THAILAND: New PM, constitution consolidate army rule

Analysis

Military leaders this weekend announced the appointment of ex-army chief Surayud Chulanont as prime minister, almost two weeks after dismissing Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup (see THAILAND: Army seizes power to end political crisis - September 20, 2006). As tanks were withdrawn from Bangkok, the junta also unveiled an interim constitution, cementing the military's political role over the coming months as the Council for National Security (CNS). Surayud is expected to appoint a new cabinet by the end of the week.

Appointment. Several factors explain Surayud's selection as prime minister, albeit one subordinate to military control:

• His military career has shown that is a proficient and morally strong soldier.
• His background in the special forces illustrates physical courage and stamina.
• He has a strong reputation for loyalty, derived in part from his willingness to help the army track down his father, who left the military to become a communist guerrilla leader in the 1960s.
• He gained considerable public credit by trying to prevent the use of force against anti-coup protestors in 1992, although he was unsuccessful.
• He was largely responsible for reforming the army during his tenure as commander-in-chief (1998-2003) by tackling corruption and cutting over 40,000 personnel.
• Since retiring from the military, he has served as one of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's privy councillors, aligning him firmly with the monarchy.

However, while such qualities make Surayud an attractive choice to the troops as an unelected prime minister, his loyalty to the army also indicates that he is unlikely to act as more than a useful and loyal servant of the junta. This impression is heightened by the terms of the 'interim' constitution, which give the junta de facto control over Surayud and his administration. For example, the CNS will appoint the National Assembly and chose the drafters of a permanent constitution. Political parties have been excluded from the process, expected to last until June, with elections by the end of October next year, leaving them without a formal role for almost one year.

Reconciliation. The military leadership has decreed limits on press freedom and a ban on gatherings of more than five people, but it has also sought to defuse tension, particularly among Thaksin supporters:

• Rural base. It appears willing to retain some of the expensive but extremely popular initiatives launched by Thaksin and aimed at garnering support from the country's majority rural poor. These include subsidised medical care, debt alleviation programmes and cash handouts to villages.
• Military. In a bid to ensure stability within the armed forces and police, the annual reshuffle -- seen by many as the trigger for the coup -- has been adjusted. Many senior military and police officers closely linked to Thaksin have been promoted, but sidelined to inactive or bureaucratic posts without direct command over troops. This will keep them within the military structure -- and discipline -- and allow them to retain some status, while reducing their ability to create problems for the new regime.

Opposition. A few incidents have been tentatively linked to opponents of the new regime over the past fortnight, including a series of arson attacks against four schools in Kamphaengphet province, about 200 miles north of Bangkok. However, it is unlikely that pro-Thaksin supporters would have targeted schools, thereby alienating local communities. Furthermore, a much-publicised incident involving a taxi daubed with slogans colliding with an army tank in Bangkok can be treated as an individual act. There is no evidence of any organised opposition to the regime within the armed forces or on the streets, although popular opposition to military rule after the 1991 coup took time to develop.

Insurgency. The new prime minister has identified containing the violence in the south as a key priority (see THAILAND: Emergency rule imposed in south - July 19, 2005). Coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin had publicly clashed with Thaksin over policy on the southern provinces. Sonthi called for dialogue with Islamist separatists. The crisis between the two was exacerbated by a series of bomb attacks shortly before the coup. Expectations that Sonthi, a Muslim, would be able to restore quickly calm in the region have so far not been borne out. However, levels of violence appear to have dropped, and may continue to do so if the military assumes full responsibility for pacifying the region.

Economic outlook. Optimism that the coup will have a limited impact on the economy may prove ill-founded (see THAILAND: Credit position is under scrutiny - August 10, 2006). While equity investors may have seen a 'bounce' in the Thai stock market, those engaged in long-term foreign direct investment or infrastructure contracts face continuing uncertainty see THAILAND: Graft stalls investment package - January 25, 2006). Nearly 12 months of political turmoil has already affected confidence, and this is unlikely to return until elections are held, at the earliest.

After being sworn in yesterday, Surayud said his government would concentrate on self-sufficiency, with a focus on people's happiness and prosperity, rather than GDP figures. The comments echo those made by King Bhumibol in the aftermath of the 1997-98 economic crisis. In practical terms, this suggests greater emphasis on supporting Thaksin's core rural constituency -- notably in agriculture, commodities and crafts -- rather than in the industrialised and manufacturing sectors.

Foreign reaction. International reaction to the coup has been either negative or muted among most of Thailand's allies. The United States is the only country that has taken direct action, cutting 24 million dollars in military aid, including 16 million dollars earmarked for counter-terrorism and other training programmes. Its ambassador, Ralph Boyce, was one of the first people to meet Surayud today, pressing for a swift return to democracy.