US/PAKISTAN: Bilateral distrust persists under Obama

Analysis

Pakistani authorities have clamped down on the Islamist Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) -- the apparent front organisation of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) -- which is strongly suspected of a role in the Mumbai attacks. These steps are intended to assure India and the United States that the Pakistani government and its intelligence agencies were unaware of the terrorist organisation's strategic intent or operational planning. However, no arrests of senior JuD/LeT leaders have been confirmed, and the group may still to be allowed to operate (see PAKISTAN: Army will accept limited LeT clampdown - December 9, 2008).

Assessing JuD/LeT militants. The operational strength of JuD/LeT is derived from its large membership base -- it draws hundreds of people to its annual meeting outside Lahore -- and their support for the Kashmir conflict. Given its internal support from elements of Pakistan's intelligence agencies, the JuD/LeT is arguably a more dangerous regional threat than al-Qaida, whose presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is relatively insignificant in terms of numbers or financial resources:

1. Sometime strategic tool. The LeT has long been used as a strategic tool by Islamabad to achieve its objectives in Kashmir. The organisation shares al-Qaida's doctrine of global jihad, albeit with a distinctly strong anti-Indian posture, and has been allowed to operate freely inside Pakistan. The Pakistani government has regularly shifted its posture towards LeT between benign neglect and active support for its activities in Kashmir. LeT seeks to weaken Indian influence in the region -- a goal shared by Pakistan -- and create an Islamist government (the 'Khalifa'), an archaic system that the current Pakistani government does not support.
2. Diplomatic sleight of hand. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf outlawed the LeT, but the group was informed of his decision days ahead of the official crackdown. Having renamed itself JuD (an organisation ostensibly concerned with welfare and charitable work) LeT was able to maintain its offices -- and even its telephone numbers -- leaving it largely unaffected. The name change also left the organisation's militant infrastructure intact.
3. Mumbai involvement? US and Indian intelligence, and many inside Pakistan, suspect that the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate -- or at least elements within it -- played some organising role in the Mumbai attacks (see US/PAKISTAN: ISI reform is urgent but faces hurdles - August 28, 2008). The group that claimed 'credit' for Mumbai, the 'Deccan Mujahideen', is very likely a pseudonym for JuD/LeT. However, even if ISI elements were involved, it was very likely without the knowledge of the civilian government in Islamabad.

Controlled crackdown on JuD/LeT. Intense pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with New Delhi and Washington to isolate JuD/LeT members -- particularly its leadership -- has produced a crackdown that Islamabad insists will damage the organisation's ability to launch future attacks:

• In a surprise move, Islamabad closed down five training camps run by the JuD/LeT, including camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir and in Punjab.
• Pakistan claims to have arrested 124 suspects, including important figures such as lead LeT commander Zaki-ur-Rehman, who was arrested outside Muzaffarabad in early December; however it is unclear how long he will be detained or whether he will be handed over to Indian authorities.
• Print media controlled by JuD/LeT have been shut down. These publications enjoyed wide readership across Pakistan's main cities and were easily accessible; some of them aimed to indoctrinate women and children.

These moves follow an earlier decision by Islamabad to ban JuD, in response to a UN Security Council resolution, requested by India in December, which designated JuD as a 'terrorist' organisation.

Domestic vs international pressures. The civilian government in Islamabad may be making a sincere effort to control the militants. However, these steps have provoked strong domestic opposition, for two principal reasons:

• The limited crackdown is perceived by much of the Pakistani public as a capitulation to Indian and US pressure. Bowing to Indian demands places the fragile democracy at greater risk of attack by militants, who benefit from support by radical clerics and patronage networks.
• JuD/LeT enjoys public support for its charitable and welfare activities, such as providing relief to earthquake victims.

Temporary anti-JuD measures? There are indications that the crackdown against JuD is a temporary measure, designed to assuage the near-term US and Indian concerns about the group in the wake of the Mumbai attacks:

• Saeed's treatment. Entrenched JuD-ISI links, and JuD's popularity as a charitable organisation, suggest that the crackdown will not last. Tellingly, JuD leader (and LeT founder) Hafiz Muhammad Saeed has only been placed under house arrest: in Pakistan, it is widely believed that if the government were serious about curbing his activities he would not have been afforded this privilege, or allowed to hold a press conference denying the charges.
• Kashmir policy imperatives. Without a political resolution to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan needs to court and control organisations such as JuD in order to retain its influence in the region.
• JuD leaders' movements. US and Indian intelligence are also concerned about the ease with which other JuD leaders have been able to move about in Pakistan from population centres to remote tribal areas. For example, key operational leader Masood Azhar is believed to have relocated to Wana in South Waziristan. Such movements effectively take JuD leaders beyond the reach of Indian intelligence.

Obama's scepticism. President Barack Obama's decision just days after his inauguration to authorise a new round of strikes by aerial drones within FATA -- particularly in Waziristan -- suggests that he is unconvinced by Islamabad's promises to curb militants such as JuD. The new president apparently understands the role of the Kashmir conflict in fostering militancy, and the new regional approach that will be espoused by US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke is apposite (see US/SOUTH ASIA: Regional security strategy may falter - January 13, 2009). However, restoring trust between Washington and Islamabad -- let alone resolving the Kashmir conflict -- will be exceptionally difficult.