Analysis

Putin's position is secure for now and he continues to ride high in the opinion polls. However, the combination of economic problems and Duma elections could create difficulties for the wider political elite.

Putin's support

Despite the economic crisis, Putin has managed to maintain high levels of popular support this year. The Kremlin narrative that Russia's economic problems have been largely driven by external factors has protected Putin from criticism.

It is likely that the state media campaign to create an atmosphere of growing anti-Westernism in order to protect Putin will continue next year.

Syria and terrorism risks

The greatest political risk to Putin is that Moscow's intervention in Syria suffers major military casualties or prompts a spate of terrorist bombings that rock Russia. This could dent Putin's image as a strong leader who is able to defend the country and his ability to restore Russia's image as a great world power.

Duma elections

Next year's Duma elections are unlikely to reproduce the anti-system protests of December 2011. Putin's team quickly rebuilt his support base after the 2011 protests, with an effective campaign centred on conservative values; this support was extended by the annexation of Crimea.

Consequently, many of those who supported the protests in 2011-12 have recently rallied around Putin. This factor, combined with the crackdown by the authorities on such key opposition leaders as Alexei Navalny, has significantly undermined support for the anti-system opposition.

Regional polls

The regional elections in September 2015 showed how weak and demoralised this opposition had become. It is difficult to envisage an opposition campaign in 2016 as effective as that waged by Navalny against United Russia in the run-up to the December 2011 federal elections.

United Russia

The governing party, United Russia, is the clear front-runner. Opinion polls consistently show the party's support to be around 60% of those respondents who intend to vote.

Thus, there is a good chance that the party will increase its narrow parliamentary majority. The party's results in last September's regional elections support this prediction.

Cuts may aid official opposition

However, the official opposition could gain from growing public concern over the government's response to the economic crisis, notably its proposed welfare spending cuts.

For example, the Communist Party stands to profit from government proposals to raise the retirement age and its decision to lower the rate of indexation for pensions.

September's regional elections also underlined the ability of the Communist Party to gain seats at the expense of the governing party. The Communist victory in the Irkutsk gubernatorial race was a notable achievement.

Graft clampdown

The elections could also provide an opportunity for new pro-regime forces to come to power. The current crackdown on political graft at the regional level is providing such an opening.

Medvedev's future

The parliamentary elections will present an important test for Medvedev, who will lead United Russia's campaign. In preparation for the poll, his public profile has grown significantly.

For example, his views on economic modernisation, which had received little coverage since his departure from the Kremlin, have gained much greater prominence in recent months. He has also been outspoken in his criticisms on US policy in Syria (see RUSSIA: Moscow will save Syria's Assad for endgame - October 5, 2015).

Election boost

The election is likely to give Medvedev a short-term boost. It will also protect the position of economic liberals within the government.

However, it carries significant risks too. If United Russia fails to win convincingly, Medvedev's position will be vulnerable.

Moreover, while Putin appears committed to protecting the position of economic liberals within his cabinet, there remains a rival statist economic agenda, which may become more appealing if United Russia becomes the focus for dissatisfaction with the economic situation.

Few alternatives

However, the chances of a successful United Russia campaign remain high, primarily because there are so few other viable choices and the opposition is weak. This should guarantee Medvedev's position within the government beyond the elections.

Consequently, he will inevitably be considered a possible successor to Putin in 2018. Despite Medvedev's recognised limitations as a leader, he remains a known factor and is acceptable to the different elite factions.

Anti-corruption campaign and elite-level conflict

The tightening of budgetary expenditure has made the authorities more eager to be seen to be tackling graft within the political elite. The anti-corruption campaign, which was marked this year by the arrest of regional officials in Sakhalin and Komi, has had indirect effects within Putin's close circle (see RUSSIA: FSB will benefit from instability - July 1, 2015).

The removal of the former Russian railways boss, Vladimir Yakunin -- a close ally of Putin throughout his political career -- has been interpreted as an example of this campaign.

All-Russian Popular Front

The election campaign has the potential to increase this activity. The All-Russian Popular Front, which is a potential Kremlin-backed alternative to United Russia, has taken the lead in anti-corruption activity.

Its influence could exacerbate tensions between different factional interests. Oligarchic interests connected to United Russia stand to lose to Popular Front activists and their backers in the security services.

These conflicts do not pose any immediate challenge to Putin's authority. Typically, elections have produced an upsurge in elite conflicts, but Putin has managed them effectively in the past.

There is also little danger of any one faction mobilising against the president -- previous elite-level conflicts that threatened to be destabilising, such as the removal of Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov -- came to very little.

Chechen leader

One possible exception is the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov. Allegations of Kadyrov's connection to the assassination of opposition politician Nemtsov exposed divisions within Russia's security services over his influence.

Any attempt by Kadyrov to expand his influence -- for example in the context of an upsurge in terrorist activity caused by Russia's intervention in Syria -- could generate more conflict.