MIDDLE EAST: Hamas triumph marks new era

Analysis

Three factors accounted for Hamas' triumph in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) elections on January 25:

• disillusionment that peace or meaningful negotiations with Israel were anywhere on the horizon, despite a clear Palestinian majority in favour of them;
• appreciation of Hamas's role as a service provider in Palestinian society and the most effective force in the armed Palestinian resistance, widely seen as the cause behind Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza; and
• above all, disgust over a decade of Fatah's misrule of the PNA, an alienation that reached its nadir with its failure to deliver political progress, law, order and economic recovery following the Gaza withdrawal (see MIDDLE EAST: Sharon's exit leaves dynamics unchanged - January 11, 2006).

The outcome seems to have been much more a verdict against Fatah than for Hamas. However, a majority of Palestinians now have little problem casting a ballot for a movement that advocates armed resistance, invokes political Islam and does not recognise Israel. For Hamas to consolidate its position as the leading force in Palestinian nationalism, it will need to overcome challenges in the domestic, Israeli and regional spheres.

Palestinian governance. Its immediate task is to form a government. The scale of its success enables Hamas to do so alone. It would prefer not to. It has already contacted Abbas to begin negotiations for a 'national coalition' consisting of all Palestinian parties, including Fatah, mainly to shield itself from the enormous international pressure it will face to moderate its political positions, particularly regarding armed resistance and recognition of Israel.

Some Palestinian parties would not be averse to such a coalition, but the critical partner, Fatah, has already ruled it out. There appear to be two reasons for this stance:

• Reformist members wish to salvage the remains of its organisation and proceed with their agenda of root-and-branch democratic reform, away from the burdens of government.
• Many harbour the thinly disguised desire to see Hamas fail, as it inherits a PNA crippled in debt and isolated diplomatically.

PNA chaos. The PNA is near bankruptcy, with a projected net deficit for 2006 of 600 million dollars. International donors, led by the EU, have said they will withhold aid until the PNA either cuts public sector jobs, or salaries, or both. The main Palestinian concern in the election campaign was unemployment -- 30% across the occupied territories and 50% in Gaza. The prospect for Hamas of beginning its rule with austerity holds little relish.

This is especially so since it is the PNA's 70,000-strong security sector that is most ripe for cutting. These forces are dominated by Fatah and beholden to security chieftains who have been truculent with Abbas's attempts at reform. They will be even less compliant with orders issuing from a Hamas interior minister. A violent polarisation is now possible between the new government and various elements of the PNA, fuelled by Fatah militias in its pay.

Abbas anomaly. Nor is it yet clear how Abbas will deal with the new dispensation. He has told all parties to respect the democratic will and is ready to cooperate with a Hamas-led government. However, he also remains committed to negotiations with Israel, disarmament of the resistance and a final peace settlement -- all positions to which Hamas, formally, is opposed.

As the leader of the PLO -- the Palestinian body responsible for diplomacy with Israel -- he has the power to pursue this agenda. However, a party now dominates an elected part of the PLO that officially is not a member of it and is opposed to the PLO's strategic choice of peace with Israel. It is a contradiction that may eventually prompt his resignation.

As far as Hamas's social agenda is concerned, most Palestinians would support genuine efforts at reform. However, any aggressive attempt by Hamas to impose Islamic law would be resisted, with Fatah leading the secularist challenge. Here, too, the prognosis is one of stasis rather than change.

Israeli response. The Israeli government is shocked, having predicted a Palestinian government with the participation of Hamas, not one led by it. However, its response has been consistent: Israel will have no truck with a 'Hamas PNA' unless it renounces armed struggle, recognises Israel and commits itself to a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

It is a line echoed by Washington and, less vocally, the EU. This may be seen as a concerted diplomatic effort to impose moderation on Hamas. However, it may fail:

• Hamas has never recognised Israel as anything other a 'political reality' with which an armistice could be reached, but never a peace treaty that would recognise the legitimacy of Zionism and a Jewish state.
• It views armed resistance as the right of any people suffering a foreign military occupation and believes it has just received a colossal electoral mandate to preserve it.
• It opposed the Oslo peace process and opposes its successor, the Israel-Palestinian roadmap (see MIDDLE EAST: Palestinians weigh diplomatic options - October 6, 2005).

On the other hand, any international attempt to isolate the PNA politically and economically would lead to confrontation. It probably would cause an already-brittle PNA to collapse, with either violence or an international trusteeship filling the vacuum. There are some in the Israeli establishment who would not be averse to this, but Washington probably would be, and the EU would be opposed.

Another possible response is containment or 'coordinated unilateralism', where all sides avoid negotiation and recognition, while reaching practical arrangements on aid, services and violence. It would replicate the detente Israel and the EU reached with Palestinian municipalities controlled by Hamas. It could work in the short term. Hamas has said it is ready to extend its year-long ceasefire on condition Israel refrains from attacks upon it. However, it would be the most fragile of relationships, which one bomb or assassination could rupture. Nor is it easy to see why donors should invest perhaps 1 billion dollars a year in a PNA and political project that is going nowhere.

Regional ties. When confronted by these possible sanctions, Hamas says it will appeal to the 'Arab and Islamic world', as a source of finance and political support. Hamas enjoys sound relations with Iran, Syria, Hizbollah, Egypt and the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. Given the strictures faced by the first three, Hamas may to look to the latter two for regional support.

However, here too the price is likely to be moderation, with pressure exerted on Hamas to recognise Israel through endorsement of the 2002 Arab peace initiative in which full Arab normalisation is the price for Israel's full withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories (see SAUDIA ARABIA: Riyadh ill-placed to lead Arab world - May 16, 2002). Hamas may eventually do so, but it would still be an enormous compromise, especially as Israel has rejected the initiative.