UNITED STATES: 'War on terror' changes tack

US officials announced on June 9 the arrest of two Pakistani citizens in California on charges of planning terrorist acts in the United States. The announcement, a reminder that Islamic terrorists may still strike at the US homeland, comes as Washington is beginning a review of its counter-terrorism policy.

Analysis

The arrests of two alleged terrorists in California comes at a time when both the administration and the public believe that the opening phase of the US-led 'war on terror' has successfully reduced direct threats to the homeland. Despite the fact that the homeland remains vulnerable to major terrorist incidents (see UNITED STATES: Why the homeland is far from secure - September 23, 2002; and see UNITED STATES: Why the homeland is far from secure - September 20, 2002), there have been no such attacks since September 2001.

New policy phase. As a result, the focus of attention in Washington remains on the offensive portions of the national strategy for countering terrorism. This is believed to have partially broken up the al-Qaida network, sharply reducing its global reach. With these perceptions in mind, the administration is moving towards a new phase in its anti-terror campaign.

One driver behind a new conceptualisation of policy is the development of a cohesive counter-terrorism team:

  • Following senior leadership changes in the intelligence community and Homeland Security Department, Frances Townsend, the assistant to the president and homeland security advisor, will be assisted by Treasury official Juan Carlos Zarate, the new US National Security Council (NSC) advisor for counter-terrorism.
  • Two other important posts are likely to be filled shortly, including the State Department coordinator for counter-terrorism and the National Counter-terrorism Center director.

Presidential Decision Directive.Once these posts are filled, the administration is likely to embark on developing a new Presidential Decision Directive. This document, which would replace the one created in October 2001, will provide inter-agency strategic guidance to US counter-terrorism policy:

  • The review will probably increase the scope of counter-terrorist strategy, involving more instruments of state power than the current military/intelligence-heavy approach.
  • More focus will fall on terrorist groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas. These are known to be separate from al-Qaida and its affiliates but share some logistical assets.
  • Regime change in so-called state sponsors of terrorism (Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Iran) is not high on the agenda.

The broad outlines of this approach are visible in initiatives already underway at the level of individual government agencies. In essence, the strategy will aim to make permanent the gains so far accrued in the war against terror by striking at the root causes and residual networks of Islamic terrorism.

Threat perception. Underlying US government policy assumptions are threat assessments that are growing in sophistication and global scope:

  • Improved data. The State Department's annual report on terrorism, now named Country Reports on Terrorism, was released in April without its usual statistical data. Instead, data on terrorism trends is now collated by the National Counter-terrorism Center, using improved collection methodology and a broader definition of terrorist incidents (eg counting terrorist attacks against non-US citizens as well as US citizens, in contrast to previous US government reports). This difference accounts for the jump from 175 incidents recorded under the old methodology in 2003 and the recently released total of 654 incidents in 2004.
  • Local franchise. The new reporting methods come in answer to a growing trend in Islamic terrorism -- namely, the decay of global operations by the al-Qaida network against principally US targets, and the proliferation of local affiliate cells that strike mainly at perceived US proxies or civilians in their own country of residence. Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 noted that al-Qaida's leadership threatened about three dozen countries in 2004, encouraging local affiliates to develop their own terrorist campaigns.

Regional capacity-building. Washington is focusing rising levels of security assistance on a broad range of threatened nations in an effort to fight terrorists where they are active. State Department-administered counter-terrorism assistance rose from 38 million dollars in 2001 to 133 million dollars recently requested for fiscal year 2006. Since 2001, 20 new countries have begun receiving assistance, which means the number of states receiving training is now 67. Key focus states include: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Columbia, Kenya, and Malaysia.

The United States is developing new forms of curriculum and mobile training teams to make such assistance even more prevalent. This form of training is one of the most cost-effective forms of security assistance, delivering high quality tuition and equipment grants that often yield tangible improvements in local counter-terrorism capabilities.

Preventative security. In addition to response and post-incident investigation, a large proportion of training focuses on the border security aspects of preventative security. A growing number of US-led initiatives are underway to reduce unregulated cross-border movement, control access to the global air transport network, and 'fence off' areas of weak government control where terrorists can develop bases:

  • TIP. The rapid expansion of the US Terrorism Interdiction Programme (TIP), only one part of the overall effort, is an indicator of the scope of the project, rising from four million dollars of funding in 2001 to the 7.5 million dollars requested for fiscal year 2006. Although small in size, this cost efficient programme provides regional states with a computerised immigration system that facilities international intelligence-sharing and 'watch list' monitoring. Key recipients include Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand, and Pakistan, plus 15 other smaller states.
  • Tighter borders. To channel terrorists through ports of entry under surveillance, US military and counter-terrorism assistance programmes also place heavy emphasis on land, air, and sea border surveillance and patrolling, providing a rage of countries with radars, night-vision equipment, and patrolling vehicles. State Department Export Control and Border Security assistance, which focuses on proliferation but has secondary benefits for border control, has also risen from 19 million dollars in 2001 to the 44 million dollars requested for fiscal 2006. In comparison with the prevention of unregulated capital flows for terrorist financing, a slow and unrewarding aspect of US counter-terrorism policy (see UNITED STATES: Tracking terrorism finance - August 27, 2003), physical interdiction of terrorists is seen to offer concrete results and will be popular with regional allies wishing to control their borders for a range of economic and security reasons.

Ideological challenge. The US government is also focusing more attention on the intangible but vital dimension of the 'war of ideas' between radical Islam and moderate Western and Islamic thought (see UNITED STATES: Abuse of prisoners is landmark setback - May 13, 2004). The Pentagon's September 2004 National Defense Strategy stressed the need to counter ideological support for terrorism to secure permanent gains in the war against terrorism.

It stated the importance of negating the image of a US war against Islam, and instead developing the image of a civil war within Islam, fought between moderate states and radical terrorists. This kind of imagery will feed into the broader debate beginning in the United States on how to win such a war of ideas and how to cultivate moderate democratic Islamic states.

Conclusion

US counter-terrorism policy is migrating away from a militarised war against terror towards capacity-building in frontline states. US diplomatic influence is also set to rise in a number of countries due to an unprecedented expansion of security ties. However, the longer-term policy of countering terrorist ideology is a complex and difficult project that has hardly begun.