GEORGIA/RUSSIA: Relations reach political impasse

Analysis

The resumption of flights between Georgia and Russia at the end of March after 18 months of suspension and a meeting between the two presidents, Mikheil Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin, during the informal CIS summit in February raised hopes that relations between the two countries were set to improve (see GEORGIA: Saakashvili reliance on Washington continues - February 25, 2008).

However, two major recent developments set off a new cycle of controversy between Moscow and Tbilisi. They were:

• Kosovo's declaration of independence; and
• Georgia's insistence on achieving a membership action plan (MAP) at the NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2-4 (see NATO: Bucharest summit will be crucial for NATO future - March 31, 2008).

Although Moscow did not take Kosovo's recognition in the West as a pretext for formally recognising Georgia's secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it did accelerate the process of economic and political cooperation with the separatists.

Moscow thus provided a Russian 'carrot and stick' to the Georgian government in the run-up to the Bucharest summit, in the hope of dissuading Saakashvili from pushing too hard for NATO membership:

• On the one hand, Moscow offered lifting an 18-month virtual embargo on air, land and sea travel, and hinted that it might allow Georgian wines, mineral water and agricultural products back onto the Russian market.
• At the same time, Moscow lifted its twelve-year-old sanctions on Abkhazia and enhanced political cooperation with both secessionist regimes, hinting at the possibility of their eventual recognition.

However, these tactics proved insufficient to dishearten the Georgian president who tried his best to get a formal MAP at Bucharest, and partly achieved his goal.

NATO summit. The two determinants of bilateral relations in the last few weeks have been:

• the formal transition of power in Moscow accompanied by political upheaval in Georgia, which has restricted Saakashvili's political room for manoeuvre regarding Russia and the secessionists; and
• a US-Russian political showdown with regard to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine.

Saakashvili badly needed a foreign policy success and much of his pro-NATO rhetoric was directed to the domestic audience. However, he promised too much in advance, partly because of US President George Bush's own support for Georgia's cause in NATO. Having the United States so openly supportive, Saakashvili understandably declared, in his rhetoric at least, that he would not settle for less than an MAP. This put him at loggerheads with not only Russia but a dozen important NATO members, Germany above all, which opposed MAPs for Georgia and Ukraine. The written guarantee of Georgia's future NATO membership in the final summit declaration provided Saakashvili with an escape, and he was able to declare an historic victory. NATO will re-evaluate Georgia's MAP prospects in December.

Thus, both sides -- Moscow and Tbilisi -- claimed the victory, which means that political struggle between the two capitals will continue and could even become more tense.

Russia's relations with separatists. Moscow's enhanced political cooperation with Georgia's breakaway regions had already been increasing, before the NATO summit. Western recognition of Kosovo's independence and Georgia's intransigence over its goal of NATO membership gave a further boost to Russian-Abkhazian and Russian-South Ossetian cooperation.

Following a call from the Russian parliament for the two territories' recognition as independent states, some Russian officials -- including Moscow's representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin -- lent their support to such a move should Georgia be accepted into the alliance. Moreover, right before the NATO summit, in a letter to the leaders of the two separatist regions, Putin declared his support for their opposition to Georgia's membership of NATO. Also, Putin emphasised that any kind of pressure on the Abkhazians and South Ossetians from Tbilisi would be counter-productive. Understandably, Tbilisi treated these statements with apprehension.

Tbilisi's choices. Saakashvili and his government confront a pair of dilemmas in the wake of recent developments:

• Economy or sovereignty. Russia's easing of its travel embargo, restrictions on visas and, possibly, trade with Georgia has proved popular among the general populace, who are increasingly disillusioned with Saakashvili's rule. However, these moves are accompanied by what is in effect the creeping annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, through Russian capital investment and political cooperation. It is likely that these tendencies will grow as the December MAP decision approaches. Hence, Saakashvili must choose between accepting growing economic ties with Russia at the cost of turning a blind eye to developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or stepping up the anti-Russian nationalistic rhetoric in the run-up to the May parliamentary elections.
• MAP or conflict. The other, longer-term dilemma relates to the choice between joining NATO and recovering the secessionist regions. Moscow made it clear that Tbilisi's further moves towards the alliance would be matched by a growing Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, the existence of 'frozen conflicts' on Georgia's territory was the main argument for refusing Georgia an MAP at this stage for some NATO countries. Thus, Tbilisi is under acute time pressure -- the unpredictability of the outcome of the US presidential election is forcing Saakashvili to make the most of Bush's unwavering support for Georgia's membership in NATO while he is still in the office. Meanwhile, pressing ahead with the MAP and NATO membership also means the loss of any means of control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Saakashvili's presidential style -- his over-use of nationalistic rhetoric, uncompromising stance towards Russia, heavy reliance on US support and widely proclaimed dedication to integration in Western political and military structures -- suggests that in both dilemmas, his choices will incline towards confrontation with Moscow. This may happen despite Saakashvili's statement that Russia and Georgia were "lucky" to have Dmitry Medvedev as the next president of Russia. This statement recalls the ephemeral hopes -- that quickly waned -- of improved Georgian-Russian relations in the wake of the 'Rose Revolution' four years ago.

Outlook. The past few weeks have been a time of renewed turbulence in Georgian-Russian relations, but with very little tangible outcome. For all the seriousness of such events as Kosovo's independence declaration, the NATO summit, the gradual transition from Putin to Medvedev in Moscow and the political crisis in Georgia, very little has changed in the two countries' relations. It is likely that confrontational rhetoric and political crises will continue in the coming months, making Russia's growing cooperation with Georgia's secessionist regions the centrepiece of mutual distrust and alienation. Saakashvili stands to lose more from this situation as his domestic support base has been significantly eroded and the NATO summit did not come as his personal foreign political triumph.