North Korea missile development will proceed apace

Analysis

Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test in January and its satellite launch in February jolted the world, especially the West, into a more robust and unified reaction than previously seen. Under UNSC resolution 2270, passed unanimously on March 2, China and Russia endorsed sanctions much stronger than those imposed by four earlier UNSCRs since 2006 (see NORTH KOREA: Sanctions usher in new era of tension - March 4, 2016).

On February 8, South Korea abruptly terminated the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the last remaining inter-Korean joint venture, which had weathered all earlier inter-Korean crises.

Washington imposed tough bilateral sanctions in February, and on June 1 named North Korea as a "primary money-laundering concern". In a dual escalation, on July 6 for the first time it sanctioned Kim Jong-un personally (with others) on the grounds of human rights rather than weapons of mass destruction.

Sanctions impact?

The aim of such pressure is to force Pyongyang to denuclearise, on the precedent of Iran. Upbeat official comments, especially in Seoul, insist this is already having an impact.

South Korea's unification ministry claimed on September 6 that sanctions are hitting the North's foreign currency earnings, citing a 7% year-on-year fall in trade with China during April-July, with anthracite exports in particular down 24.4%.

On August 22 President Park Geun-hye told her National Security Council that "even the elite in the North is collapsing... high-profile figures are escaping... the regime's instability is growing".

The case for collapse

North Korea's collapse has been confidently predicted since at least 1990. The recent evidence is thin and inconclusive:

• For China trade, the trend is unclear and varies with the period chosen: the January-June figure was up 2.2%.
• Since South Korea decided in July to deploy the US THAAD anti-missile system, Beijing has reportedly relaxed its already uneven enforcement of sanctions (see EAST ASIA: THAAD will destabilise geopolitics - July 8, 2016).
• The sole confirmed recent elite defector is Thae Yong-ho, a diplomat based in London. Six similar cases are rumoured, but even if true this is far from a general regime breakdown.
• Seoul's latest allegations of elite executions and purges await confirmation. If true, they may equally suggest that Kim Jong-un's grip is tightening rather than weakening.

As Kim nears his sixth year on the throne, a more neutral narrative would stress three aspects:

Political consolidation

Several major meetings of the ruling Workers' Party, climaxing in May's Seventh Congress (the first in 36 years), have seen Kim steadily accumulate and consolidate both formal and substantive power. Despite 2013's dramatic purge of his uncle Jang Song-thaek, elsewhere at the top personnel continuity is far more manifest than change.

Economic revival

Kim is keen to reinvigorate the North Korean economy, though shackled by the shibboleths of 'juche' (self-reliance) and hostile to any avowals of reform:

• He brought back and has retained a known moderniser, Pak Pong-ju, as premier.
• He has not sought, as his father Kim Jong-il did, to curb the influence of market forces.
• Some 20 new special economic zones have been created, though takers for investment are few.
• On September 6, North Korea held its first meeting of economic officials for a decade.
• The Party Congress saw a new Five-Year Plan announced, though no details were given.
• Farm animals may be privately owned; details of wider agrarian reform are elusive.
• A growing consumer economy is visible in Pyongyang, including coffee shops and retail outlets.

All this suggests that sanctions are not yet biting. An alternative approach might try to defang Kim by working with the grain of his economic goals, rather than painting him into a corner.

WMD forced march

Unhelpfully for advocates of engagement, however, under his 'byungjin' (tandem) policy Kim has not only reaffirmed Pyongyang's commitment to nuclear weapons -- now written into both the Constitution and the Party Rules, suggesting they are non-negotiable -- but speeded up work on rendering them deliverable and hence a more credible threat.

The pace of ballistic missile testing has accelerated strikingly. Kim Jong-il's 17-year reign (1994-2011) saw a total of 16 launches. In less than five years, his son has conducted 37, with 21 of them occuring in the six months since UNSCR 2270.

The long-untested Musudan medium-range missile, after five failures, finally flew on June 22.

Similarly, after several failures faked to appear otherwise, on August 24 North Korea successfully launched a missile from a submarine (SLBM). This flew some 500 kilometres.

The SLBM would enable North Korea to evade targeting of its land launch sites. However, these SLBM launches are thought to be from a short-range platform. North Korea lacks any long-distance submarines, though Kim reportedly has ordered their manufacture.

Zoom

The North's rapidly advancing WMD prowess alarms Seoul, but evokes contrary reactions:

• Calls are growing for South Korea to have its own nuclear weapons and/or nuclear-powered submarines.
• Conversely, an editorial on August 27 in Seoul's leading conservative daily declared that sanctions have not worked. The JoongAng Ilbo called for a two-track approach, employing diplomacy as well as pressure.

Even if Park Geun-hye hews to her new hard line, her successor as president will show more flexibility (as she herself did until this year). All potential contenders from the liberal opposition support efforts to re-engage the North. The conservative front-runner, though undeclared, is Ban Ki-moon. Once foreign minister under the left-leaning Roh Moo-hyun in 2004-06, he too favours outreach.