Analysis

The history of Turkish civil-military relations is complex; military intervention in politics has been the norm rather than the exception. Nevertheless, the July 15 coup attempt caught most observers by surprise, after a period of improved relations between Turkey's military and the conservative-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) government (see TURKEY: Coup plot retrials will proceed slowly - January 10, 2014).

In the months leading to the attempted putsch, under Erdogan's leadership, civilian leaders had granted the military:

• more autonomy to wage operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and terrorism more broadly;
• greater access to national security decision-making mechanisms; and
• more legal protections for soldiers and security personnel engaged in counter-terrorism around the country.

Since the TSK had no history of executing coups outside its most-senior chains of command, the personal closeness between Erdogan and the chief of the General Staff (CGS), Hulusi Akar, further obscured the potential for a coup. Akar was a witness at the wedding of Erdogan's younger daughter in May.

Erdogan's 'parallel state' narrative

The government accuses what it calls the Fethullah Gulen Terrorist Organisation (a broad-brush label given to anyone who supports US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen) of masterminding the coup. That the attempted coup was engineered and executed in total secrecy has somewhat vindicated Erdogan's warnings of a 'parallel state' working to undermine Turkey's democratically elected rulers.

From the government's perspective, the attempted coup is evidence that the TSK has become a 'compromised organisation' that has failed to implement adequate internal controls and security-vetting mechanisms for its personnel.

The popular response to the coup has lent Erdogan massive support for a dramatic and wide-scale counter-response (see TURKEY: Emergency rule will arouse fears of abuse - July 22, 2016). The declaration of a three-month state of emergency (SoE) is allowing the authorities to initiate a massive security crackdown to purge the state of any and all Gulen supporters -- and other potential adversaries -- with the aim of permanently guaranteeing the military's political neutrality.

The SoE also permits the government to enact substantive reforms with scant parliamentary approval or oversight.

Purging senior officer corps

Erdogan's immediate objectives are to identify and purge the TSK of any suspected followers of Gulen. Overall, about 3,725 military personnel have been dismissed.

This includes 157 of the 358 officers of general or flag rank and 1,099 of the 32,189 lower-ranking officers across the TSK's three branches. Those dismissed include Erdogan's chief military adviser, the CGS's aide-de-camp and the defence minister's chief secretary.

Another 584 colonels -- many not seen as 'reliable enough' -- have been retired. To fill senior positions, the government has been forced to promote colonels to 24 brigades that would normally be commanded by brigadier generals.

Restructuring civil-military governance

Erdogan issued a decree on July 31 radically altering civilian-military relations within Turkey's machinery of government. The ultimate aim is to 'coup-proof' the TSK by consolidating civilian control over strategic and operational decision-making structures.

The measures include:

• reducing the influence of the once all-powerful CGS by allowing the president and prime minister to issue direct orders to individual commanders of the army, navy and air force;
• increasing civilian representation in the Supreme Military Council (YAS) by including all deputy prime ministers, plus the justice and interior ministers -- the YAS structure had restricted civilian participation to the prime minister and defence minister;
• bringing the coast guard and gendarmerie under interior ministry control;
• holding all future YAS meetings in the prime minister's office, rather than at General Staff Headquarters;
• transferring all factories, shipyards and industrial facilities under TSK control to the defence minister;
• closing all military high schools and training academies in favour of a new national defence university within the defence ministry; and
• transferring all military hospitals and medical training academies from the TSK to the health ministry.

Constitutional changes needed

Erdogan would also like to place the General Staff and the National Intelligence Organisation directly under his authority. However, these changes, unlike those announced in the decree, require amending Turkey's constitution.

By itself, AKP does not have the seats in parliament to change the constitution. If it wants to push through these changes, it must either work with opposition parties or increase its seats through new elections.

Military efficiency

If the TSK purge puts in place a system where career advancement becomes predicated on a narrow concept of loyalty to Erdogan above all else, then the quality of its officer class (the organisation's cumulative competence) is likely to suffer.

There has already been an impact on operations in the south-east, mainly against the PKK. The number of TSK operations has dropped noticeably, whereas the number of PKK operations against the Turkish security forces has remained constant.

That said, Turkey's invasion of north-eastern Syria yesterday suggests that the overall capability of the military to plan and execute large-scale operations may not be as affected as previously feared.

Outlook

Erdogan and his allies will have to be careful moving forward. They have received support from across the political spectrum following the attempted coup, but opposition parties are now beginning to criticise the government for rushing reforms without proper care and consultation in parliament.

Republican People's Party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has said there were concerns that in implementation the SoE could surpass its avowed goals; it may be necessary to restructure the state, but that was a matter for parliament.

Others have warned that quick reforms risk causing more problems than they solve. The TSK has a long history, traditions and principles -- including republicanism and secularism -- that could be eroded in an effort to fix the military's institutional and structural shortcomings.

Failure to upheld these core values risks turning the military into a 'praetorian guard' tasked with protecting the interests of the ruling political class, rather than the nation as a whole.