Russia will seek global rewards for Syria withdrawal

Analysis

Initial reports suggest that around half the approximately 60 military aircraft at the Hmeimim air base at Lattakia will return to Russia in the first phase of withdrawal. A first group of Su-34 fighter-bombers was shown flying out the morning after Putin's announcement; a second soon followed. Some aircraft will stay, their number as yet unknown.

Military intervention continues

Deputy Defence Minister Nikolay Pankov emphasised that Russian air strikes would continue as it was "too early to speak of victory over terrorism".

Putin's chief of staff, Sergey Ivanov, clarified another point: advanced S-400 surface-to-air missiles will remain deployed in Syria, giving Russia leverage in airspace where the only other military aircraft belong to either its ally President Bashar al-Assad or the United States and its allies.

Securing US acquiescence on Syria

From a position in September-October where Washington expressed grave concerns about Russian military action, Putin has managed to draw the United States into bilateral talks on a truce, in force since February 27, and secure its agreement to Russia continuing air attacks on certain militant groups.

Announcing the withdrawal, Putin summed up the aims of the short-term intervention: to help Assad's ground troops take the initiative and "turn the situation around", setting the scene for a political settlement.

The UN-led negotiations which got under way on February 14, take place under circumstances engineered by Moscow, in which Russian air cover for advances by Iranian-organised militias and Syrian regime forces has helped turn the military balance in north-western Syria in Assad's favour.

This combined Iranian-Russian offensive has helped Assad's depleted forces reclaim some lost territory, isolate rebel forces around Aleppo, cut their main supply route to the Turkish border and shore up regime defences in Hama and Lattakia provinces (see SYRIA: Regime poised to defeat rebels in Aleppo - February 16, 2016).

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Assad or alternatives

The military gains delivered by Tehran and Moscow have made Assad over-confident and less amenable to compromise than ever. Recent Syrian declarations have publicly defied the Russian game plan, such as Assad's vow to fight to retake all of Syria (in contrast to Moscow's desire to limit operations to the west), and Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem's rejection of any discussion of Assad's future as president during the peace talks.

Assad risks losing relevance in Moscow's scheme for a settlement. Russian officials have hinted that he could be replaced if need be, although it is difficult to envisage his hierarchy surviving without him.

The removal of Russian air support will hinder any attempt by Assad to capture more territory, including the rebel-held part of Aleppo. Russian planes may return if his troops lose ground to rebel forces or such jihadists as the Islamic State group (ISG) and Jabhat al-Nusra, but not if he obstructs a political outcome that Moscow wants.

As long as Russia is prepared to support Assad in this way, rebel factions are unlikely to reverse their recent losses, except in the unlikely event that their Gulf backers provide them with game-changing weaponry such as portable anti-aircraft missiles.

Route out of isolation

Moscow has a long-term investment in the Syrian state. Tartus provides a vital port on the Mediterranean, and the government buys Russian arms. At relatively low cost, the air campaign has asserted these interests and demonstrated Russia's ability to defend them.

However, the primary objective is to reset relations with the United States and EU states by demonstrating that Moscow is a great power capable of effective warfare but also of cooperating on peace.

With no strong ally to back, Western policymakers have stepped back from their earlier insistence on removing Assad, and now instead focus on attacking ISG, letting the civil war run on and trying to stem the flow of migrants.

Putin's actions offer them the contours of a solution, however partial and unpalatable.

In return, he will demand flexibility on US and EU sanctions (the latter are up for review by July) and also on the conflict in eastern Ukraine, where Moscow seems keener than before to make progress.

Military lessons

The effects of Russia's limited military commitment in western Syria compare favourably with the US-led air campaign against ISG in the east. The rapid extraction of forces avoids the 'quagmire' some US officials predicted, but can be scaled up again with little effort.

Western governments will worry about the implications for future NATO-Russia confrontations. Turkey, whose forces shot down a Russian plane in November, is already suffering further airspace violations with threats of retaliation (see RUSSIA: Air power will defy NATO while pounding Syria - February 17, 2016).

ISG not a priority

Despite recent comments by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on tackling ISG as a common aim, the downscaling of air power and the assertion that the air campaign is largely over imply that Putin does not plan to take on the task and will leave it to Western militaries, for now at least.

This contradicts Moscow's argument that action in Syria was needed to prevent Chechens and other Russian nationals coming home and engaging in terrorism. Many but not all of them are part of ISG. (see RUSSIA: Moscow will watch returning jihadists closely - January 14, 2016).

Putin may be content to leave Assad's government in control of the western part of a de facto partitioned state, while much of the north and east would be held by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party and Jabhat al-Nusra as well as ISG.