ASEAN force will focus first on disaster aid

Analysis

Indonesia introduced the idea of an ASEAN regional peace-keeping group in 2003, as part of the plan of action for an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). Strengthening peace-keeping cooperation by creating a network of national peace-keeping centres was an objective in the APSC blueprint formulated in 2009.

These centres train personnel (primarily military and police) to participate in UN peace-keeping operations and form rapid response units for natural disasters. Some centres train medical teams, election observers, judicial experts and de-mining technicians. Others, including Indonesia's, provide counterterrorism training.

Meetings of the peace-keeping centres were held in 2012 and 2013. Except Myanmar and Laos, all ASEAN states have national centres and have contributed forces to UN peace-keeping missions.

ASEAN has limited experience at intra-regional peace-keeping:

• In 2003, Indonesia invited several ASEAN states to send observers to monitor the Aceh ceasefire.
• In 2004, the Philippines invited Malaysian officials to observe negotiations between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
• However, in 2011, Thailand rejected Indonesian attempts to place ASEAN observers on the Cambodia-Thailand border to monitor a ceasefire in the Preah Vihear temple dispute.

Foundational obstacles

Establishing an ASEAN peace-keeping force faces obstacles:

Uneven capabilities

ASEAN's militaries have considerable disparities in size, funding and modernisation. The wealthier governments would probably bear the greatest costs of a peace-keeping force, but assessing contributions would be controversial.

Inter-operability problems

Through the mechanism of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), militaries are beginning to share information and conduct limited joint exercises (see ASEAN: Defence meeting will see modest progress - May 13, 2014). However, except for the participation of Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines in the UN Transition Administration in East Timor, South-east Asia's militaries have little to no experience of actual joint operations.

The "ASEAN Way"

ASEAN espouses consensus and non-interference in the affairs of member states. The development of a regional peace-keeping force would require delicate negotiation of terms of engagement. Further, deployment would be constrained by ASEAN's decision-making process, requiring the consent of all ten members.

Nor would member governments likely agree to a supranational command for the force, while coordinating command across ten countries would be difficult.

External alliances

ASEAN as a group avoids security alliances with external partners, but individual ASEAN states have ties to other powers that could complicate a decision to deploy a peacekeeping force.

This is unlikely to matter if the ASEAN force is focused on disaster relief or resolving intra-ASEAN state frictions. It could pose problems if the force were used beyond South-east Asia, eg, in disputed international waters.

Competing visions

Beyond foundational challenges, determining the operational mandate of an ASEAN regional peace-keeping force would be difficult. Suggestions include:

• settling disputes between ASEAN states;
• participating in UN peace-keeping operations under the ASEAN flag;
• providing a united front against threats to South-east Asia within Asia-Pacific;
• organising regional natural disaster responses; and
• helping ASEAN states recover from conflict.

Jakarta cited the first point as the rationale for a peace-keeping force in 2003; Hussein mentioned it again in February. However, an ASEAN force could only be deployed at the request of the member governments concerned. Strong ASEAN adherence to sovereignty makes this unlikely in the foreseeable future.

On the second point, Malaysian officials have suggested that the African Union's peace-keeping force might be a model. However, ASEAN's consensus rules could hinder unanimous agreement on deploying an ASEAN force outside the region.

On the third, the obvious threat would be China. However, most ASEAN leaders would view this role as more likely to exacerbate than prevent conflict. Some governments, including Thailand and Singapore, have raised concerns that a regional force with this focus could push ASEAN into a coordinated security role too rapidly.

Under a mandate of organising regional natural disaster responses, an ASEAN peace-keeping force would help to maintain order and facilitate disaster relief (see ASEAN: 'Disaster diplomacy' to gather pace - January 29, 2015). This option would particularly appeal to Indonesia and the Philippines -- two large, archipelagic countries vulnerable to natural disasters.

Cambodia has suggested that war-torn ASEAN members could benefit from a regional force to help clear landmines and other dangers remaining from conflicts. This could appeal to Laos, which like Vietnam has unexploded US ordinance left over from the Vietnam War, and to Myanmar.

Outlook

Intra-ASEAN dialogue on Malaysia's peace-keeping proposal will be conducted primarily through the ADMM; the first ADMM senior officials' meeting of 2015 took place on March 15-16. Meanwhile, Hussein is conducting supplementary individual consultations in ASEAN capitals.

The first credible indication of whether ASEAN will take even preliminary steps towards a regional peace-keeping framework will come at the April 24-27 ASEAN Summit.

However, there is little chance that ASEAN leaders will agree to establishing an integrated peace-keeping force this year, or even soon.

Kuala Lumpur's efforts will probably lead to a formal ten-member ASEAN Peace-keeping Centres Network as a first step, though this will require Myanmar and Laos to establish national peace-keeping centres.

Despite Hussein's reference in March to South China Sea frictions, any ASEAN peace-keeping cooperation will avoid that contentious issue. Even the possibility of a common ASEAN approach to any aspect of security, even peace-keeping, will concern Beijing. ASEAN leaders will be wary of risking any such Chinese displeasure.

Nevertheless, Kuala Lumpur's advocacy of such a force signals increased willingness to stand up to China, due partly to Malaysia's own maritime differences with Beijing. Previously, Malaysia had opposed any ASEAN action that might be interpreted as a bloc attempt to counter China.

Little progress on a common peace-keeping approach will be possible without Indonesia's strong support. This is not assured under President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo. Early indications are that his foreign policy may be more nationalistic and less multilateral than that of his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Growing China-Indonesia economic engagement, particularly over infrastructure, will also make Jokowi cautious about provoking Beijing (see INDONESIA/PHILIPPINES: Maritime reform may spur growth - February 20, 2015).

Different visions will persist of how an eventual ASEAN peace-keeping force might be used. The least controversial common ground -- and thus most likely first deployment -- would be coordinated efforts to stabilise areas afflicted by natural disasters.