VENEZUELA: Referendum debate will deepen cleavages

Analysis

At rallies celebrating the tenth anniversary of his election to the presidency and victories in the November's regional elections, President Hugo Chavez called for a second popular referendum on constitutional reform (see PROSPECTS 2009: Venezuela may face turning point - November 28, 2008). If supported by the electorate, the planned changes to the 1999 constitution would enable Chavez to re-contest the presidency in 2012 and govern until 2019.

It had been anticipated that Chavez would make a second attempt to lift the two-term limit following the narrow defeat of the referendum held in December 2007 (see VENEZUELA: Referendum may force Chavez rethink - December 4, 2007). The surprise lies in the speed of the announcement and the language used to press for a second referendum to be convened.

Motivations. There was no mention of a second referendum during the campaign for the November elections. Several factors may have motivated the decision to press for a second referendum so soon after the November contest:

• Economy. There is speculation that the government needs to move ahead with the referendum as soon as possible in order that a marked deterioration in the economy will not negatively affect the pro-government vote. In the view of the opposition, the constitutional reform campaign is a ruse to distract the electorate from serious economic challenges and government mismanagement.
• Opposition revival. In November the opposition gained control of governorships in the most strategically important and heavily populated urban areas of the country; the referendum is intended to curtail a potential opposition honeymoon, allowing the government to redefine the political agenda.
• Chavista divisions. The November election campaign revealed deep personality and ideological divisions within the ranks of the Chavistas. A second referendum is intended to galvanise unity and refocus internal power struggles on the consolidation of the Bolivarian revolution.
• Chavista succession crisis. The defeat in November of Diosdado Cabello -- incumbent governor of Miranda, former vice-president, close confidant of Chavez and expected leadership successor -- has imperilled the planned succession within the ranks of the Chavista movement.

Manner of announcement. The latter point was underlined by the way in which Chavez re-ignited the reform debate, declaring that "I'm ready to be with you until 2019", and that "There's no Chavismo without Chavez". While the Bolivarian revolution has always relied heavily on his central figure, this marks a major change in strategic orientation. Chavez signalled that internal ruling PSUV party criticism of his position will be marginalised, that the political process will be channelled through his office, and that those who betray Chavez 'die politically.' For moderates within the Chavistas, the revolution is running the risk of turning in on itself.

The referendum proposing the constitutional amendment will be introduced by the PSUV in the National Assembly; the constitution allows referenda to be convened through either the support of one third of Assembly members, or a petition signed by 15% of registered voters. Once the referendum proposal has passed in the Assembly, the National Election Council has 30 days to prepare for the referendum. Chavez has signalled that he would prefer to see the referendum convened on February 27, the anniversary of the Caracazo, a major national protest against neo-liberal economic measures that led to the death of an estimated 3,000 people in 1989.

Although the opposition has protested, the actions of the government are within the constitution. However, the opposition may capitalise on its claim that the government is acting in bad faith in going against an expressed popular will not to allow term limits to be lifted.

Rising tension. The referendum campaign will exacerbate polarisation between pro and anti-Chavez groups, which has intensified since the November elections:

• Pro-government groups in Miranda state have recently marched to defend social programmes initiated by the national government, which they argue have been threatened by the new opposition governor Henrique Capriles Radonski. Opposition supporters and officials have also been accused of closing down public spaces for education and cultural programmes.
• Newly elected opposition administrators have claimed that Chavistas have ransacked offices and that local government staff are refusing to work for incoming opposition officials.

Rosales accusations. The Venezuelan Journalists Association and Venezuelan Episcopal Conference have denounced what they call a political witchhunt against Chavez's opponents. The former governor of Zulia and ex-presidential candidate Manuel Rosales, newly elected mayor of Maracaibo, has been called to a hearing by the attorney-general on December 11, accused of fraudulent use of public funds.

There is a strong possibility that the prosecution of Rosales could backfire against the government. In presenting their evidence against him, the National Assembly has relied on phone taps, raising serious concerns over human rights and questions as to the performance of the intelligence services. This coincides with the expulsion of the Colombian consul in Zulia, Carlos Fajardo, following the release of phone tap evidence of his support for the opposition. There is a view that the government is seeking to deflect from its own serious problems of official corruption. Moreover, the opposition's moderate demeanour in challenging the allegations contrasts sharply with government denunciations of opposition 'fascism'.

Political gamble. It is difficult to predict the results of a February referendum:

• Single issue. In the December 2007 referendum, the proposal to lift term limits was just one of a package of 69 reform measures put to the electorate. However, Chavez's confidence that a single-issue referendum on lifting term limits will succeed is not borne out in (sometimes opposition-linked) poll surveys by Hinterlaces, Datanalysis, Datos, Ecoanalitica and Alfredo Keller Associates. The majority sentiment is that presidents should not be allowed to serve indefinitely, a view linked to the long experience with military authoritarianism that prevailed until 1961. Even among Chavez supporters there is a view that the president should be planning his succession.
• Core support. Although the government will rely heavily on its core support base among the poor, the November elections demonstrated that this can no longer be taken for granted, while public spending projects may face increasing constraints.
• November momentum. Chavez is seeking to capitalise on the relatively strong performance of the PSUV in November, which demonstrated its capacity to mobilise pro-government votes -- in contrast to the situation in the December 2007 referendum when it was in the process of being established. Moreover, opinion polls and surveys by by Gallup and Latinbarometro indicate strong popular confidence in the political system and the administration's social programmes. However, it is not clear if the PSUV's November vote will translate into support for lifting term limits. Regional elections are heavily influenced by local level concerns, undermining the possibility of a vote carry-through.

Chavez's decision to press once again for re-election is a major political gamble. Defeat in December 2007 was a serious psychological upset for the president, a major boost for the opposition and divisive for the Chavista movement. While moderates argued that defeat was a sign of voter antipathy toward radicalisation, radicals argued that defeat was attributed to the slow pace of revolutionary change.