INTERNATIONAL: Private firms may have anti-piracy role

Analysis

Increasingly bold attacks by Somali pirates against commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters -- and the sporadic, uncoordinated, and largely ineffective actions of various governments to counter the threat -- have led shippers to consider expanding their use of private security contractors (PSCs). While there are significant downsides to the use of PSCs, a lack of viable alternatives may cause more shipping firms to fall back on this age-old method of protecting their vessels. (Centuries ago, the East India Company ran its own convoys to protect its ships from pirates.)

Pirate depredations increase. Somali pirates are increasingly sophisticated, and have begun to expand their range well beyond the Gulf of Aden:

• Sophisticated equipment. Long-range boats equipped with GPS navigation systems, 0.5-calibre machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades have enabled Somali pirates increasingly to launch long-distance attacks against high-value targets in major shipping lanes. Against such weapons, traditional non-lethal deterrents -- such as high-powered hoses, slippery foam, acoustic devices and electric rails -- are of no avail.
• Blood and money. In the first six months of 2008, 71 vessels were boarded off Somalia, twelve were hijacked and eleven were fired on before escaping. A total of 190 crew members have been taken hostage, seven have been killed and another seven are missing and presumed dead, according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).
• Valuable booty. The capture of the Sirius Star last month, a Saudi Aramco-owned supertanker carrying 2 million barrels of oil worth approximately 100 million dollars, was rapidly followed by the seizure of a Thai fishing boat with 16 crew and an Iranian cargo vessel with a crew of 25. More recently, pirates also captured the Hong Kong-flagged bulk carrier Delight, laden with wheat for Bandar Abbas, Iran.
• Expanding range. The capture of the Sirius, approximately 450 nautical miles south-east of Kenya, demonstrated that the pirates' operating zone had expanded to encompass the main oil trade route from the Gulf to Europe and the United States.

Ineffectual government responses. With rare exceptions, regular military forces are either unavailable or unwilling to engage in anti-piracy missions:

• India. The Indian Navy said on November 19 that one of its warships, the INS Tabar, had engaged a pirate "mother ship" in the Gulf of Aden, sinking it and forcing the pirates to abandon a second boat. However, this action appears to have resulted in the deaths of several hostages.
• France. France is the only country to have used commando forces to capture Somali pirates and rescue hostages. One occasion involved chasing several marauders back to Somalia after the crew of a French luxury yacht had been freed. A second incident involved covertly boarding a small yacht to free a French couple from their sleeping captors. However, on both occasions, some ransom payments had been made, which convinced the pirates that the use of force was unlikely -- and all of the hostages were French.

Insufficient naval protection. Currently the United States and its allies have 14 warships off Somalia, but this is insufficient to provide escorts to all commercial vessels (see INTERNATIONAL/SOMALIA: Piracy solution lies ashore - November 19, 2008). At least 251 incidents worldwide have been reported this year to the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC). Piracy is a global phenomenon. Even if sufficient forces were dispatched to the Gulf of Aden, pirates would continue to operate in other global hotspots. It may not be possible for any one country, perhaps not even the United States, to protect all sea lanes.

Possible contractor opportunities. Traditionally, the shipping industry has used private companies to help negotiate ransoms and the release of crews after a ship has been captured. However, maritime firms and the US government have also used contractors to help protect ships against pirates and other security threats:

• Malacca precedent. For years, strategic 'choke points' such as the Strait of Malacca have been plagued by pirate attacks. As a counter-measure, shippers have turned to firms such as Background Asia Risk Solutions to provide armed escort vessels -- in addition to soliciting government help.
• HollowPoint. After the September capture of the Ukrainian MV Faina off Somalia, which was carrying 33 tanks, HollowPoint Protective Services announced that the firm was in negotiations to provide "asset protection and security services" in the Gulf of Aden.
• Blackwater. Blackwater Worldwide has offered a support vessel service that would accompany a ship and deploy patrol helicopters. This would involve defensive escort duty, rather than hunting down pirates. For anti-piracy operations, the 14-member crew would be supplemented with Blackwater security guards and four rigid-hull inflatable boats. Blackwater says it has had enquiries from about 60 shippers and insurance companies and is preparing a presentation for potential clients in London this month.
• Public-private cooperation. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, a number of UK contractors -- including Marine Underwater Security Consultants and Hart Security -- were invited to participate in a committee drafting the US Coast Guard's International Ship and Port Facility code submission to the UN's International Maritime Organisation (IMO). More recently, Vice Admiral William Gortney of the US Fifth Fleet, whose headquarters are in Bahrain, urged merchant vessels to sail with armed guards.

Problems with contractors. However, employing contractors may also be problematic, in several respects:

• Illegitimate firms. In 2005, a US contractor signed a two-year deal worth more than 50 million dollars with the Somali Transitional Federal Government to escort ships through Somali waters. However, the company's capacity was so dubious that the US Department of State's Bureau of Arms Control issued a 'cease and desist' order.
• Legal issues. The legality of some security operations may be questionable. For example, the state flags under which ships are registered differ over whether employing contractors on their vessels is permissible. Some states explicitly prohibit it, some say they do not support it, and others remain neutral (see INTERNATIONAL: Pirates' hostages require caution - December 2, 2008).
• Wary shippers. Shipowners, masters and crews do not like the thought of a fire-fight occurring somewhere around or aboard their vessels, particularly in the case of oil tankers. Therefore, the shipping community has been circumspect about whether commercial vessels should carry security guards.
• UN opposition. The IMO distributed new guidance after the September 11 attacks, strongly discouraging shippers from arming commercial crews, because it would risk "escalating an already dangerous situation".

Long-term fix. With respect to piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters, it is likely that the only long-term solution involves a stable Somalia (see PROSPECTS 2009: Horn of Africa's challenges grow - November 5, 2008).