RUSSIA: Constitutional reforms beget uncertainty

Analysis

President Dmitry Medvedev's November 5 state of the nation address to parliament was by far the most radical address of any post-communist Russian president (see RUSSIA: Medvedev shifts focus to political reform - November 6, 2008). He outlined a comprehensive set of political reforms that will affect all branches of representative government. These measures will result in the first amendments to the Russian constitution since it was introduced in 1993.

Constitutional changes. Medvedev's proposed reforms not only address federal and local representative institutions, but also have implications for Russian political parties:

• Presidential terms will be extended from four to six years.
• Terms for members of the Duma (lower house of parliament) will be extended from four to five years. Furthermore, the Duma's executive oversight powers are to be strengthened, with the government required to submit annual reports.
• The Federation Council (upper house of parliament) will consist of representatives from regional and local government bodies.
• The executive heads of Russian regions will be nominated by parties that gain a majority of votes in regional elections.
• Local representative bodies will have the power to remove heads of municipalities from office. Political parties and other public associations will also play a greater role in local councils.
• Political parties that receive 5-7% of the vote in Duma elections will now receive minimal representation, which they were previously denied. Restrictions on forming political parties will also ease: monetary deposits will no longer be required at elections, there will be a gradual reduction in the number of voter signatures required for registration and the number of members required to form political parties will also be reduced. Regular rotation of party leaders will become mandatory, and state media will now cover the activities of all parties in parliament.
• The Public Chamber will be required to participate in drafting legislation.

These proposals do not signal a desire by the president to democratise the political system. The secrecy surrounding their announcement and the speed with which they are being introduced have left almost no room for public discussion or scrutiny. However, this is unlikely to affect Medvedev's ability to implement his proposals. Given the ruling party's political dominance in parliament and regional assemblies, the procedural requirements to amend the constitution -- a two-thirds majority in the Duma, three-quarters in the Federation Council, plus majorities in three-quarters of all regional assemblies -- will pose no significant obstacles. It seems likely that the Federation Council will approve the amendments by end-November, and that Russia will have an amended constitution by early January.

The measures announced by Medvedev were almost certainly prepared before former President Vladimir Putin became prime minister. Although Putin never publicly supported an extension to his term in office, he did express support for a lengthening of presidential terms in 2007. Around this time, a Kremlin working group was reportedly formed to examine possible amendments to the constitution.

First and foremost, the proposals benefit the Kremlin. Extending the presidential term will reduce the uncertainty that electoral competition presents to Russia's rulers. At the same time, key concessions have been made to legislative, regional and party interests. These appear to be aimed at shoring up the regime's support across Russia's political elite. However, it is unclear whether these proposals are a response to the political uncertainty that was expected to follow the succession from Putin to Medvedev, or Russia's leadership is preparing the ground for a potentially greater shock: the return of Putin to the Kremlin. Revelations on the reasoning behind Medvedev's proposals are likely to shape Russian politics over the coming year.

Further consolidation? Although Putin frequently affirmed his commitment to the 1993 constitution, the Kremlin was never entirely happy with the arrangements that he inherited. Putin's presidency witnessed many institutional changes, notably:

• new rules on the appointment of regional governors, political parties, elections and parliament;
• quasi-constitutional innovations such as the creation of super-regional districts headed by presidential representatives ('polpredy'); and
• the creation of the Public Chamber.

These changes helped to consolidate Putin's power and partly account for his political success. However, Putin's presidency provided only incremental solutions to the many problems of governance that face Russia:

• The prolonged and frequent periods of political uncertainty that normally accompany short presidential electoral cycles has been a major problem for Russia's ruling elite. Notwithstanding the great resources that the Kremlin had at its disposal to manage the handover of presidential power, the process still introduced an element of unpredictability (see RUSSIA:Uncertainty and elite fears prove destabilising - November 19, 2007).
• Calls for longer presidential terms by elite groups were frequently voiced as the Putin-Medvedev succession drew closer. Indeed, what is striking about Russian politics in recent weeks is the limited criticism of the idea of longer presidential terms.
• Putin's political success also enabled the Kremlin to reassess the capacity of the Putin system to evolve. Towards the end of Putin's rule, supporters of the regime openly expressed reservations about the effectiveness of the new arrangements. In particular, reforms to the Federation Council and the system for appointing regional governors were singled out as producing a deficit of legitimacy at the federal and local level.

Strengthening institutions. Medvedev's proposals engage with these elite concerns. Moreover, within the confines of the current system, they have the potential to strengthen and broaden the institutional centres of power that support the regime:

1. Legislative institutions. The Russian parliament has suffered from low levels of public confidence since the early 1990s. Along with political parties, parliament is one of the least-valued institutions in Russian society. This is partly a consequence of its relatively weak influence over the executive branch (see RUSSIA: Weakened parliament offers political insights - February 1, 2008). Therefore, proposals to strengthen the Duma's executive oversight powers are a positive step. While the constitution grants the Duma many significant powers, its weak rights of interpellation have often been characterised as a major shortcoming.

   Changes to the composition of the Federation Council may revive regional interests and strengthen legislative expertise in the upper house. Under Putin, the chamber effectively became a sinecure for semi-retired public officials and business interests, which further undermined public (and elite) confidence in the institution.

2. Political parties. Reform of the Federation Council, along with a new method for appointing regional governors, could provide further incentives for the development of regional political party organisations. Currently, decisions about the appointments of regional personnel are taken by the presidential administration and its regional representatives, the polpredy. By giving political parties the power to nominate candidates for regional gubernatorial positions, Medvedev is reintroducing an electoral process for appointing governors, and is thereby weakening the role of the polpredy.

