INDIA/US/CHINA/RUSSIA: Delhi plays off possible allies

Analysis

President George Bush's offer, at his recent 'summit' with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to extend technological cooperation with India's civil nuclear programme represents a potentially significant shift in Asia's geo-strategic alignments (see INDIA/UNITED STATES: Nuclear deal transforms ties - July 22, 2005). The offer has yet to be ratified in the US Congress where it could face opposition. It breaches what appeared to be accepted protocols on relations with emergent nuclear powers and undermines any general policy of nuclear non-proliferation.

Strategic rationality. It is surprising that it has taken Washington so long to recognise the India's importance:

• It possesses a fast-expanding economy.
• It is geographically positioned between the United States's two principal regions of global concern -- the Middle East and China (see INTERNATIONAL: Attitudes to China are mostly positive - September 20, 2005).
• As a stable democracy with a secular (or at least non-Muslim) state, it shares many of Washington's values.
• It contains the second largest army in the world, now bearing nuclear weapons.

Suggestions that the United States might re-appraise relations with India began in the 1990s, soon after the end of the Cold War. However, India's independent nuclear tests in 1998, and the need to accommodate Pakistan in the 'war against terrorism' launched in Afghanistan, held them up. Nonetheless, nuclear non-proliferation has never had the significance for Bush that it did for his successor Bill Clinton, and the problems of Afghanistan no longer represent a 'global' emergency.

From Washington's perspective, a close alliance with a strong India could set a firm perimeter to the expansion of China's influence to the south and west, into both Central and South-east Asia. It could also establish a new base of influence from which to contain disturbances in the Gulf and Middle East. As in the case of Israel, with which Delhi is developing relations of technological and defence cooperation, India could provide the United States with surrogate force and influence in regions, which -- otherwise -- it would find difficult to penetrate.

Indian bargain. For India, the prospective relationship has many attractions:

• It has long desired better access to US technologies, not only for economic but also military reasons. Until now, US weaponry has had little place in its arsenal.
• US influence could also help smooth its rise to global power in a number of areas. India covets a permanent place on an expanded UN Security Council (see UNITED NATIONS: Security Council reform is fraught - July 15, 2005). It increasingly needs access to external energy resources -- its performance thus far has not been impressive in acquiring overseas oil and gas rights. One of its most important export industries -- IT processing -- is heavily US-dependent and at risk of suffering from any resurgence in US protectionism.

A significant lobby has gathered around the Indian Foreign Ministry, pressing the case for accepting Bush's blandishments and adopting a 'special' relationship with the United States.

Counsels of caution. There is a lobby on the other side urging the need for caution. Atavistic attitudes influence part of this lobby, recalling the relationship with the Soviet Union, which the Congress Party -- returned to office last year (see INDIA: Rural vote propels Congress to power - May 17, 2004) -- particularly cultivated in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of Singh's cabinet began their political careers in this era.

However, the lobby also reflects a sober assessment of India's changing strategic interests. A closer India-US alliance has implications for relations with Russia and China:

• Russia. Russia remains an important partner, which supplied weaponry and nuclear technology when the United States would not -- on terms carrying fewer political strings. It is also a potential source of energy.
• China. Relations with China have been moving onto a different footing. Recent economic developments in both countries have generated new forms of complementarity -- India's strength lies in services and China's in manufacturing. Trade has grown over the past two years, starting to improve bilateral relations -- both countries are presently engaged in resolving their long-standing border disputes.

China has also shown that its 'old' relationship with Pakistan will not jeopardise this improvement in relations. For example, by refusing to be drawn into the situation currently developing in Nepal (see NEPAL: Military offensive looms as king takes charge - February 9, 2005), it has signalled that it recognises India to have a legitimate sphere of influence, even in areas adjacent to its own borders.

To sharpen India's dilemma, Russia and China have been drawing closer together (in the energy and military fields) and, visibly, posing themselves as a joint counter-weight to expanding US influence. In this spirit, they have begun to court Delhi -- seeking to draw it towards their alliance. India now participates with them in a range of regional 'security' organisations and attended the summit, held recently in Vladivostok, aimed at impressing Washington (see INDIA/CHINA/RUSSIA: Competing interests weaken triad - June 30, 2005). If Delhi is presented with a choice between two clearly demarcated US-Israel and China-Russia 'blocs', calculations may be fine in terms of the economic, energy and military resources obtainable it can obtain from each.

Middle East problems. Delhi may fear that too close an association with 'US-Israel' would compromise its position on several fronts in the Middle East:

• Most of India's energy imports come from this region and it would suffer severely from any politically inspired embargo.
• Also, it has its own Muslim population of 130 million, whose existence it has used successfully with other Muslim countries to weaken Pakistan's influence and prevent it from being isolated as an 'anti-Muslim' power.

India would prefer not to have to choose between its 'western' and 'eastern' courtiers, but seek a balance between them. If played delicately, this could yield extremely lucrative results -- as each side makes more generous offers of arms, trade and cooperation. However, there is always a danger that the hand could be over-played.

Iran testing-ground. At a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 24, India voted to report Iran to the UN Security Council at an unspecified date (see EU/IRAN: IAEA to meet as nuclear crisis deepens - August 8, 2005). While the Indian government maintains that its stance has not changed, this indicates a desire not to enter into open confrontation with Washington. India's attitudes towards Iran over the coming months will prove a testing ground for how far it is prepared to accept Washington's offer of a 'special' relationship, and how far it will defer towards the interests of Beijing and Moscow:

• It cannot wish to have a new nuclear power on its doorstep, least of all one with militant Islamist associations.
• Yet Delhi has taken care in the past to preserve good relations with Tehran, whose influence has helped it in other Islamic circles. Iran is the focus of important energy ambitions for India and provides it with access to Afghanistan and central Asia (see PAKISTAN/INDIA: Joint accord raises pipeline hopes - April 19, 2005).