IRAQ: Transition outcome unlikely to be resolved soon

Analysis

Iraq remains firmly in a messy political transitional period. The potential outcomes are remarkably varied. The main elements that are likely to be crucial in determining the political outcome are:

• the constitutional process;
• the durability and effectiveness of the US occupation of Iraq; and
• the sustainability of the violent insurgency.

1. Constitutional process. The completion of the drafting process for a new constitution required only a slight extension to the timetable. The price paid for this was lack of consensus on some of its major provisions. Sunni Arab participation in its drafting was limited. There is therefore no ownership of the document in the wider community (see IRAQ: Draft constitution has strongly federal theme - August 29, 2005).

   The absence of incentives for the Sunni Arabs to support the document means that this sense of alienation is likely to continue, leading to a campaign of either rejection or boycott during the referendum on the draft on October 15. The outcome is therefore likely to be either that:

   • it is voted down by a two-thirds majority of three or more Sunni Arab dominated governorates, thereby returning the process to square one; or
   • it is adopted by default in the Sunni Arab areas, thereby saddling Iraq with a political rulebook which has no legitimacy within one of the country's three main communities.
2. US military occupation. The decline in US public support for the military occupation of Iraq has not been lost on the insurgents. The White House is now virtually committed to a substantive scaling down of forces in 2006, to be completed presumably well before the mid-term elections in November (see UNITED STATES: Iraq withdrawal raises Vietnam spectre - September 13, 2005). It is widely assumed that the ending of the full US military occupation of Iraq is only a matter of time. This perception reduces the chances that the insurgents will be tempted to negotiate a political deal with the US-backed government in Baghdad. The temptation is unlikely to diminish to hold out, and then claim a victory analogous to Hizbollah in southern Lebanon when Israel withdrew.

3. Insurgency. In the absence of institutionalised political channels, violence remains the main instrument of Sunni Arab leverage. As long as the Sunni Arabs continue to view themselves as an embattled minority whose rights are under threat within a Shia-Kurd dominated Iraq, this is likely to continue. In this defiance the insurgents are, in effect, being encouraged by the Arab states, which have publicly rejected the draft constitution, and warned of the creation of a 'Shia crescent' (see MIDDLE EAST: Sunni Arabs fear 'Shia crescent' - April 11, 2005). With the insurgency more dominated by militant Islamists than previously assumed, the prospect of a reduction in violence is even less likely (see IRAQ: Jihadist training ground recalls Afghanistan - August 26, 2005).

   The current constitutional process is unlikely to be a panacea, and large numbers of US troops will probably remain in Iraq for at least the next year to deal with a continuing insurgency. Iraq's messy transition is likely to continue, at least through 2006.

Political outcomes. During this period, four political outcomes are possible:

1. Constitution re-run. If the constitution is rejected, the process must re-commence, beginning with new parliamentary elections, leading to a new draft constitution and another national referendum. It is possible that such a process could follow a different course next time. However, this would require the Sunni Arabs to desist from continuing to boycott the electoral process, as they did in January this year.

   Even the presence of a proper Sunni Arab bloc in a new parliament would not necessarily make much difference to the basic political impetus: a Shia-Kurd understanding in favour of a decentralised, federal state. The two sides are most clearly at odds over federalism, and the implication that it holds in Sunni Arab minds for state integrity and resource allocation. More likely than not, a second attempt to reach a constitutional draft would simply prove to be a re-run of the current, flawed process and the current constitutional crisis might simply have been replaced by another one.

2. Grand political bargain. The main way to avoid this would be the forging of a 'grand political bargain', which would incorporate the Sunni Arab communities and their external supporters, as well as the Shia and the Kurds. Such an approach might be based on a three-level process, featuring international and regional, as well as national actors with, for example, Arab state involvement helping to reassure the Sunni minority that their interests would be taken fully into account. The incorporation of all of the main Iraqi communities would then help to isolate the violent extremists.

   Such an outcome is more likely in the longer term, especially if the main participants fight themselves to a standstill, and would be contingent on a US withdrawal. It is less viable in the short to medium term, due to

   • the lack of trust among national, regional and international actors;
   • the clashing visions for a future Iraq; and
   • the ambitious procedural nature of such an initiative, when regional cooperation has generally been hard to generate.

3. Descent into civil war. The insurgency has intermittently had a sectarian element to it, which seems to have become more sustained during 2005. Indeed, the internecine nature of much of the violence has led some Shia leaders to observe that a civil war has already started. In such circumstances, a spiralling in Shia-Sunni sectarian strife is more a matter of degree than of change.

   Hitherto, predominantly Sunni Arab perpetrated violence has sought to provoke the majority Shia into inter-communal retaliation. This unidirectional violence could end in the event of a US military withdrawal, and a 'no holds barred' attempt by the mainly Shia-Kurd dominated military forces of the Iraqi state to pacify the insurgent strongholds in the 'Sunni triangle'. This could have three outcomes:

   • the successful suppression of Sunni Arab violence through repressive means, leading to their incorporation through an authoritarian occupation into a Shia dominated state;
   • a military stalemate, leaving the integrity of the Iraqi state further weakened, but the Arab Sunni areas impoverished; or
   • the regionalisation of the civil war along the Lebanese model, with neighbouring Arab Sunni states assisting the Sunni Arabs.
4. 'Permanent' transition. The failure to draft a permanent constitution would leave Iraq with the current transitional arrangements, based on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL has allowed the Shia to dominate the administration in Baghdad, the Kurds to continue with their self-government in the north and the Sunni Arabs to refuse to cooperate with the political centre. While such a situation is unsatisfactory, it at least affords the respective communities something of what they seek politically. In the absence of a grand bargain or a civil war, it is this scenario that is likely to persist. With the alternatives too difficult or too awful to contemplate, the acceptance of permanent transition may become the line of least resistance for all.