Paris attacks boost Russia's Syria stance

Analysis

The November 13 attacks involved three groups of terrorists, one targeting the Bataclan concert venue, one the Stade de France national stadium, and the third restaurants and bars in the tenth and eleventh districts. The terrorists killed at least 129 in total, with a number critically injured.

Attack fallout

The effects of the attacks will depend in part on facts which have not yet been confirmed:

Attacker profiles

The make-up of the terrorist group will shape the amount and type of attention directed at the radicalisation of French- and Belgian-born Muslims. Of the seven attackers named so far, at least five appear to been French- or Belgian-born Muslims. This will focus attention again on the radicalisation of some Muslims in the community, and potentially in prison, and the role of travel to Syria to fight for, or be trained by, ISG.

Attacker movements

Two linked movement regimes may have played a role in the coming-together of the terrorists in Paris.

First, the attack was a cross-border operation between France and Belgium. As such, it may have been facilitated by the abolition of border checks under the Schengen regime.

Schengen is already breaking down, in fact if not law, as several Schengen states re-impose border controls to manage or prevent the current influx of migrants and refugees. The Paris attack is likely to strengthen this trend, and bolster the position of those calling for Schengen's formal amendment or abolition.

EU justice and home affairs ministers will hold an emergency meeting on November 20 to consider the implications of the attacks, including for Schengen.

Second, one of the attackers has today been identified via fingerprints as a man who registered in Greece as an arriving refugee on October 3, with a Syrian passport which was found at the Stade de France attack site. It is not yet confirmed whether the passport is genuine. However, the finding links the Paris attacks to the current influx of people into Europe from the Syrian conflict.

Confirmation that any of the attackers entered the EU as a refugee would bolster the position of those calling for the EU to try to seal its external borders, and their own countries to seal their own. It would also increase resistance from some member states to the EU's mandatory quota-based relocation scheme for refugees already in Greece and Italy. At the least, the premium will rise on the security checks conducted on the refugees to be relocated, but shortfalls in the authorities' capabilities will not be quickly made up.

ISG role

ISG issued a statement the day after the attacks praising them and referring to the attackers as "soldiers of the Caliphate", but the claim revealed no unique information that would confirm that the group based in Iraq and Syria had ordered and directed the operation.

However, the French authorities said today that the attack was "organised from Syria", and identified a number of the attackers as having recently been there.

This suggests that at least some cell members may have received combat and bomb-making training from ISG.

Hitherto, ISG has focussed on state-building in, and territorial expansion from, its Iraq/Syria base, and has targeted primarily Shia Muslims in the Middle East. However, in addition to the Paris attack, ISG has recently claimed responsibility for the apparent downing of the Russian Kogalymavia plane over Sinai on October 31 and the twin bombings in Beirut on November 12 (see today's LEBANON: Islamic State seeks sectarian conflict; and see EGYPT: Russia plane crash will weaken Sisi regime - November 13, 2015).

If ISG were found to have directed the operation of the Paris attacks, and especially if it were found also to have directed the other recent bombings rather than just to have inspired local affiliates, it would mark a strategic departure towards a concerted campaign against external enemies.

ISG might wish to switch to 'spectacular' attacks against external targets to retaliate for international intervention in Syria, and to deflect attention from current territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, at the hands of Kurdish forces, and Syrian regime forces backed by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia.

Such attacks would also be aimed at bolstering ISG's narrative of victory and power, and attracting further recruits, including by provoking anti-Muslim sentiment and policies in the West.

Syria policy implications

The attackers appear to have targeted France because of its stepped-up role in the international military action against ISG in Syria. The Bataclan attackers told their captives that this was the motive for their action, placing the blame on Hollande.

After the United States, France is the most significant Western participant in the anti-ISG operation in Syria. It launched air strikes against ISG targets in September, and this month announced the despatch to the region of its carrier Charles de Gaulle.

France's high profile in the anti-ISG campaign confirms the tough line against radical Islam in areas of French interest abroad that it showed in its operation in Mali in 2013.

If ISG directed both the Kogalymavia and Paris attacks, it would appear now to be conducting terrorist actions in reprisal for, and in an attempt to shift, external powers' foreign policies.

By attacking France, jihadists would aim to undermine popular French support for the Syria campaign -- and dissuade other states, such as the United Kingdom, from intensifying or joining the anti-ISG action. However, France has already stepped up its action, conducting a major bombing raid on November 15-16 against Raqqa, ISG's base in Syria.

The Paris attacks highlight the failure so far of the US-led aerial bombing campaign against ISG. They will increase pressure for more robust military action against ISG in the Middle East, and for an international settlement on the Syria conflict.

However, a stepped-up military intervention by Western states involving ground forces in Syria and Iraq is unlikely, given the high political and military costs to them of such a policy, and its uncertain -- and potentially counterproductive -- outcome (see US/RUSSIA: Obama will likely wait out Syria gambit - October 14, 2015).

Other military options appear equally unworkable for Western policymakers. Working via local Syrian proxies on the ground is difficult, given Western governments' concerns about working with groups that could have links with radical Islamists.

Another option is scaling up airstrikes and widening their scope. However, this would increase the risk of civilian casualties, which the coalition has been keen to avoid so far, without displacing ISG, since this would also require significant ground forces.

On the diplomatic front, the Paris attacks will bolster Russia's argument in favour of a global coalition to fight ISG in Syria and Iraq, and for a transitional process which would keep President Bashar al-Assad's regime in power, at least for the time being. International consensus will increasingly move towards this option, but Syria diplomacy will continue to make little headway given Saudi Arabian and Syrian rebel opposition to Assad.

French domestic politics

The attack came in the run-up to regional elections on December 6 and 13 which are a springboard to the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The leader of the anti-immigration, anti-Muslim National Front (FN), Marine le Pen, was already likely to win her first executive office, as leader of Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie (see FRANCE: Growth failure leaves left vulnerable - October 1, 2015). The Paris attacks are likely to boost her further. Hollande's governing Socialists are likely to perform poorly.

However, the attacks are likely to strengthen Hollande's position, at least in the short term, as occurred after the 'Charlie Hebdo' attack in January 2015 (see FRANCE: Hollande's turnaround may not help Socialists - February 17, 2015).

In the longer term, it could be to Hollande's advantage against Le Pen to perpetuate the language and image of a 'war leader'. If dealing with security at home and in Europe comes to be seen as an increasingly central aspect of the presidency, eclipsing the economy, Le Pen as a presidential candidate would face questions over her lack of executive experience and likely difficult relations with other European leaders.

However, this trend could also benefit the mainstream right, and either of its likely presidential candidates, former President Nicolas Sarkozy or former Prime Minister Alain Juppe. Of the two, Juppe is more likely to express greater solidarity with the executive, and Sarkozy to call for tougher measures on security and against radical Muslims.