Russian security merger will not make for efficiency
Multiple agencies will be replaced by one large institution that will be hard to control
A shake-up of Russia's security and intelligence agencies, in which the Federal Security Service (FSB) would expand at other institutions' expense, has been discussed in insider circles for some weeks, with the Kommersant newspaper reporting the plan on September 19. The overhaul is still unconfirmed, but shifts in the security sector are already evident, most recently with the September 22 appointment of parliamentary speaker Sergey Naryshkin to head the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
What next
If the plan is implemented, several existing security structures will be folded into a new 'super-agency' combining domestic and foreign intelligence, while broader changes will affect law enforcement. The creation of one large institution reverses President Vladimir Putin's previous 'multi-agency' policy and reflects growing concerns about stability given the uncertain economic outlook.
Subsidiary Impacts
- The consolidation of overlapping functions may extend to other government agencies.
- Unwieldy, hard-to-supervise institutions will make governing Russia harder.
- Systemic corruption is likely to worsen due to lack of oversight.
Analysis
Just before the September 18 Duma elections, it was announced that Vladimir Markin, the influential spokesman of the Investigatory Committee, was leaving his position. Rumours abounded that the committee's head, Alexander Bastrykin, would soon follow.
A substantial reduction in the strength of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) was announced on September 20, a day after the Kommersant story appeared.
Signs of impending change
The Kommersant story, which was probably an approved leak, said the new structure would be called the Ministry for State Security (MGB).
While the reported reform remained unconfirmed in the week that followed, circumstantial evidence suggested that it was close to the truth:
- Presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov pointedly stonewalled when given opportunities to deny the story.
- Leading figures like Oleg Denisenko, deputy chair of the outgoing State Duma's security committee, began publicly applauding the idea.
- Those agencies likely to lose out remained silent instead of launching the kind of counter-attack that normally follows a 'trial balloon' or an attack by a rival institution.
Structuring the new agency
The plan envisages the FSB reclaiming the foreign intelligence role held by its Soviet predecessor
Sources in Moscow suggest the new agency's title is not yet final. The reported choice of name -- MGB -- harks back to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's security police from 1946 to his death in 1953. The KGB (the 'K' reflecting its status as a committee, reduced from the MGB ministry) was established the following year and was dissolved into separate agencies after 1991.
The 'MGB' agency is likely to unite several functions, recreating the KGB's structure and remit:
- the FSB, which is likely to dominate as the core of the new structure;
- The SVR, now under Naryshkin; and
- The Federal Guard Service (FSO), responsible for the security of key government figures and facilities, and including the Kremlin Guard.
The Presidential Security Service will be exempted from the merger and remain a discrete service.
Foreign intelligence
With the SVR's future as an independent agency in doubt, its autonomy has been eroded rather than enhanced by the appointment of State Duma speaker Naryshkin to replace its current head, Mikhail Fradkov.
The fundamental reason for this appears to be a desire to find Naryshkin another position so that Putin's political manager-in-chief and deputy chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volodin, can take up the post of Duma speaker. Putin nominated Volodin for the job on September 23. The incoming parliament is unlikely to refuse (see RUSSIA: Duma polls pave way for Putin's re-election - September 20, 2016).
Naryshkin served as a KGB intelligence officer in the 1980s but has not demonstrated strong ties to the security apparatus since then. He is regarded as a loyal factotum, a business and political manager who will not resist instructions, thus facilitating any SVR merger with a larger security agency.
The politicisation of SVR activities is likely to continue. Naryshkin's extensive contacts with European right-wing parties may result in a greater focus on foreign covert operations.
Efficiency arguments
Supporters of consolidation argue that it will improve coordination and efficiency by streamlining overlapping functions.
There is some logic to this. At present, capacities are split among multiple agencies. External human intelligence operations are shared by the SVR and FSB, cyber espionage is in the hands of the FSB, SVR and FSO, while both the FSB and FSO have domestic counter-terrorism functions.
The military's Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU runs its own foreign intelligence and covert operations (see RUSSIA: Interest groups vie to control army spy agency - February 1, 2016).
At present, inter-agency rivalries and a poor intelligence-sharing culture result in parallel, even competitive operations.
However, the advantages need to be weighed against downsides including the expense and upheaval of a reorganisation.
Turf wars may simply be transferred inside the new agency and replayed there. It is highly unlikely, for example, that the FSB would let its foreign operations be subordinated to the SVR branch (see RUSSIA: Security agencies will vie for influence - May 9, 2016).
Anti-corruption role
An all-powerful security service would become hard to investigate
Another rationale is that a super-agency would strengthen efforts to combat corruption both within the security apparatus and across the whole of government (see RUSSIA: More arrests of corrupt officials are likely - August 1, 2016).
This argument is hard to sustain given the removal of checks and balances:
- Lack of supervision. An all-powerful single agency will not be subject to scrutiny from above, as there is no institution comparable to the Soviet Communist Party, which exerted tight control over the KGB.
- Absence of rivals. Successful prosecutions within the law enforcement system have come out of investigations by other agencies; the security services have a lamentable record of conducting internal investigations.
- FSB's poor record. While the FSB has recently been busy arresting officials from other agencies, it has a record of corruption itself.
Cuts to other agencies
The wider law enforcement system is also undergoing changes.
The MVD keeps the uniformed police but will lose 163,000 personnel -- 15% of its strength -- due to the transfer of riot and rapid-response police and the Interior Troops to the National Guard which Putin announced in April (see RUSSIA: New National Guard reflects stability worries - April 8, 2016).
The Investigative Committee, set up in 2011 to handle primary investigations of all serious crimes, is likely to be subordinated to the Prosecutor General's office, eliminating it as a powerful independent institution. Bastrykin, its founding head, will be transferred to an honourable sinecure.
Centralising power
The principal imperative for these measures appears to be political and reflects Putin's anticipation of both popular unrest or intra-elite turbulence (see RUSSIA: Over-reaction to protests is a stability risk - May 25, 2016).
He appears to be moving away from his previous model of bureaucratic pluralism, where multiple agencies were played off against one another, towards having fewer, more powerful agencies headed by people he regards as personally loyal to him.
As the MVD is weakened and the Investigative Committee is subsumed, the National Guard, prosecution service and a 'neo-KGB' agency will form the three pillars of domestic security.
The new agency will acquire primary responsibility for investigating corruption and economic crimes -- Putin's main method of curbing the elite.
