Protest groups signal shift in Middle East politics
New grassroots movements in Iraq and Lebanon are finding more effective ways to challenge governments
Protest movements in the Middle East have been curtailed severely by retrenched autocratic governments and civil wars since the Arab uprisings in 2011. With their relatively open political systems, Lebanon and Iraq never participated in these protests fully. However, over the past year they have seen a resurgence in grassroots politics that could influence civil society across the region.
What next
Iraq and Lebanon's new protest movements exemplify a new approach to protest culture in Arab countries. If they achieve results in their campaigns to challenge government corruption and sectarian elite politics, this could help revitalise civil society movements and street protests regionally. Their success would cause greater political instability in the short run, but would improve prospects of the emergence of more representative and accountable forms of government in the region.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Protest movements provide an outlet for popular frustration; their repression increases the risk of longer-term political instability.
- Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco have the most favourable conditions for a revival of civil society protest movements.
- Such movements could play a larger role in Yemen, Libya and Syria after conflicts have ended.
- In the longer run, these movements could benefit business in the region by driving efforts to fight corruption and improve transparency.
Analysis
In both Iraq and Lebanon, spontaneous demonstrations against depleted living standards and decaying infrastructure in 2015 grew quickly into formal political movements with the potential to challenge the existing order.
Iraq
Protests against harsh living conditions and political mismanagement have erupted periodically in Iraq since 2011. Last summer saw the outbreak of nationwide protests centered in Baghdad. Since then, Iraq's political establishment has come under considerable pressure from a protest movement called Mustamiroun (We Continue the Struggle) demanding fundamental political reform.
The movement represents the first large-scale popular challenge to the post-2003 Iraqi political system. Its targets are the endemic state corruption; the sectarian quota system in its current form, which protesters see as the root cause of sectarianism in society; and the political elite's role in Iraq's economic crisis. Mustamiroun's demands and vocabulary have become dominant themes in Iraqi politics.
Reform, not revolution
From the outset, Mustamiroun did not contest the political system as a whole, as was the case in many of the 2011 Arab uprising movements, but instead argued for specific political goals within the existing constitutional framework. These included a shift towards technocratic appointments, which they argue would help combat corruption and improve institutional efficiency.
In another change from the 2011 uprisings, Iraqi activists have built alliances with strong political actors, including Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, the opposition Reform Front, elements of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (Shia-dominated militias), and the Sadrist Movement.
Iraq's activists have learnt from the mistakes of the 2011 Arab uprising activists
This marks a significant improvement compared to the Arab uprising activists whose failure to organise formal political movements and make alliances among the political establishment made them easy targets for repressive security apparatuses and leaders such as President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi in Egypt.
Risks and benefits of alliance
The strategic partnership with the Sadrists has not only given Mustamiroun political muscle, but also swelled its numbers in public demonstrations, and given its protesters protection there.
On April 30, thousands of protesters entered the Green Zone in Baghdad and occupied the parliament building. While the events demonstrated mass popular support for the civic movement, swarming parliament was bad publicity, and exposed the flaws of an alliance with Muqtada al-Sadr, which risks undermining the democratic and peaceful nature of the protest movement.
As a result, Mustamiroun split in July, with a new group, Madaniyoun (Civilians) group representing activists who rejected cooperation with any political entity. They criticised the Sadrists for attempting to use the civil society movements as a front for tactical political purposes, in particular as a tool to pressure Abadi.
Madaniyoun are also not convinced that Sadr himself fully supports reforms. They warn that the cooperation with the Sadrists could see the civil society movement deviate from its proper path and become irrelevant (see IRAQ: Sectarianism will weaken Iraqi state - April 21, 2016).
Lebanon
Lebanon's Beirut Madinati (Beirut, My City; BM) movement emerged in April 2016 after months of spontaneous protest over uncollected rubbish. During these protests, civil society activists faced a choice of whether or not to work with the Shia Amal movement and its supporters, leading to debates about the relative benefits of forming a strategic alliance with popular, but sectarian, elements of society.
The protest movement that mobilised around the rubbish collection issue lost momentum gradually due to splits over this issue, and due to its inability to influence politics. BM filled this space. Formed by activists, academics and other professionals with little political experience, it gave itself the concrete and realistic aim of competing in Lebanon's municipal elections.
A new kind of politics
In a short period of time BM succeeded in creating a new political discourse. The list won more than 50% of votes in some districts, but ultimately won no places in the municipal council due to Lebanon's first-past-the-post system that favoured Sunni leader Saad al-Hariri's list (see LEBANON: Politics signals shift away from sectarianism - June 6, 2016).
Despite its election loss and still limited influence, BM illustrated that it is possible to mount a serious challenge to the political establishment with limited campaign funds and with candidates who are unaffiliated with any of the ruling political parties.
BM used social media to raise money via individual donations, and reached voters through town hall meetings. Its programme highlighted the public good, social justice and transparency, mounting a successful challenge to the personality politics and sectarian rhetoric that normally characterise Lebanese elections.
Cross-sectarian platform
Since the elections, the movement has continued to press for local changes and held meetings with Beirut's city council focusing on specific issues. BM has found that concrete proposals addressing local grievances work better than grand reforms of the whole sectarian system, as has traditionally been the focus of leftist and secular movements in Lebanon.
BM can attract support from across sectarian, class and geographic divides
In the coming months BM may seek to form a political party, channeling popular disenchantment across the sectarian divide with the performance of Lebanese political elites.
Regional impact
The success of grassroots movements in Lebanon and Iraq could have a significant demonstration effect elsewhere in the Arab world.
Egypt and Bahrain's relatively strong civil society movements are currently restricted by repression, but the governments still allow some limited venue for civil society movements to operate. Both countries also have a deeper history and institutional set-up to allow for activism than many other Arab countries.
Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait could also be affected -- the conditions that prevail in Iraq and Lebanon most resemble Jordan and Morocco, which also 'missed out' on the 2011 Arab uprisings, but had large protest movements that remain semi-active. Equally, Kuwait has some historical foundation for civil society, a tradition of protest and a less restrictive government.
The success of such movements would cause greater instability in the near term, but be positive in the longer term, by providing a political outlet for popular frustration and accelerating the development of more accountable and less repressive state systems.
