GREECE/TURKEY: EU speeds tentative rapprochement

Analysis

Under the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has made great strides over the past two years towards meeting EU socio-political conditions, while its economy has been growing strongly. The European Commission has set out a detailed negotiating framework for Turkey that could lead to full membership, though no sooner than 2014 -- the year the next EU budget but one will begin to take effect. The framework document pointedly states that the outcome of negotiations "cannot be guaranteed beforehand". However, the likelihood is that, given the decade-long negotiating horizon, many issues now perceived as problems will resolve themselves, allowing Turkey to become a full member of the EU.

Waning enthusiasm. However, a diplomatic spat between the EU and Turkey since July has cast a shadow over the start of accession talks:

• The Erdogan government issued a unilateral protocol in July saying that it would not recognise the Republic of Cyprus ahead of a settlement for the island, and insisting that it would continue to bar entry to its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and aircraft.
• The EU issued a 'counter declaration' on September 21, with the threat that "failure [by Turkey] to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations."
• The Turkish Foreign Ministry's response was a call for the EU to support new efforts by the UN to achieve a comprehensive settlement, and remove all embargoes and restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots.

While Turkey is poised to embark on entry talks on October 3, support for Turkish EU entry now has fallen to just 35% across the EU, while support in Turkey has fallen from 73% to 63% (see TURKEY: Reduced EU expectations boost US ties - June 2, 2005). Popular support for Turkish entry is lowest in Austria (10%), whose government is currently calling for 'privileged partnership', rather than membership, for Turkey.

Negotiating Framework. The proposed Negotiating Framework document sets out a tough framework for EU membership negotiations with Turkey:

• Good relations. It reiterates that it must work for a settlement on Cyprus, but also that it must make an "unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and ... [resolve] outstanding border disputes" a thinly veiled reference to the disputes with Greece over territorial and seabed rights in the Aegean. Moreover, the document states that, "if necessary", disputes should be resolved through the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the International Court of Justice -- something Greece long has demanded and Turkey long resisted, arguing that they should be settled through a negotiated package. The Greek side says there is nothing to negotiate and that the only issue to be resolved is court-adjudicated delineation of the seabed.
• Safeguards. The proposed Negotiating Framework, as well as officially pushing the accession deadline to 2014 or beyond, provides for "long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses" on matters such as the free movement of persons, structural aid and rights under the Common Agricultural Policy. The document also states that Turkey will not qualify for membership of the Schengen area for the free movement of persons until it has demonstrated its "readiness" for it, and that there will be a derogation regarding its participation in the Economic and Monetary Union until such time as it can prove its finances to be sufficiently sound.

Public opinion in Turkey may respond badly to such rigorous terms and conditions. Nonetheless, the Greeks are hoping that Turkey will embrace the Negotiating Framework as the attainment of its goal of Western adhesion (see TURKEY: Long and arduous path for EU accession talks - July 4, 2005), and, in turn, seize upon the new environment as an opportunity to work towards resolution of the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean in order to facilitate its entry.

Aegean settlement? Since 1999, there have been a total of 28 low-level agreements between Greece and Turkey on non-contentious practical issues such as trade, double taxation, protection of investments, tourism, health and culture. The rapprochement process has led to an improvement in bilateral trade, as well as increased ministerial visits. This process can be expected to accelerate once Turkey's accession negotiations commence.

Since late 2001, the two Foreign Ministries notably have been exploring the "modalities of a settlement" of outstanding issues in the Aegean. As the discussions touch on issues of sovereignty, both sides have been rigorous about not leaking the contents so as to allow the intermediaries to continue their dialogue without pressure from nationalists. The two sides probably are trying to work out in advance a package that could be put to the ICJ, which would be expected to rule accordingly, allowing both sides to save face: the Greek side could claim that the dispute had been adjudicated, and the Turks that it had been negotiated.

Confidence-building measures. Through NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the two sides have agreed a series of military confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed to prevent potential clashes in the Aegean. The CBMs provide rules of the road for warships and methods of defusing incidents between fighter jets.

However, the complexity of the Greek-Turkish relationship on the issue was highlighted this April during a visit by Greek Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis to Ankara to announce a new package of CBMs. While he was still in Ankara, there was a 26-hour standoff between Greek and Turkish coastguard vessels in waters off the uninhabited island of Imia (Kardak), over which the two sides nearly went to war in 1996 (see GREECE/TURKEY: Chronic Tension - February 5, 1996). While the incident was resolved, it led the Greek prime minister to comment that in future such incidents could affect the Greek response to Turkish EU entry.

Outlook. While both sides hope that Turkey will enter the EU and evolve from antagonist to partner, neither is prepared to make one-sided concessions -- particularly over Cyprus. For Turkey to become an EU member will require a tempering of knee-jerk nationalist reactions. Even once within the EU, Turkey -- like the United Kingdom -- could prove a reluctant partner. However, its membership would have the advantage of placing Turkey around the same negotiating table as its partners and traditional antagonists. The potential stumbling block remains the question of Cyprus, where a standoff remains. That issue is more likely to be resolved once all parties are within the EU, and Turkey might also become more accommodating over the issue of recognition once negotiations are under way and membership appears within reach.