IRAN: Ahmadi-Nejad win cements conservative control

Analysis

The ultra-conservative mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, soundly defeated the presumed front-runner, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in Friday's presidential election run-off, gaining 62% of the vote to Rafsanjani's 36%. He appears to have resonated with voters by running on a largely populist platform. He emphasised opportunity for the 'little man', job creation, more equitable wealth distribution and the need to break up the narrow elite which, he claimed, has dominated the government, the economy and social life (see IRAN: Presidential election goes to second round - June 20, 2005).

Conservative control . Although the election revealed deep fissures in the conservative camp, the new president can expect cooperation from the conservative majority in the Majlis (see IRAN: Hardline conservatives consolidate power - January 27, 2005). He should face no problems from the Council of Guardians which favoured his election. He is said to have excellent relations with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The latter may not share all of Ahmadi-Nejad's views, but knows he can control him and values his ability to mobilise a popular base.

Economic policy. It is not clear that Ahmadi-Nejad has any well-developed ideas for creating jobs and sharing wealth. However, his attacks on narrow elites that, he says, control banks and bank loans, manipulate the stock exchange, and artificially inflate real estate prices, along with his dismissive attitude to current development plans which he alleges benefit the same elites, point to some policy initiatives. They include:

• lowering officially-set interest rates on bank loans;
• bank loans for small start-up companies;
• a higher minimum wage and higher salaries for teachers and civil servants;
• greater opportunity for the 'little guy' to participate in the stock market; and
• financial help for young couples get married and start a home.

These measures are implicit in his critique of things as they are, not specific policies he has advocated. During his first press conference since his victory yesterday, he repeated his attack on corruption in the oil industry. Fiercely nationalistic, he has said that Iranian resources should be developed by Iranians, not foreigners. This could mean additional obstacles to foreign investment (see IRAN: Budget will worsen economic malaise - March 18, 2005).

Appointments. In forming his cabinet, the new president may reach out to other factions in the conservative camp and offer positions to his presidential rivals, including Ali Larijani and Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf. He will almost certainly have to clear appointments to key ministries, including Foreign Affairs, Interior, Intelligence, and Culture and Islamic Guidance with Khamenei.

However, Ahmadi-Nejad's attacks on the narrow power elite also apply to senior government positions. Extensive changes at the sub-cabinet level appear likely: men with backgrounds similar to the president's will replace the Western-educated technocrats who have dominated senior civil service posts.

Cultural policy/ civil liberties. During the campaign, Ahmadi-Nejad scoffed at allegations he intends to clamp down on women and the young or to restrict social and political freedoms. He skirted the issue at yesterday's press conference. However, he does not seem to attach a great deal of importance to freedom of the press or political liberties. When he speaks of expanded freedoms, he appears to have in mind expanding economic opportunity, making civil servants answerable to the public, empowering the common man, and allowing people like himself into the ruling the elites. Government-sponsored cultural centres, he has said, should make room for ordinary people, not just the cultural elites. Iranians are free to behave as they wish but should not to engage in excesses in public.

All this seems to point to cautiously more restrictive social and cultural policies. However, Ahmadi-Nejad's supporters in the para-military Basij forces, the morals police and the like, emboldened by his victory, may try again to impose 'moral' values through harsher methods.

Foreign policy . During the campaign, Ahmadi-Nejad described the Iranian government as weak in negotiating with the EU-3 on Iran's nuclear programme. He insisted that Iran should retain a full fuel cycle capacity and said negotiations with Washington do not rank high on his priorities (see EU/IRAN: Talks buy time on nuclear crisis - May 26, 2005). He repeated these themes yesterday, while expressing willingness to continue the EU talks.

This may imply less for foreign policy under his presidency than is generally supposed. Foreign policy on major issues remains the prerogative of the Leader; and the new president's inexperience will make him even more dependent on Khamenei's guidance. Iran's position in the nuclear negotiations is well developed; a sudden and sharp change in direction is unlikely. There is no indication that Ahmadi-Nejad has any intention to change Iran's policy in Iraq or Lebanon or in its relations with its major trading partners.

However, some change in tone and attitude is likely:

• While Rafsanjani would have made a concerted effort to reach an understanding with Washington, Ahmadi-Nejad will not.
• To make good on his campaign statements, he will have to appear firm in negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme.

While in the last two years, Khamenei has seemed open to an understanding with the United States, he remains deeply sceptical about the possibility or benefits to Iran of a deal. The orientation of the new president could strengthen both Khamenei's scepticism and that of Bush administration officials, many of whom have always doubted a more moderate Iran is in the offing.