Ankara bombings will entrench social divisions

Analysis

An alliance of mainly leftist NGOs and political parties, including the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), organised a rally in Ankara to call for a return to peace talks between the government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Almost all of those who gathered outside Ankara train station that morning opposed President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In the general election on June 7, AKP lost its parliamentary majority for the first time in nearly 13 years. After attempts to form a coalition had failed, Erdogan called for fresh elections on November 1.

Critics claim Erdogan has been trying to exploit the upsurge in fighting with PKK by arguing that it proves the need for strong single-party government. Erdogan has also made it clear that, if AKP regains its majority, it will introduce a new constitution replacing the parliamentary system with a presidential one, concentrating virtually all political power in his hands (see TURKEY: Guerrillas could prompt state of emergency - September 9, 2015).

Syrian about-face

Between late 2011 and early 2015, AKP allowed any opponent of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to transit Turkey to join the war in Syria (see TURKEY/RUSSIA: Ankara will stick to its Syria policy - October 7, 2015). There is also evidence to suggest that Turkey's National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) facilitated supplies of weapons and equipment to extremist Islamist elements among the rebels.

Most links were with Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and Syria's Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority. However, MIT also appears to have had contacts with ISG elements, who could cross the Turkish-Syrian border with impunity.

Also, Turkish authorities banned access to more than 80,000 websites and frequently prosecuted critical journalists, but no attempt was made to restrict the ability of Islamist extremists to recruit and propagandise inside Turkey.

This began to change in early 2015, under growing pressure from Ankara's Western allies to restrict the flow of jihadists into Syria and increasing concerns that ISG sympathisers now posed a threat to Turkey's security. Gradually, Turkish authorities imposed tighter border controls and restricted ISG activities inside Turkey.

Pressure on Kurds

However, Erdogan and AKP feared that any weakening of ISG inside Syria would benefit the Democratic Union Party, a Kurdish organisation closely affiliated with PKK, enabling it to expand the de facto autonomous Kurdish area in northern Syria, which Ankara believes could fuel further similar ambitions among Turkey's own Kurds.

In the run-up to the June election, Erdogan fiercely criticised HDP in hopes of keeping it below the 10% threshold necessary to enter parliament, and increasing AKP seats. However, HDP won 13%.

Nevertheless, the campaign was marred by an unprecedented level of violence. More than 150 attacks on HDP offices and meetings culminated in the bombing of an HDP rally in Diyarbakir on June 5, killing four. A Turkish national reportedly trained by ISG in Syria was arrested for the attack.

On July 20, 33 people died in the suicide bombing of a meeting of young leftists and Kurdish nationalists in Suruc, close to the Turkish-Syrian border. The police later named the bomber as a Turkish national who had fought for ISG in Syria.

AKP critics accused MIT of collusion. Tensions rose still further when Erdogan refused to express his condolences to relatives. On July 22, PKK supporters assassinated two policemen in Ceylanpinar. Turkey responded with a military campaign, including hundreds of air strikes against PKK bases in northern Iraq.

Violence swiftly escalated to its worst level since March 2013, when tentative peace talks resulted in a unilateral PKK ceasefire. Erdogan abrogated the talks in March 2015.

Wilful indifference?

In the immediate aftermath of the Ankara bombing, speculation about the perpetrators ranged from Turkish ultra-nationalist 'Grey Wolves' to Islamist extremists and even a shadowy network of covert operatives with roots in the Turkish military -- the 'Deep State'. However, that began to disintegrate in the late 1990s and it has not been implicated in any attacks since the early 2000s.

Similarly, the Grey Wolves are mainly active in clashes between students at Turkey's highly politicised universities and have no record of suicide attacks.

On October 11, the security forces said they believed that the two assailants, who detonated improvised explosive devices strapped to their bodies within seconds of each other, were Turkish citizens with links to ISG. This did not halt the conspiracy theories.

EU Affairs Minister Hatice Beril Dedeoglu has suggested it could have been a joint ISG-PKK operation -- though they have been fighting each other bitterly in Syria and Iraq since mid-2014.

Oppositionists believe the bombings are an attempt to intimidate them in the run-up to the election. They note that this is the third fatal attack on a public meeting of leftists and Kurds in four months. There have been no similar attacks on government supporters.

Such suspicions were hardly allayed by the alacrity with which the police detained dozens of alleged ISG sympathisers immediately afterwards, raising questions why -- if their whereabouts were known and they were believed to be a threat to public security -- they had not been rounded up earlier.

On October 12, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said Turkish intelligence had a list of 21 suspected suicide bombers at large and preparing attacks in Turkey, 19 of them Turkish nationals. However, he added that it was not possible to arrest suspects until they had committed an offence.

Such an explanation does not explain why, compared with pro-government rallies, almost no security was provided for the rally in Ankara. Nor does it explain why -- particularly after Diyarbakir and Suruc -- the organisers of the event were not notified of the potential heightened security threat posed by the 21 suicide bombers.

Outlook

The outrage has come at a time of unprecedentedly violent clashes between different segments of Turkish society. It may be possible to contain rising tensions if, as opinion polls suggest, the November election results in a coalition government; an AKP majority could fuel tensions still further and result in severe domestic instability.