SOMALIA: Chaos looms after CSIC collapse

Analysis

The seemingly cohesive and authoritarian CSIC has crumbled in the face of the Ethiopian attack launched on December 24 in support of government troops. The departure of CSIC from Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia leaves the TFG facing a potential minefield of factions and interest groups, as well as the possibility of a guerrilla insurgency.

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TFG challenges. The TFG is an unwieldy entity beholden to both foreign troops and former warlords, with little institutional strength (see SOMALIA: Intervention compounds escalating tensions - November 30, 2006). Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi has taken the vanguard in leading the TFG into Mogadishu. Significantly, President Abdullahi Yusuf, whom Ethiopia trusts less, has not yet entered the city.

The TFG's ability to establish its rule remains in doubt:

1. Weak base. It has been historically unpopular in Mogadishu and its presence is dependent not only on Ethiopian troops but also a collection of Hawiye warlords-turned government ministers -- including Mohamed Qanyare, Mohamed Dheere and Hussein Aideed -- who were ejected last year from Mogadishu by Islamist forces.
2. Internal divisions. Qanyare and Aideed have already contradicted some of Gedi's statements concerning the TFG's disarmament programme and the threat of a renewed Islamist insurgency. The dissident parliamentary speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden -- who has kept strong links with the Hawiye political class in Mogadishu and still theoretically holds his parliamentary role -- is also issuing statements contrary to the government's position.

3. Mogadishu management. While the TFG has achieved some success, such as re-opening the international airport, there has been a negligible response to its weapons amnesty, and roadblocks and violence have returned after several months of stability. Moreover, the powerful Habr-Gedir Ayr clan -- which placed its business influence at the disposal of the CSIC (generating resentment among other groups) -- has published an open letter of 'advice' to Gedi, warning him not to overstep the TFG's limited mandate or to sideline the clan's interests.

   Certain Hawiye groups -- especially the Abgal, Murosade and Warsangeli -- will see the TFG's entry into Mogadishu as an important corrective to the overweening ambitions of their Habr-Gedir rivals, especially the Ayr. However, no group will want to see a loss of influence and will be prepared to fight their corner.

CSIC collapse. Both Ethiopia's conventional military superiority and a tactical retreat by its opponents have been posited as explanations for the swift and unexpected collapse of the hitherto successful CSIC's armed forces. It also seems that at a crucial juncture, the CSIC leadership was divided -- issuing both inflammatory and conciliatory statements towards Ethiopia.

What is clear is that the CSIC leadership underestimated Ethiopia's willingness to act in defence of its regional hegemony. It also seems that, the effectiveness of the core Islamist forces -- such as the radical 'Shabaab' youth wing -- was blunted by a mass of enthusiastic but untrained volunteers and conscripts. In addition, as the CSIC's ability to provide stability disappeared with the Ethiopian advance, clan elders withdrew their political and military support -- hastening the collapse.

Potential insurgency? Nevertheless, the remnants of CSIC have threatened to wage war against the TFG, and spokesman Abdirahman Ali Mudey claimed that they would "rise from the ashes". Aideed has estimated that 3,500 Islamist fighters remain in Mogadishu. Scattered attacks by presumed Islamists this week -- including the killing of two Ethiopian soldiers in the south and a grenade attack on an Ethiopian barracks in Mogadishu -- may be a prelude to a wider Islamist and nationalist insurgency.

Yet the CSIC leadership remains scattered throughout the region:

• Foreign Minister Ibrahim Hassan Adow and some key advisers are in Nairobi, where they were pursuing peace talks when the fighting started. Other high ranking officials or supporters are thought to be in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
• Key leaders Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys are fugitives in southern Somalia -- presumably along with Shabaab radicals such as Sheikh Aden Hashi 'Ayro' and Sheikh Hassan Abdullai Turki. They may be involved in fighting which continues along the Kenya border.
• On the eve of battle, CSIC security chief Yusuf 'Indha Cadde' Mohamed Siad, who issued many of the inflammatory statements against Ethiopia, disappeared -- leaving his deputy Sheikh Muktar Robbow 'Abu Mansur' to perish.

Although al-Qaida's deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, reportedly called this week for an Iraqi style insurgency against Ethiopian troops, al-Qaida's influence in Somalia remains in doubt. Moreover, the with CSIC's charismatic leadership pinned down, there does not appear to be the organisational capacity for a widespread campaign.

Ethiopia's role. The defeat of CSIC has been a remarkable foreign policy victory for Ethiopia. Nevertheless, there is a widespread perception -- not least in Somalia -- that Ethiopia acted as Washington's proxy despite Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's insistence that the United States was cautious about Ethiopian involvement.

Ethiopia acknowledges having 4,000 troops on the ground in Somalia, although Aideed has put the figure at 12,000. Popular conceptions are far higher. Meles has said he will pull out within weeks. Many Somalis -- Islamist or secular -- will find continued Ethiopian occupation unpalatable. Ethiopia cannot afford to risk an Iraqi style insurgency, and wants the rapid deployment of peacekeepers.

US influence. The top US Africa diplomat, Jendayi Frazer, met in Addis Ababa yesterday with Ugandan, Ethiopian and African Union (AU) leaders to rally support for peacekeepers. She is co-hosting the Somalia Contact Group meeting in Nairobi today. Washington has pledged over 16 million dollars in humanitarian aid to Somalia. Nevertheless, the overriding US concern remains counter-terrorism, and US naval ships are patrolling the Somali coast to prevent the escape of CSIC leaders or al-Qaida suspects (see US/EAST AFRICA: Somalia puts US policy to the test - October 23, 2006).

Peace process? The deployment of 1,000-2,000 Ugandan troops looks increasingly likely, to be followed by other AU sanctioned forces -- possibly Nigerian, Rwanda, Egyptian, South Africa and Tanzania. However, much will depend on the finance made available by Western donors. The EU, whose last minute shuttle diplomacy was overtaken by the military confrontation, is pushing for an "inclusive" peace process.

Kenya will also push for such peace process since it is acutely aware of the security threat from disillusioned and angry Islamist sympathisers. It will also want to counter Ethiopia's current dominance over events in Somalia. Meanwhile, Egypt has broken ranks with the Arab League in voicing "understanding" for Ethiopia's actions.

Outlook. In some ways, the TFG and Ethiopian victory has made the region slightly more dangerous (see PROSPECTS 2007: Horn crisis blunts economic potential - December 20, 2006):

• The risk of underground violent Islamist insurgency has increased.
• There is a real risk of renewed intra-Hawiye fighting in Mogadishu and environs, and a return to the status quo ante of warlordism and a toothless TFG.
• Even if peacekeepers are deployed within the next few months, without some progress towards a political reconciliation between the TFG and the remnants of the CSIC, international forces will be unable to maintain security and will probably be subject to attacks.