AFRICA: Ethiopia shifts focus from Somalia to Eritrea

Analysis

Ethiopia has agreed to withdraw its troops from Somalia as part of the UN-facilitated Djibouti peace process, which has seen several landmark agreements reached since the initial deal was signed in mid-August (see SOMALIA: Fragile Djibouti Agreement raises peace hopes - September 3, 2008). The withdrawal is scheduled to be complete by end-December, although it is likely that this may overrun by some weeks -- particularly if Ethiopian troops provide cover for either the withdrawal or further strengthening of African Union peacekeepers (AMISOM). The Djibouti process has provided an effective legitimisation for ending what has been a costly intervention for Ethiopia. US efforts to establish a UN peace-keeping mission to replace AMISOM, if successful, probably would not persuade Addis Ababa to remain deployed inside Somalia.

Humanitarian disaster. Ethiopia's action comes amid a growing humanitarian crisis. A local human rights group estimates that since the start of 2007, more than 16,000 have been killed in south and central Somalia, with over 28,000 wounded and more than 1 million displaced. The US Agency for International Development estimates 3.2 million are in need of emergency assistance, including some 334,000 Somali refugees in neighbouring countries.

The humanitarian crisis in Somalia comes in the context of a wider food security emergency across the Horn of Africa, mainly a result of poor rains. The International Federation of the Red Cross estimated last week that more than 20 million across the region were at risk. In Somalia and south-eastern Ethiopia in particular, the food crisis is compounded by insecurity (see AFRICA: Food crisis worsens Horn of Africa security - August 13, 2008).

Djibouti developments. On November 25, an agreement was reached on power-sharing under the Djibouti process:

• The negotiations include elements of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), led by Prime Minister Nur 'Adde' Hassan Hussein, and the Djibouti-based faction of the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), under former Council of Somali Islamic Courts Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former TFG Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan.
• The two sides laid out a plan to increase parliament by 200 seats to accommodate the ARS, and to set aside a further 75 seats for those not already involved in the peace process, such as civil society, but potentially including militant groups.

TFG meltdown. However, tensions within the TFG have escalated significantly over the last two months, and especially in recent days:

• President Abdullahi Yusuf has become increasingly hostile towards the Djibouti process, motivated both by the impending loss of Ethiopian military support and the prospect of a significant dilution of his support base within the parliament. The Nairobi meeting in November of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), under whose auspices the TFG was established, failed to push Yusuf to approve a cabinet put forward by Nur Adde and supported by donors.
• On December 14, Yusuf unilaterally announced that he had sacked the prime minister, by-passing parliament -- which responded by holding a confidence vote the next day that overwhelmingly supported Nur Adde. Nevertheless, Yusuf has named as prime minister Mohammed Mahmud Guled 'Gamadhere', an Hawiye clan ally and former TFG minister. Some 120 members of parliament yesterday supported opening impeachment proceedings against Yusuf.

Ahead of Ethiopian withdrawal, the TFG now faces the prospect of collapse. However, it seems likely that parliament, with the backing of donors, will approve the changes to its structure outlined under the Djibouti process, and elect "new leadership", as specified in the November 25 agreement -- which was endorsed by legislators yesterday. This could be interpreted to include a new president.

Withdrawal effect. Amid this upheaval in the TFG, the removal of Ethiopian troops from Somali territory will significantly alter the political landscape, especially if AMISOM also withdraws:

• Clan politics. Yusuf's likely removal, following the incorporation of the ARS into a unity parliament, would bring Hawiye-Darod clan tensions back to the fore. The new TFG would be led by the Hawiye clans and subclans that had controlled much of Mogadishu until the Ethiopian invasion, and characterised the TFG's predecessor (the Transitional National Government, 2000-04). Yusuf, a Darod, and his closest allies would probably be purged. Clan politics did not disappear as a result of Ethiopia's intervention, but the presence of its troops provided a galvanising influence, which helped relegate clan interests to a secondary role.
• Insurgent cohesion. The absence of a foreign occupier will diminish the cohesion of the two ARS factions, and their respective Islamic Court and clan militia affiliates and other insurgent groups. This could slow momentum for the Djibouti process, which has benefited from the perception that it could speed Ethiopia's exit. Once this goal is realised, militia can be expected to return to fighting among themselves for control over local resources, especially the strategic ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo.
• Islamist militancy. The radical Shabaab militia in particular may see its influence and capacity diminished as a result of Ethiopia's withdrawal. Shabaab is not a unified movement, and some groups calling themselves Shabaab are simply clan-based groups cashing in on the group's tactical successes against Ethiopian and TFG positions. The numbers of ideologically motivated fighters are probably very low, although there is no doubt that the popular perception that Ethiopia's intervention was orchestrated by the United States has contributed to a rise in anti-Western and anti-US sentiment.

Outlook. If the withdrawal proceeds, as seems likely, this could significantly alter the security dynamics of the wider region (see PROSPECTS 2009: Horn of Africa's challenges grow - November 5, 2008):

1. Manageable Somali instability. It seems possible that Ethiopia's exit will lead to a short-term spike in the level of violence in Somalia, as various armed groups battle for position. However, this may well be followed by a return to a lower level of conflict, such as that which characterised the country before the TFG attempted to establish itself in Somalia in early 2005:

   • The TFG/ARS unity government would remain ineffectual, as control over militia would return to local-level clan interests.
   • Core Shabaab Islamists could well continue to target Western interests, including humanitarian workers.

   This tense but stable level of conflict may continue to be punctuated by US counter-terrorism operations and potential Ethiopian cross-border interventions, should the latter feel its interests are threatened.

2. Ethiopia/Eritrea tensions. Ethiopian attention and resources will probably be refocused on Eritrea (see ETHIOPIA: Polls conduct reflects government pressures - April 21, 2008):
   • The tense border stand-off has been exacerbated this year by the expiry of the UN peace-keeping mission, which was completely withdrawn by October.
   • The international community no longer plays a role as a buffer between the two countries' troops, and now lacks even the capacity to monitor the situation, to prevent an accident or misperception from escalating into resumed conflict.
   • Ethiopian and Eritrean sponsorship of each other's insurgencies will probably also increase (see ERITREA: Asmara retains role as regional spoiler - February 18, 2008).