US/IRAN/GULF STATES: Direct US-Iran clash is unlikely

Analysis

A military clash between the United States and Iran would have far-reaching consequences in the Gulf, in Iraq and more broadly. In this context, observers are particularly sensitive to apparent indicators of a US military build-up, and numerous war scares have occurred since Iran's uranium enrichment programme was uncovered in 2003 (see IRAN: Tehran needs 3-5 years to build nuclear weapons - May 18, 2006). The latest involves a period of overlap that will see two US (aircraft) Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and a further two non-carrier Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region as Iran faces a UN deadline to cease uranium enrichment on February 21.

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Naval build-up. However, analysis of US naval operations shows that the current level of deployment is not out of the ordinary, nor does it suggest a higher risk of war. Almost exactly the same apparent naval 'surge' occurred in October 2006 and was also subject to suspicious interpretation. Key aspects of the purported naval 'build-up' demand critical assessment:

• Gulf deployment. The Fifth Fleet, which is based in Bahrain, commands the four naval groups, but the ships will be spread across an expansive region. Fifth Fleet covers an area of responsibility that includes the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and parts of the Indian Ocean. Possible employment spans Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and patrolling activities, exercises and port visits throughout the region.
• Carrier overlap. The USS Eisenhower and USS Stennis CSGs will overlap for approximately four weeks in the Fifth Fleet area. The overlap was scheduled up to a year ago and its occurrence at the same time as Iran's nuclear deadline is largely coincidental.
• ESG overlap. The two ESGs are overlapping for longer than usual for mundane logistical reasons and will be occupied with exercises, port visits and operations off the coast of Somalia.

US-Iranian naval issues. With regards to Iran, CENTCOM has three key roles in the coming year:

1. Reassure regional allies. Naval forces will be used to reassure Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, featuring a sustained US Navy presence and increased joint exercises with regional states.
2. Deterring Iran. Washington intends to deter Iranian adventurism in the Gulf, particularly bullying of regional allies such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the offshore gas and oil fields they share with Iran.
3. Interdicting proliferation. CENTCOM will make increased use of the powers granted under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which allows US warships to board and search vessels in international waters looking for weapons of mass destruction components and missile technology.

Cautious approach. CENTCOM assesses that Iran will be very active in trying to increase its influence in the Gulf this year and will undertake a busy military exercise programme. According to CENTCOM estimates, some of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's backers would welcome any opportunity to bait Washington into military action, so Fifth Fleet is advising its ships to use extreme caution when operating in close proximity to Iranian vessels to avoid accidental or provoked clashes (see US/IRAN: Tensions unlikely to stoke military conflict - January 26, 2007).

CENTCOM leadership. The new CENTCOM commander, Admiral William Fallon, was not selected for command of US forces in the Middle East for any reason related to Iran. Instead, he was appointed to rectify some of the problems that have plagued US Gulf policy:

• Overemphasis on Iraq. Recent CENTCOM commanders have been narrowly focused on Iraq to the detriment of broader relations in the Gulf. Fallon has many characteristics that make him ideal for the multi-faceted job of running the major US combatant command and strengthening local alliances. As commander of the sprawling US Pacific Command (PACOM), Fallon excelled at coordinating many sub-regional efforts, undertaking sensitive diplomatic missions and bolstering US prestige in the face of assertive 'near-peer' competitors like China.
• Politicisation. Fallon is the first naval officer to head CENTCOM, which is traditionally led by US Army or US Marine generals. This change was undertaken because of the US Navy's loyalty to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and because the Navy is one stage removed from political debates over the impact of Iraq policy on the Army and Marine Corps.

Future Gulf strategy. Recent developments hint at broad outlines of emerging US policy in the Gulf:

• Pressure without confrontation. Although US naval deployments are coincidental to the current nuclear standoff, the administration has sought to weave military means into the broader pattern of pressures on Tehran. Last month Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns asserted that Washington would not allow the Gulf to be "controlled by Iran". CENTCOM itself will maintain correct relations and a cautious distance from the Iranians; Fallon was quick to downplay the prospect of war with Iran during his congressional testimony on January 31.
• Tightening US-GCC ties. Recent whistle-stop tours of the Gulf states by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Burns and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sought to gauge GCC willingness to play a more prominent role in collective defence arrangements focused on Iran.

GCC reaction. The GCC states remain hesitant to undertake actions that could destabilise the region and raise tensions with Tehran or within the GCC itself, where Saudi Arabia increasingly resents growing US influence over the smaller GCC states. Instead, the GCC has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo, albeit with Iran more closely contained in the region, while restraining the United States from starting new wars in the Gulf. To achieve this end-state, a policy of sorts is emerging from disparate GCC actions:

• Limited US-GCC military cooperation. The US-GCC Cooperative Defense Initiative and NATO-GCC Istanbul Cooperation Initiative both languished in 2006. Likewise, GCC states have played only a small and grudging role in the PSI due to their traditional concern about any US moves that might precipitate a regional crisis by threatening Iran's maritime lines of communication (see GULF STATES: Leaders prefer status quo to contain Iran - January 4, 2007).
• Distinctive nuclear policy. The GCC announced its own largely symbolic joint nuclear research programme on December 10, 2006 to underline the basic right of regional states to acquire safeguarded nuclear technology. However, at the same time, Gulf Arab leaders made clear their continuing commitment to a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, and, significantly, in the Gulf itself.
• Proxy struggles. In the regional effort to constrain Iran's nuclear ambitions, GCC states will play at the margins using their financial and political clout to undercut Iranian policies in places like the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon.