KENYA: Power-sharing government will be fragile

Analysis

Since the disputed presidential elections in late December, a wave of violence has left over 1,000 people dead and more than 500,000 displaced (see KENYA: Kibaki faces uncertain post-poll politics - January 7, 2008). Following urgent but ineffective shuttle diplomacy by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former African Union (AU) Chairman John Kufuor (Ghana's president) and US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan last month established a mediation process between the ruling Party of National Unity (PNU) and opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).

The announcement of an agreement today follows Annan's suspension of the mediation process on February 26, saying the negotiations had become "acrimonious". Further details are expected later today, although it appears that the agreement reflects a rumoured 'breakthrough' reached late last week. However, while those positive noises may have built momentum and embarrassed the key players into making further concessions, any power-sharing deal will be extremely fragile.

Deal breaker. The prospective agreement will involve the creation of the post of prime minister (to be filled by ODM leader Raila Odinga), and the inclusion of key ODM figures in the cabinet. However, the mediation broke down on specific details, and it is not clear that these have been overcome by today's deal:

• ODM is demanding that prime minister have significant executive powers, which is unacceptable to the PNU (in particular, President Mwai Kibaki).
• ODM wants senior and other cabinet positions distributed in proportion to party strength in the legislature, which would give ODM a plurality in the cabinet. This would force Kibaki to remove a number of his allies and key coalition partners, and so is unacceptable to the PNU.
• The PNU is refusing to introduce major constitutional changes. ODM leaders are reluctant to join the government until there are sufficient checks and balances on the powers of the president to enable parliament to hold Kibaki accountable.
• ODM favours holding fresh polls within the next two years. The PNU is keen to put off an election for as long as possible.

Resurgent violence. Militias on both sides have used the relative calm of the last ten days to re-arm. A February 21 report by the International Crisis Group documents the mobilisation and organisation of militias, including groups such as the Saboat Land Defence Force in Mt Elgon and the Mungiki group which is strongest in Central Kenya, but is reported to be becoming increasingly active in the Rift Valley (see AFRICA: Kenyan gang violence reflects wider trend - May 31, 2007). The report reveals two aspects of the conflict with significant implications for mediation efforts:

• Leadership. It presents the most compelling evidence to date that established political figures, including those known to have played a role in the ethnic clashes of the 1990s, are linked to the violence against Kikuyus in the Rift Valley. The report also documents a concerted effort among government circles to encourage and justify the involvement of the largely Kikuyu Mungiki gang in the conflict.
• Fragmentation. The fragmentation and proliferation of the violence suggests that a political settlement in Nairobi may not be able to end the conflict in all parts of the country. The violence in the Kibera slum of Nairobi is between different groups, and has a different dynamic, to the violence in the Rift Valley. Even within the Rift Valley it appears that there are a number of overlapping conflicts, many of which are becoming increasingly removed from the disputed presidential election.

Army role. The UK government has been calling for deployment of the military, which it sees as the most effective and respected institution in Kenya. However, should today's deal not prevent a resurgence of violence, Kibaki will remain reluctant to involve the military, to avoid it fragmenting along ethnic lines:

• Although the senior ranks have been handpicked by the president, the loyalties of junior officers are more questionable.
• Senior PNU leaders believe the best way to keep the army united -- and to minimise the possibility of a coup -- is to avoid the military being involved in direct confrontation.

However, it is clear that the police and the General Services Unit (GSU) special forces cannot cope with scope of the conflict, and lack the trust of the Kenyan people. If Kibaki is forced to deploy the military to deal with an escalation in the violence, the coercive capacity of the government would be significantly increased, but so would the possibility of the disintegration of the Kenyan state.

Outlook. The power-sharing deal will be extremely fragile. Kibaki and Odinga's previous attempt at coalition government in 2002 began to fall apart within months and ended in the break-up of the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) government. Any coalition government composed of roughly equal numbers of PNU and ODM members would probably deadlock over the same divisive issues, such as constitutional review. Both sides are well aware of this; one of the major sticking points in the negotiations so far has been over the question of what would happen if the coalition were to break down.

Annan understands that the continuation of talks is crucial to Kenya's fragile calm. Today's deal can be viewed as part of an exit strategy that will allow him to leave Kenya without triggering an eruption of violence. However, in real terms, the government is unlikely to make genuine concessions unless there is a rapid deterioration in conditions in Kenya, or it is placed under significant pressure by the international community:

1. Mediator. When Annan eventually leaves, his position as lead international mediator will be taken by Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, the new chairman of the AU, who arrived in Nairobi yesterday. Kikwete lacks Annan's profile or experience, but appears more willing to play a major role in the negotiations than Kufuor. Kikwete also has an army background, which may prove to be significant if military involvement -- Kenyan or regional -- becomes necessary (see TANZANIA: New generation leader offers continuity - May 24, 2005).
2. International pressure. Today's agreement notwithstanding, the international community will probably become increasingly critical of the government if the negotiations process breaks down. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has already said that unless significant progress is made, bilateral relations between the two countries could suffer. However, Washington has historically enjoyed close ties with the Kibaki government. The Bush administration is reluctant to take any action that could jeopardise a key ally in its regional counter-terrorism efforts, especially given Kenya's proximity to Ethiopia and Somalia (see US/AFRICA: Terror policy strains other strategic goals - August 7, 2007).

3. Reconciliation. Furthermore, the mediation process involves the prospect of some form of truth and reconciliation mechanism, which runs counter to elite interests:

   • Among senior ODM and PNU figures are individuals who have been publicly implicated in the most serious of the corruption scandals of the past 20 years (see KENYA: Corruption furore threatens Kibaki's government - February 17, 2006).
   • There are political figures on all sides with ties to the groups conducting the violence.
   • The PNU campaign was in part financed by figures for whom protection from prosecution was probably a precondition for support.