CHINA/MIDDLE EAST: Beijing engages, ups its influence

Analysis

Until the 1990s, there was little active Chinese involvement with Middle Eastern affairs. However, its position of neutrality has not always been to Beijing's advantage. For example, in 1990, Kuwait was angered by China's abstention on the UN resolution to free the country following invasion by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. China now wants to engage more with the region, because:

• it wants greater regional influence at a time when US prestige in the Middle East has declined; and
• it needs an increasing, stable supply of oil (see CHINA: Short-term factors play into slowing demand - August 15, 2005).

Regional context. China is a secular, modernising state, with more in common with secular Middle Eastern states such as Syria than an Islamic republic such as Iran. However, it has cordial, if somewhat ambivalent, relations with most Middle Eastern states, with which it shares a certain wariness of US dominance in the region. For example, with Iran:

• China has provided assistance for the country's civil nuclear programme since the 1990s;
• it recognises Tehran as a regional counterweight and friendly energy supplier, and was happy to see it granted observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which Beijing dominates (see ASIA: SCO will expand only cautiously, if at all - July 31, 2006); but
• it will delay full membership as it is nervous about coming too close to the unpredictable and populist president, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, and his defiance of the international community over Iran's nuclear aspirations (see IRAN/UN: Nuclear tactics seek to prolong UN divisions - August 29, 2006).

Similarly, in respect of Iraq, while China firmly opposed the occupation in 2003, it was one of the first countries to re-establish relations with the US-supported government that took over after Saddam's fall.

Energetic envoy. Beijing is successfully seeking greater influence in the region. Last month, in an energetic bout of diplomacy -- and at a difficult time, during the Lebanon war -- special envoy Sun Bigan stood out as one of the few diplomats to visit Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The welcome he received contrasted with the temporary refusal of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to meet US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, because of her unwillingness to condemn Israeli actions, and President George Bush's rejection of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's offer to make a regional tour in some ways similar to Sun's.

Advantage. Sun became China's special envoy to the Middle East in March, since when he has raised the profile of the position. China has calculated that it can exploit a rise in anti-US sentiment in the region to its advantage, putting its envoy in a position to have major influence. UK influence in the region is also diminished, and France is seen by Israel as too pro-Arab. Of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia appear relatively disinterested. The ability of Beijing's representative to receive a respectful hearing in Israel, Syria, Iraq and Iran places China in a powerful diplomatic position.

Sun is one of China's most distinguished diplomats and a specialist on the Arab world. He graduated from college in Beijing just before the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and studied Arabic in Damascus. He has served as ambassador in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. In June 2003, he was made head of a special team to re-establish the Chinese embassy in post-Saddam Baghdad. Although China opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Sun has articulated the positions maintained by Beijing since then:

• that Iraq must be allowed to reconstruct without the fear of terrorism; and
• that a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem is necessary for a wider peace in the region.

Lebanon. China suffered an important casualty as a cost of its new prominence in the Middle East in the death of Lieutenant Colonel Du Zhaoyu, one of four UN observers killed in an Israeli airstrike on southern Lebanon on July 25. Although the Foreign Ministry communicated its serious concern and strong displeasure over the incident, it did not attempt to stoke up international or domestic outrage over the death, nor did it demand that Israel unilaterally cease fire.

This contrasts with the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, when anti-Western demonstrations were permitted in China. It appears that China does not consider that the death of one peacekeeper was worth the price of losing influence with Israel, and Beijing may have even considered that Du's death gave China more moral authority to exercise influence in the post-ceasefire settlement.

Israel. Beijing was uncritically pro-Palestinian in the 1970s, but has steadily upgraded its ties with Israel in the 1980s, despite enjoying good relations with Arab countries and Iran. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989, when most Western countries imposed an arms embargo and other sanctions on China, Israel began a programme of military technology transfers, as well as offering support in other areas in which it has expertise, such as agricultural technology.

Israel remains an important supplier of military technological expertise to China, and shows no hostility towards it, despite Beijing's close relations with states such as Syria and Iran (see ISRAEL: Arms makers caught out by market changes - August 20, 2004). Indeed, Israel has expressed approval of Chinese efforts to play a role in the Middle East peace process.

Crossroads. For now, China has succeeded in a very difficult balancing act, remaining on good terms with all the key states in the region. Its rhetoric on the region is bland and inoffensive: it repeats its "concern" and calls for dialogue. However, ultimately it will have to take up positions to have influence, which cannot please everyone.

Oil will be the policy driver for the near future. While China values the transfer of Israeli technology and enjoys its status as honest broker in the Middle East -- particularly as a means of chipping away at US influence -- China's immediate energy demands are crucial, and this priority will prevail if a choice has to be made. For instance, if Iran becomes more confrontational, China will have to decide whether or not to support a major anti-US power, with significant oil reserves.

However, China's overwhelming interest is in retaining stability in the region. In the medium term, Beijing will have to make decisions about flashpoints over Iran's nuclear policy, the Israel-Palestine conflict, UN forces in Lebanon, and the status of Iraq. The appointment of a high-profile and well-received figure like Sun was a necessary step for a more active diplomacy, in which China's demands for regional stability and compromise are to be taken seriously.