Saudi-Iran escalation will prolong regional conflicts

Riyadh's execution of a Shia cleric risks escalating hostilities between the rival regional powers

Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran yesterday after its embassy in Tehran was stormed and ransacked by protesters. The protests came in reaction to Saudi Arabia's surprise decision to execute prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, who was imprisoned for his role in anti-government protests in eastern Saudi Arabia in 2011. The escalation between rival regional powers Saudi Arabia and Iran comes as efforts intensify to solve proxy conflicts in the region, most notably Syria and Yemen, and to fight the rising threat from the Islamic State group (ISG).

What next

Saudi Arabia and Iran will step up efforts to confront each other on proxy fronts in the region, but will stand back from direct confrontation. Diplomatic efforts to resolve regional conflicts, in particular Syria, will suffer a further setback, and sectarian sentiment will increase the risk of anti-Shia attacks and unrest among Shia communities in the Gulf. However, in the medium term, Riyadh and Tehran will seek to restore ties, given the risk that rising regional insecurity could directly threaten their own stability if left unchecked.

Subsidiary Impacts

  • Rising anti-Shia sentiment in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain will fuel ISG's rise.
  • Iran's hardliners will play on anti-Saudi rhetoric in order to strengthen their position ahead of elections next month.
  • Saudi Arabia may refuse to participate in international talks on Syria later this month.

Analysis

The Saudi authorities executed Shia religious leader Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on January 2 alongside three other Shia activists and 43 al-Qaida militants. The mass execution comes at a time of increasing domestic security and economic pressures inside Saudi Arabia, and of regional geopolitical setbacks for the House of Saud in Syria and Yemen.

Saudi motivations

Nimr was a religious leader for the Shia protest movement in the kingdom's Eastern Province, which saw concerted anti-government unrest in 2011-13 over claims by the Shia minority of routine discrimination by the government in Riyadh (see SAUDI ARABIA: Anti-Shia violence will stoke tensions - November 11, 2014).

His sentencing to death in October 2014 over allegations of attacking policemen sparked protests in the Eastern Province, where the kingdom's Shia minority is concentrated, and the Saudi authorities would have been well aware that his execution would provoke further unrest.

The Saudi authorities appear to have carried out Nimr's execution in order to placate rising anti-Shia sentiment among the kingdom's Sunni majority and demonstrate that the kingdom is acting firmly against perceived internal threats.

Riyadh has to show Saudis that it is taking a tough line against its Shia opponents

Sectarian tensions have risen sharply in the region in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings, as Saudi officials blamed unrest in the Eastern Province and in Bahrain on Iranian and Shia interference. This sectarian sentiment has been fuelled further by conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and the rise of ISG, whose strong anti-Shia ideology has significant appeal in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia.

For these reasons, the government appears to have deliberately timed Nimr's execution with those of the al-Qaida militants. Facing increased internal threat from ISG, the kingdom is keen to demonstrate that it will take strong action against anyone who joins salafi-jihadist movements opposed to Saudi rule. However, at the same time, it does not want to leave itself open to accusations from militant sympathisers that it is taking a softer line against the Shia (see GULF STATES: Sectarianism raises Iraq blowback risk - February 23, 2015).

Iranian reaction

Nimr's execution sparked protests in Iran and among Shia communities throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Iran's top leaders condemned the execution with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warning that Saudi Arabia would experience "divine vengeance" as a result, and with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) saying that the House of Saud would be brought down by "harsh revenge".

Hardline protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran on January 3. In contrast to the storming of the UK embassy in 2011, there is as yet no evidence of Iranian government complicity in the raid. Police moved in quickly after the assault and arrested 40 people.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani swiftly condemned the assault and has promised to prosecute those involved. Given the gravity of the incident, Saudi Arabia's decision to cut off diplomatic relations was to be expected.

Western reaction

The United States and the EU both expressed their concern to Riyadh about the possible damage Nimr's execution could have on the region. In the wake of Saudi Arabia's cutting of diplomatic ties with Tehran, Washington has also called on regional governments to take steps to maintain diplomatic contact in order to seek ways to reduce regional tensions.

Washington has limited leverage over Riyadh

However, Washington has limited leverage over Riyadh. The Saudi leadership views itself as needing to take a more proactive and independent line against perceived Shia and Iranian expansionism. It no longer trusts its traditional defence guarantor, the United States, to protect it against Iran in the wake of Washington's decision to secure an international deal on the Iranian nuclear programme.

Regional implications

Nimr's execution and the cutting of Iranian-Saudi diplomatic ties have several implications for regional security and diplomacy.

Sectarian tensions in the Gulf

Nimr's execution marks a low point in Sunni-Shia relations within Saudi Arabia post-2011, and raises the risk of prolonged unrest among Shia communities in the Eastern Province, and in Bahrain. However, government forces in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have the capabilities and experience to contain the unrest, and the violence is unlikely to affect business or oil production.

Revenge attacks could be carried out against Saudi security forces by Nimr's supporters, prompting further anti-Shia sentiment and radicalisation, and weakening moderates in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain who favour dialogue over violence. This will play into the hands of ISG recruitment, increasing the appeal of its anti-Shia narrative to mainstream Sunnis in the Gulf.

Military conflict risk

Saudi Arabia's actions will reinforce the hand of hardline elements in Iran and weaken Rouhani's argument for prioritising diplomatic engagement with Riyadh over proxy conflict in the region.

The risk of military conflict is low

IRGC and hardline rhetoric of 'revenge' against Saudi Arabia is unlikely to translate into action. Tehran is firmly committed to its process of re-engagement with the international community and does not want to jeopardise this with direct military action in the Gulf or a terrorist attack against Riyadh. Instead, they are more likely to respond by seeking to weaken Saudi allies in proxy theatres such as Syria (see IRAN: Military will keep asymmetric advantage in Gulf - December 15, 2015).

Diplomacy

The severance of diplomatic ties has the potential to disrupt the forthcoming international talks on Syria. Russian and US efforts to reinvigorate the diplomatic process on Syria are unlikely to make headway until there is some kind of understanding between the two regional powerbrokers -- Saudi Arabia and Iran -- on Syria's future.

Similarly, the deterioration of Saudi-Iranian ties will also set back efforts to form a government in Lebanon, which also requires agreement between Tehran and Riyadh.

By contrast, talks on finding a solution to the conflict Yemen are unlikely to be affected, given the lack of direct Iranian involvement here.