UNITED STATES: Republican fissures imperil Bush agenda

Analysis

President George Bush has experienced a steady decline in political momentum throughout 2005. After setting out an expansive programme at home and abroad in his January Inaugural Address and February State of the Union speech, the president struggled to impose his agenda in Congress and rally public support. By June, the situation had worsened, with Bush's poll ratings hovering around 40%, signs of public disillusionment over Iraq, spiralling gasoline costs and the failure of the drive to reform social security.

Accustomed loyalty. Despite these setbacks, the broader conservative movement and Republican Party remained essentially loyal to the administration. Activists were cheered by the confirmation of John Roberts as chief justice of the Supreme Court. The passage of the controversial Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in July also implied that Bush retained the capacity to win key votes in Congress (see UNITED STATES: Bush wins CAFTA but loses wider war - July 28, 2005; see UNITED STATES: Roberts bound for Supreme Court - September 9, 2005).

Party implosion? Therefore, the present public discontent within the Republican Party is unprecedented during the president's time in Washington. For observers beyond the Washington 'beltway', the origins of these troubles may be opaque:

• Improved standing. Bush's overall public approval ratings, while unimpressive, have recovered from their nadir during the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, an event that embarrassed the White House (see UNITED STATES: Bush manages political fallout - September 6, 2005).
• Washington scandals. Several 'scandals' have emerged involving figures close to the president, although thus far they have created a greater stir in the Washington press corps than among the public at large. These include the indictment of House Majority Leader Tom Delay on campaign finance charges and a lesser controversy concerning Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist's share dealings. A more serious case involves the investigation of key administration aides Karl Rove and Lewis Libby, as part of an criminal inquiry into how the name of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative with connections to the president's political opponents was leaked to the media. However, the impact of these probes has been relatively limited -- although the administration's standing could be damaged when Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald delivers his report on the CIA case, perhaps as early as next week.

While these difficulties -- and the fear that they might imperil the Republican majorities on Capitol Hill in the November 2006 midterm election -- have disturbed conservatives, they are not at the core of current intra-Party warfare.

Conservative discontent. Republican operatives, such as Rove, have spent years cobbling together an effective governing coalition (see UNITED STATES: Can the conservative ascendancy last? - July 25, 2005). Until now, the White House has been adept at playing to this hard core of conservative support, even though different factions within the Right always have espoused somewhat incompatible agendas. However, events and White House policy choices have recently aggravated three distinct sections of the conservative movement:

1. Fiscal conservatives. The 'big government' conservatism -- tax cuts, accompanied by expanded federal programmes and deficit spending -- associated with the Bush White House has long caused resentment among fiscal conservatives. This section of the Republican Party expressed particular distaste concerning:

   • expanded federal funding for education, traditionally the province of the states;
   • the addition an expensive prescription drug benefit package to the to the Medicare old-age healthcare programme; and
   • ballooning federal budget deficits throughout the Bush administration, exacerbated by the expense of the Iraq War.

   These irritants were tolerated, in part, because of the imperatives of the 'war on terror' and the drive to establish a stable Republican majority in Washington. However, victory in the 2004 elections suggested that the latter objective had been secured, and fiscal conservatives began to push for austerity during the Bush second term.

   Recently, two factors have pushed fiscal conservatives into open revolt:

   • Congressional 'pork'. There was concern over Bush's July decision to sign the 286 billion dollar Transportation Bill -- legislation widely perceived to be lined with expensive 'pork barrel' items of little relevance to the national interest (see UNITED STATES: Transportation bill short on solutions - August 4, 2005).
   • Katrina costs. There was unhappiness over the president's policy to federalise spending on the reconstruction of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (see UNITED STATES: Katrina may cause steep drop in growth - September 14, 2005).

   Fiscal conservatives recently forced House Speaker Dennis Hastert to concede that future expenditures would be offset by cuts in spending elsewhere in the budget, although this principle will probably not endure.

2. Social conservatives. Bush could afford a degree of discontent among fiscal conservatives, provided that he retained the backing of his socially conservative bedrock. This group was pleased by the Roberts nomination. The political sophistication of that appointment led activists to assume that a similarly effective strategy would be employed to nominate a right wing ideologue to the seat of retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.

   These high hopes caused the overwhelming majority of social conservatives greet the appointment of Harriet Miers with disappointment or outrage (see UNITED STATES: Miers nomination heralds shift to right - October 6, 2005). Three aspects of this selection have triggered concern:

   • She has not served on a federal or state bench, so there is no means of evaluating her judicial philosophy.
   • Her age (60) means that she would be unlikely to exercise conservative influence on the Court for a generation in the manner of Justice Clarence Thomas or (Republicans expect) Roberts.
   • Finally, she is perceived to be little more than a personal confidant of the president, lacking both a distinguished academic record and the correct ideological credentials.

   This is a particularly critical nomination, because O'Connor frequently served as a moderate swing vote on the Court. Even those conservatives who are willing to tolerate the Miers appointment have scant enthusiasm for it.

3. Foreign policy conservatives. Although it has been less public than either fiscal or social conservative dissent, the course of events in Iraq has exacerbated fissures between traditional foreign policy 'realists' -- who focus on balance of power politics -- and their antagonists in the small, influential faction that provided the primary impetus for the Iraq War.

   Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is perceived to have moved toward a more conventionally 'realist' foreign policy, and former power brokers such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith have stepped down or been forced out at the Department of Defense. The continued difficulty establishing a secure and stable democratic regime in Iraq has also raised questions about the broader objective of democracy promotion in the Middle East. There is a growing suspicion among the ranks of former administration officials responsible for the Iraq intervention that some in the White House are now more interested in fashioning a plausible 'exit strategy' than in finishing the process of 'nation building' in Iraq.

Political consequences. These conservative divisions have the potential to cripple the White House political and legislative agenda. The Republican majorities in Congress are not large by historical standards, and may be especially sensitive to internal Party fissures:

• 'Itch' hitch. The 'six year itch' is one of the more reliable hazards of US electoral politics. The term describes the particular vulnerability of the president's party during the sixth year of an administration. The only twentieth century president who avoided a substantial midterm election swing against his party in these circumstances was Bill Clinton.
• House vulnerability. The profile of the 2006 Senate elections makes it hard to imagine that the Republicans will suffer a substantial setback. However, the House may be more vulnerable to Democratic inroads. Combined with the loss of Bush stalwart DeLay, this has undermined White House influence in the chamber.

Administration challenges. Republican infighting presents the White House with both short-term and long-term challenges:

1. Short-term hazard. For the moment, the conflict between the White House and social conservatives over the Miers nomination looms large. However, its fallout, either way, will not endure. Bush's vigorous defence of her appointment will either force social conservatives to put aside their doubts, or her nomination will collapse and a chastened president will be obliged to produce another name more acceptable to his base (even if that invites a clash with Democrats). The latter scenario will cause more embarrassment than political damage.

2. Longer-term split. The emerging chasm with fiscal conservatives is far more serious. A long-suppressed disagreement about the basic character of Republican government has opened, and will not easily be closed. Fiscal conservatives in Congress will attempt introduce major spending reductions. The initiative will probably earn the support of the majority of the House caucus but be resisted by a coalition of centrist Republicans, leading committee chairmen and Democrats. The White House will find fashioning an internal compromise difficult.

   The fight over Katrina-related expenditures this year will essentially be a preliminary skirmish over the issue. It is likely that the breach between economic conservatives and the president will be a recurring theme for the remainder of the Bush administration. Moreover, the president may eventually be obliged to choose between making his 2001-04 tax cuts permanent and instituting drastic spending cuts. Either choice would enflame part of his base.

3. Subtle danger. Alienating former officials such as Wolfowitz could subtly alter the political landscape in a fashion ultimately more damaging to the White House than the controversy over Miers. The administration risks finding itself defending an Iraq policy that is attacked for an overly slow pace of troop withdrawals by Democrats and an overly rapid pullout by the Right. This will make the political management of such an operation even more difficult.

Toward 2008. Republican jockeying to succeed Bush further complicates the political picture for the White House. Vice President Dick Cheney will not run in 2008, leaving the Republican nomination campaign without a front-running candidate from within the administration. Instead, the two most high profile potential candidates are Senator John McCain and former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Neither man is close to the Party's conservative base. A number of more right wing senators are considering a run, but need to boost their cause by increasing their national name recognition. At the moment, the easiest way to raise their profiles is to support aggrieved conservative constituencies against the White House. There is an incentive to foment dissent.

Democratic silence. Given that the administration's current woes are mainly the product of Republican fratricide, there is little incentive for the Democratic Party to inject itself in the debate. The Katrina disaster has already increased the pressure on the White House to maintain social spending, one of their primary concerns. Likewise, there is little incentive to intervene on the Miers nomination at this stage, lest it induce Republicans to rally around the Bush's nominee. Moreover, with little consensus on the Party's own agenda during the 2006 elections, Democrats have more to gain from any unravelling of the conservative movement than in articulating an ideological alternative.

Instead, the Democrats will pursue a counter-punching strategy, which includes:

• vigorously pursuing emerging scandals among the congressional leadership and the administration;
• focusing on Miers' inexperience rather than her ideology; and
• simultaneously portraying Republicans on Capitol Hill as fiscally irresponsible, and callous for cutting social welfare programmes such as Medicaid.

Public reaction. The paradox of these internal difficulties for Bush is that they may prove to have little bearing on his public standing in the polls. Many of the divisions within the Republican Party will be invisible to the bulk of the electorate. If the economy strengthens and the Iraqi security situation improves, it is conceivable that Bush's approval ratings could creep back above 50%.

Political potency. Yet public esteem is not the same as the capacity to govern. Most second-term presidents leave office with their popular standing relatively intact. However, they are also reduced to almost ceremonial status at home and often compensate by focusing on foreign policy.

Bush may not enjoy this chance to burnish his legacy. The president entered the fifth year of his tenure in an unusually favourable position, which appeared to provide him with a chance of avoid the 'lame duck' fate of his predecessors. However, increasing division within the Republican Party has imperilled his agenda, undermined his ability to maintain congressional discipline and complicated his already difficult foreign policy challenges.