   The proposals also loosen many of the regulations that currently restrict political parties. Opposition parties will welcome the simplification of party registration requirements.

3. Regime stability. By shifting certain responsibilities to other representative institutions, Medvedev's proposals could facilitate further institutionalisation of the arrangements established by the 1993 constitution. The main weakness of the Russian political system is its overdependence on presidential leadership. In times of crisis, the political system has few credible representative institutions to bolster its authority. By dispersing power, the regime is seeking to root its authority in other institutions. This may have the positive effect of depersonalising the exercise of political power in Russia.

Double-edged sword. The incentives and benefits generated by these new arrangements could help to cement elite cohesion amid expected economic uncertainty. However, their consequences are also likely to be double-edged:

• United Russia's dominance. Under the current political circumstances, United Russia will be the main beneficiary of these reforms (see RUSSIA: United Russia dominates as elections approach - January 17, 2007). Its control of regional parliaments will guarantee the party's dominance of the Federation Council, as well as a greater role in the appointment of regional governors. While this may force the Kremlin to take United Russia more seriously, it does not necessarily signal a more pluralistic political system. The upper house is currently led by Sergei Mironov, leader of United Russia's main pro-Kremlin competitor, Just Russia. Arguably, this political arrangement has provided a check on United Russia's power.
• Restricted opposition autonomy. Although Medvedev has proposed lifting a number of electoral hindrances on political parties, he is also seeking greater regulation over the appointment of party leaders. The idea that parties will have to rotate their leaders on a regular basis could derail the emergence of popular opposition leaders, and is almost certain to cause periodic rows over party leadership. It is likely to create problems for the Communist Party (CPRF), which has faced leadership conflicts in the past, and it could signal the end for parties that rely on charismatic leaders, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Over the next year, the fate of Russia's most durable post-communist parties, the CPRF and LDPR, is likely to come under scrutiny.
• Strengthened Putin. The reforms will have immediate benefits for the prime minister. As leader of United Russia, Putin will gain from the party's strengthened position. Medvedev's proposals to enhance the Duma's powers of oversight also present advantages to the prime minister in the current political climate. The requirement that the government present an annual report will give Putin another independent platform that he will use to extol the government's achievements.

Putin comeback? The benefits that Putin stands to gain from these reforms will be watched eagerly by foreign investors and governments. Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding who really governs Russia continues to affect international relations and confidence in the Russian economy. The speed at which the reforms are being implemented by Russia's authorities has led some commentators to consider the possibility of a Putin comeback, perhaps as early as next year. Putin's return to the Kremlin may come sooner rather than later:

1. Economic challenges. In the past, Russian presidents have shirked responsibility for economic problems by blaming their prime ministers. The economic crisis of 1998 produced a number of prime ministerial casualties. It is therefore entirely possible that Putin's reputation for achieving unprecedented economic growth and prosperity will be damaged by a serious economic downturn.

   Despite Putin's statements about the government's ability to handle the current crisis, the authorities are clearly concerned about the potential consequences of a prolonged recession, and measures have already been taken to forestall likely political opposition. For example, the authorities have refused to register the most outspoken democratic opposition to Putin, Mikhail Kasyanov's Russian Popular Democratic Union, and local organisers of United Russia have allegedly been ordered to monitor labour unrest. If Putin plans to return to the Kremlin (his comments on this issue have been ambiguous to date), the economic crisis might hasten his comeback.

2. Medvedev's growing authority. Although most observers contend that Putin remains the dominant partner in Russia's diarchy, Medvedev's authority has grown since he became president (see RUSSIA: Rhetoric differentiates Medvedev from Putin - July 29, 2008). Medvedev has started to make his mark in areas of policy where Putin was largely unsuccessful -- particularly military reform and measures to tackle corruption -- and he is gaining international credibility. His support within the ruling establishment is likely to increase over time, as well. Moreover, some of Medvedev's proposals to reform political parties suggest that he may be seeking to establish his own political base.

Outlook. If constitutional reform is used as a pretext for a new presidential vote next year, the re-election of Putin would have little impact on policy. Since the war in Georgia, Medvedev's policy statements have been largely indistinguishable from those of Putin. One striking feature of Medvedev's presidential address to parliament was its hard-line, anti-US rhetoric. Putin's return to the Kremlin would clarify the uncertainty that surrounds the division of power in Russia, but it would also damage his credibility. Throughout his presidency, Putin remained wedded to the principle that the constitution was inviolable and would not be altered for short-term political gain. Any attempt by Putin to go back on this pledge would be a major blow to perceptions of the regime's ability to commit credibly to its foundational principles. If such a scenario were to transpire amid a severe economic crisis, it might affect Russia's prospects for a successful recovery.

The speed at which the authorities have pushed through these political changes suggests that they have been planned for some time. While the timing may signal Putin's intent to return to the Kremlin next year, there are other factors that should not be discounted:

• The Kremlin may perceive a need to ensure the security, unity and confidence of the elite in the aftermath of the presidential succession process.
• The ruling elite may wish to resolve constitutional issues well before Russia enters its next electoral cycle in 2011-12.
• There is a tactical advantage for the Kremlin in realising the reforms at the peak of its authority.

There is a real possibility that Russia is entering a period of social and political unrest as a result of the economic crisis. Therefore, while a Putin return cannot be ruled out, there are many other reasons that could plausibly account for Medvedev's actions at this time.