Ankara will probably let Moscow get its way on Syria

Analysis

Turkish anger at the United States has never been so great as it is now.

Turkish-US ties fray...

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's son-in-law Berat Albayrak (who is also Turkey's energy minister) has publicly blamed a US cyber hack for a massive power failure in Istanbul in the final days of December.

Defence Minister Fikri Isik warned at the same time that Turkey might shut the Incirlik airbase to the United States, a move that would eviscerate the country's role in NATO.

.... as Turkey and Russia grow closer

Meanwhile, Turkey and Russia are increasingly close partners on several fronts, from energy to acting as co-guarantors of a Syrian peace settlement that would retain President Bashar al-Assad but exclude the United States.

The twin driving forces for this upheaval in foreign policy are: Turkey's distrust of and anger at the United States; and Erdogan's determination that Turkey should have a permanent strategic role in Syria.

Turkish-US divergences

Turkish anger with the United States arises from several different issues, mostly involving accusations that Washington has failed to give Erdogan's policies its active support.

Air support

Ankara charges that the United States and the US-led coalition against Islamic State (IS) have not used their air power to help Turkey capture al-Bab, a strategic town north of Aleppo. The coalition's reply is that Turkey has not shared information or planning about its army's Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria.

Syrian Kurds

Turkey complains that the United States has provided arms and training to the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, which Turkey regards as terrorists linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party insurgents in Turkey, and as trying to form a separatist Kurdish state. This accusation is well founded and has been a major US embarrassment in dealings with Turkey.

Gulenists

Erdogan also argues that Washington is neither cracking down on the Gulen movement (which almost all Turks, regardless of their politics, believe played the main part in the July 15 attempted coup) nor returning its leader, Fethullah Gulen, to Turkey. Erdogan regards the movement as his most deadly adversary.

There is no sign that Gulen will be forced to leave the United States or that his movement has lost respectability in Washington because of the coup attempt.

Personal chemistry

Personal relations between President Barack Obama and Erdogan, once very warm, have cooled sharply. Obama is seen as responsible for denying Turkey a no-fly zone in Syria and thus blocking progress towards overthrowing the Assad government for several years. In contrast, Moscow has offered Ankara a strategic presence.

These issues are all short-term ones, arising largely from Turkey's inflexible policies of rejecting all political dialogue with Kurdish groups inside and outside its borders and pledging all-out war against them, while insisting on ever-deeper involvement on several fronts in Syria.

Erdogan's responsibility

Erdogan has consolidated his power to the point where no debate is possible inside Turkey about his strategies or about the fact that they may well trigger more terrorist attacks in the cities.

Consequently, most Turks accept his message that the United States has betrayed Turkey and that Turks stand alone in the fight against IS. A public opinion poll published yesterday showed three out of four Turks believing that the United States was behind the wave of terrorist attacks afflicting the country.

Behind this lies a deepening feeling of rejection and lack of solidarity by the West, including both the EU and the United States.

The shooting at an Istanbul night club at the New Year, which killed 39 people -- unfortunately by no means the largest terrorist attack in recent Turkish history -- has triggered enormous turbulence and an almost hysterical sense of abandonment.

Russia's partial alternative

That mood dovetails with the messages that Turkish politicians and journalists have received for more than a decade when visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin. Except for the seven-month period after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter-bomber in November 2015, the Russian leader told Turkish visitors that his country was a more sympathetic and understanding friend to Turkey than the EU or United States, and that the Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation might be prepared to accept Turkey as a member.

Meanwhile, Turkey and Russia have a growing partnership: trade and tourism links are reviving, and such energy projects as the TurkStream natural gas pipeline are to go ahead. Russia is being invited to tender for an air defence system. After the murder of the Russian ambassador to Ankara last month, both Putin and Erdogan immediately confirmed that the assassination would not damage Turkish-Russian relations.

Outlook

Turkey still has to accept openly that it will engage directly with Assad at the Astana summit. If it does not, the Syrian deal could stall. With growing pressures on Erdogan at home, including tumbling Turkish lira exchange rates (see TURKEY: Growth worries and politics will let lira fall - December 23, 2016), he is likely to accept what Russia offers.

Turkey hopes that Trump's arrival at the US helm will ease Turkish-US tensions (see TURKEY/US: Improved relations may only be temporary - January 3, 2017). However, Ankara will have two conditions: less support for the Syrian Kurdish Peoples' Protection Units militia and a crackdown on the Gulen movement in the United States.

Trump could make fairly dramatic gestures in both directions. If he does, the current fierce tension in US-Turkish relations will subside.

Russia, as the senior partner, plans that a new Syria should then begin to emerge under a shaky Russian-Turkish hegemony. Islamists in Turkey will resent this, but Erdogan will probably bow to the inevitable.