East Asia's regional power struggles converge in Seoul
Several separate but interacting crises are raising risk in and around the Korean peninsula
North Korea claimed yesterday that the four missiles it launched on March 6 were a test strike against US bases in Japan, supervised by supreme leader Kim Jong-un. That evening, the first components of the THAAD missile defence system, including two launchers, arrived at Osan airbase in South Korea, prompting renewed protests and further reported sanctions by China. Meanwhile, in Seoul, the Constitutional Court’s verdict on President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment is expected imminently. Protesters for and against the president are facing off, raising the spectre of civil disorder. Extremists have threatened violence.
What next
The rush to deploy THAAD is a bid to tie the hands of Park’s successor. Opposition presidential candidate Moon Jae-in wanted this decision left to the next administration, yet no leader in Seoul can kowtow to Beijing’s blatant bullying. Whatever the Constitutional Court decides, violent protests are likely, the more so if Park is reinstated -- which is unlikely but possible.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Washington's review of US North Korea policy is a wildcard, with all options (including military) said to be under discussion.
- The murder of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother and subsequent diplomatic row make outreach to Pyongyang harder to argue for.
- South Korea’s likely next president's commitment to engaging with Pyongyang will create friction with Tokyo and probably Washington too.
- With neither Beijing nor Seoul minded to back down, the THAAD row will further damage business and political ties.
Analysis
Park's impeachment is coming to a head. In a clearly political move, acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn refused the independent counsel an extra month to continue inquiries. Wrapping up with some haste but no ambiguity, the independent counsel's multiple charges mean Park will be indicted once she leaves office, and if convicted could face a lengthy prison term.
In all, 30 persons were indicted. With the expiry of the independent counsel's mandate, these cases now return to the regular state prosecution service. The prospect looms of many lengthy trials, including of high-profile figures such as Samsung's (Jay Y.) Lee Jae-yong and Park's confidant Choi Sun-sil, which will keep these scandals on the front pages for many months to come.
The Constitutional Court has until June but is expected to decide very soon. If it upholds Park's impeachment, presidential elections must be held within 60 days.
The latest weekly poll gives Moon Jae-in of the liberal main opposition Democrats (Minjoo party) an approval rating of 36.4% -- his highest yet, far ahead of all other candidates to succeed Park Geun-hye as president.
By June, South Korea may thus be set on a political course for the next five years (through mid-2022) very different from the past four.
78%
Share of the public who say they want President Park jailed
Mindful of public sentiment (polls suggest 78% of voters want Park jailed) and angered by her uncooperativeness -- she refused to meet either the independent counsel or the Constitutional Court -- the latter will probably find against Park.
Her supporters have sworn violence in that case; already police are probing acts of intimidation against a Constitutional Court justice and Park Young-so, the independent counsel whose final report filed 13 charges against the currently suspended president, including bribery by Samsung. Lee, the conglomerate's de facto boss since the illness of his father, the chairman, has been in custody on related charges since February 16.
Threats of violence from a small far-right hard core are containable. However, if fewer than six of the eight judges endorse Park's impeachment, she will be reinstated to serve out her term (until February 2018). That could unleash massive demonstrations, with unpredictable consequences.
Will Seoul buckle to Beijing?
South Korea's power vacuum, and likely imminent change of direction, have emboldened China. Fresh cases of pressure on South Korean businesses are reported daily, disingenuously denied by Beijing (see CHINA: Sanctioning Seoul over THAAD may work - January 10, 2017). However, such blatant bullying may backfire.
Lee Hyun-jae, chairman of the policy committee of South Korea's ruling Liberty Korea Party (formerly Saenuri), said yesterday that Seoul will actively consider filing a complaint about China's actions with the WTO. Beijing is betting that a Moon administration would refrain, but Moon may inherit such a process along with a THAAD fait accompli.
What is Pyongyang's game?
North Korea, too, is keeping up the pressure with its latest missile launches.
The fallout from February's fatal attack on Kim Jong-nam in Kuala Lumpur continues to spread (see NORTH KOREA: Murder may damage foreign relations - February 16, 2017). Malaysia declared the North Korean ambassador persona non grata, but deported an arrested North Korean civilian for lack of evidence; it wants to question several others, including two thought to be hiding in the embassy. Each state has now banned the others' nationals from leaving, in effect taking them hostage.
North Korea and Malaysia have taken each other's nationals hostage
Pyongyang often behaves outlandishly, but the reputational cost of alienating a friendly and useful partner (UN investigations found a disguised North Korean arms sales firm based in Malaysia) is high. It may also prompt other ASEAN member states to reconsider their hitherto similar tolerance.
While much about his half-brother's death remains obscure, the suggestion that Kim Jong-un deliberately chose to flaunt North Korea's prowess in chemical weapons adds a new level to concerns about weapons of mass destruction, while making diplomatic engagement harder to defend.
One direct impact was a refusal of visas to senior North Korean officials, set to come to New York for the first 'track two' talks on US soil for five years. Moves are also afoot to redesignate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism (it was delisted in 2008 by George W Bush).
What will Trump do?
Some Pyongyang media articles express the hope that US President Donald Trump will be more willing to enter into dialogue than his predecessor, but his stance on North Korea seems to be hardening. Having once suggested meeting Kim, Trump now says it is too late for that.
Despite criticising his predecessor's foreign policy as ineffective, Trump may end up continuing the Obama administration's hard line, which recent reports suggest was more aggressive than had been realised. Media reports claim that successful US cyberattacks contributed to a spate of failures of North Korean missile launches last year, especially of the Musudan medium-range rocket. Washington reportedly ordered these in retaliation for the hacking of Sony Pictures in 2014.
