Bush remains popular with the Republican base and calls for unity under his leadership are still effective. Furthermore, the recent disharmony among congressional Republicans has prompted concern among congressmen that their position in advance of the 2006 elections is deteriorating. That perception is likely to reinforce a degree of internal discipline.

Necessary decisions. Nonetheless, the president is not in a position to be complacent. He needs to make key decisions in the short-term in the following key areas:

1. Social Security. Bush will not be able to maintain his original plan for securing Social Security reform legislation. He will thus need to decide whether to cut back his proposals (and, if so, whether to focus on measures to shore up the Social Security trust fund or instead to encourage personal investment accounts). Alternatively, he will need quietly to back off this territory and look for some other domestic centrepiece instead such as tax reform (see PROSPECTS 2005: Focus in US on tax, energy and tort - December 1, 2004) or a fresh push for a comprehensive overhaul of energy policy (see UNITED STATES: Energy bill faces major obstacles - April 12, 2005).
2. Supreme Court. Given the strong prospect that Chief Justice William Rehnquist may soon retire (and perhaps other Supreme Court justices too) Bush needs to settle on a convincing approach to any Supreme Court vacancies. It has been eleven years since there was an opening on the court and that lengthy passage of time (without precedent in US history) has made a battle over the appointment inevitable almost irrespective as to who the candidate is (see UNITED STATES: Next president will reshape judiciary - August 24, 2004). The prolonged conflict over federal judgeships has been in large part a rehearsal for the Supreme Court struggle. Bush needs to settle on nominees whom the whole of the Senate Democratic caucus will not unite in opposing. Otherwise, there is the risk that Bush will be completely sidetracked by judicial politics for a sustained period.
3. Congressional victory. Bush needs to reassert himself by demonstrating a significant victory on a congressional issue. Exactly what this is matters less than the importance of him being seen to have the Republican majorities in Congress behind him. One battle where a win would be particularly welcome for the White House is CAFTA (an issue on which he will also get some support from moderate Democrats). That accord is currently very uncertain of congressional passage (see UNITED STATES: Deficit casts cloud over trade agenda - April 20, 2005): failure to secure approval would be a considerable setback for Bush.
4. Iraq assertiveness. The administration has indicated that it will take a more assertive position towards the Iraqi authorities. The likelihood of the timetable slipping for a constitution being drawn up, then ratified, then final legislative elections occurring (see IRAQ: Oil, security, constitution face new government - June 6, 2005) are disturbing for the administration. Iraq is also such a pivotal element of Bush's foreign policy that it would be very difficult to compensate for failure in that country with success elsewhere (see PROSPECTS 2005: Iraq holds key to US global stance - December 2, 2004).