Sousse attack risks authoritarian return in Tunisia

Beyond the loss of life and economic impact, the Sousse attack may set Tunisia on a different political path

Interior Minister Mohammed Najim al-Gharsalli said today the government would arm the tourist police in the wake of the attack at a beach in the town of Sousse in which 39 people were killed. The administration also deployed more police to tourist resorts and promised to close Salafi mosques and to curb some religious associations. At least one religious political party may be closed, but there are concerns about a return to authoritarian policies.

What next

The government is now facing increasing popular pressure over its failure to improve the security situation and will probably resort to new tough policing. There is likely to be less tolerance of the many religious and charitable associations that have sprung up since 2011 or of the recent wave of strikes and demonstrations fuelled by socio-economic frustrations. However, the security threat is unlikely to recede in the short term.

Subsidiary Impacts

  • There will be damage to the wider economy, well beyond the already troubled tourism sector.
  • The government will try to limit radicalisation with authoritarian-style policies, but this is unlikely to work in the short term.
  • Popular mistrust of the government, already significant, will grow.

Analysis

The coalition government, led by the secularist Nidaa Tounes party, was elected in October 2014 on a platform of security and prosperity. Yet in three months Tunisia has suffered its two worst terrorist attacks of recent times: 39 tourists, most of them British, were killed in Sousse, and in March, 22 European tourists were shot dead at the Bardo museum.

Domestic security

Tunisia has seen a sharp rise in extremism since 2011. The government lost control over many mosques in the aftermath of the revolution, allowing radical imams to establish a presence and recruiters to tap into the large numbers of disenfranchised youth. The state now claims to have regained control over all but 5% of mosques.

However, Tunisia's unreformed police and security forces are not sufficiently well trained, equipped or deployed to offer a better challenge to the growing threat of attacks by lone gunmen or small groups of terrorists.

Radical groups benefit from training and material across the border in Libya

The country's immediate neighbourhood exacerbates the situation. Tunisian armed forces since the end of 2012 have faced a low-level jihadi insurgency along the Algerian border (see TUNISIA: Security fears worsen Libyan refugee concern - August 4, 2014).

Intermittent government efforts to close the border to curb the smuggling of goods, drugs and arms have stirred severe unrest in the past, as border communities rely on these trade routes to earn a living (see TUNISIA: Smuggling will weigh on economy and politics - February 2, 2015).

This largely unmonitored border also provides a transit point through which radicalised Tunisians travel to Libya for training and as a transit point to fight in the Levant or the wider Maghreb. Over 3,000 Tunisians are estimated to have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria -- more so than any other country. Tunisians were also active in the In Amenas attack in Algeria in January 2012, and one Tunisian was involved in the attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli in January this year.

Government steps

Following the Sousse attack, the government will deploy another 1,000 armed police to tourist resorts. It will close 80 mosques which it believes are run by Salafi preachers.

Parties and associations deemed 'unconstitutional' will also be closed. Prime Minister Habib Essid has already signalled that Hizb ut-Tahrir, a legal religious party that advocates a caliphate under sharia law and which rejects the political process, may be shut down.

However, Hizb ut-Tahrir has not been linked to any violence in Tunisia, and this strategy may play into the hands of extremists. By cracking down on non-violent associations, the state may force them underground, where they may morph into or ally with more radical groups. Funding for associations, especially religious groups, will face renewed scrutiny, even though 157 such groups were already closed down last July in an earlier crackdown.

New areas will be declared military zones, particularly Mount Sammama and Mount Ouergha on the Algerian border, near where the Uqba Ibn Nafi group -- al-Qaida-linked militants blamed by the government for the Bardo shootings -- has based itself. This may be the prelude to a new stage of military operations.

It is not yet clear who was behind the Sousse attack, although the Islamic State group (ISG) has claimed responsibility and is known to be trying to establish itself in Tunisia. There is a risk of outbidding between Uqba Ibn Nafi and ISG, which would further increase the risk of violence (see MAGHREB: Jihadi groups will compete for support - March 13, 2015).

The authoritarian narrative

A new emphasis on security, stability and counterterrorism is likely further to delay much-needed reform of the police and judiciary. The government has promised to accelerate drafting of a new anti-terrorism law and criticisms of the first draft, which rights groups said was seriously flawed, may now be ignored.

There will be even less tolerance now for popular demonstrations or industrial action. President Beji Caid Essebsi, the Nidaa Tounes founder, has said "painful but necessary" measures will be needed (see TUNISIA: Growing discontent challenges success story - June 25, 2015).

Growing security focus will revive measures that could roll back political rights

The Sousse attack could also give the upper hand to some hard-line, former regime elements. They may use the cover of national security to force through measures to clamp down on political opponents, which could close the already-tenuous space in which civil society operates.

Ennahda's concerns

Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of the Islamist movement Ennahda, has warned of the danger of returning to a police state. His party has a small role in the coalition government, but will privately be concerned about any crackdown that targets religious groups.

Nidaa Tounes dominates the coalition and will face most of the criticism for security failings. It has tried to bring opposition parties on board, promising a national dialogue on the security challenge in September, but increasing political criticism is likely. There is already much popular criticism of the government for its perceived laxity.

Internal fissures

These pressures may create internal friction within both these parties, sharpening differences between moderate and hard-line elements.

Nidaa, itself a coalition that came together in shared anti-Islamism, may begin to fragment as disagreements about how closely to collaborate with Ennahda and what reforms to undertake come to the fore.

With its institutionalised and open structure, Ennahda may be better able to survive these pressures. However, it will need to rein in its fringe elements in order to prevent itself from being conflated with terrorism or extremism, as anti-Islamist trends in the region increase.