Afghan Taliban’s multiple faces reduce scope for peace

Analysis

The government has revived the Kabul Process, which it wants to have international backing but to be driven and controlled by Afghanistan in contrast to, for example, a series of Russian-led talks that have taken place since December.

At a June 6 meeting to restart the process, President Ashraf Ghani offered peace talks to the Taliban and said the government's High Peace Council would facilitate negotiations in any acceptable location. However, he warned that the offer was not "open-ended" (see AFGHANISTAN: Taliban will not follow Hekmatyar lead - March 30, 2016).

The Taliban present a direct military threat to Kabul, controlling or contesting perhaps 40% of the country and, according to spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, planning further expansion in several provinces this year (see AFGHANISTAN: Security is likely to deteriorate in 2017 - April 26, 2017).

The Taliban continue to make absolutist demands. Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, leader of the Quetta Shura faction, used a June 23 statement marking the end of Ramadan to restate that the foreign troop presence is "the main obstacle to peace".

Incoherent structure

The Taliban movement's military successes bely chronic structural weaknesses.

Throughout the insurgency, the Taliban have lacked a unified command-and-control system. Instead, there are multiple chains of command, overlapping battle lines and competition for territory, funding and recruits.

Managed chaos

The late Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, did not play an operational role after 2001 and only occasionally intervened to resolve disputes.

The Quetta Shura leadership saw its role as being to manage disparate Taliban forces and get them to work towards common goals. The de facto leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, excelled in oversight of multiple forces.

Fragmentation

As the conflict went on and foreign sponsorship of the insurgency grew, groupings with privileged access to funding started asserting autonomy.

The first to do so, in 2007, was the Haqqani network, headed by veteran mujahedin leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and later his son Sirajuddin, with their strongholds in the south-east.

The Peshawar Shura, the leading influence in eastern and north-eastern Afghanistan, followed in 2009.

From then on, the Quetta Shura dominated only southern and western Afghanistan; its forces were in the minority elsewhere.

Quetta splits

After Mullah Baradar was arrested in Pakistan in 2010, the Quetta Shura lost the ability to manage internecine tensions even in those areas where it was dominant.

Rival alliances emerged in Quetta. Broadly speaking, a pragmatist group was led by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour while the hardliners were led by Abdul Qayum Zakir.

Mansour was named as Taliban 'amir' or leader when Mullah Omar's death was confirmed in 2015. The selection was controversial and was accompanied by further schism:

• A faction within the Quetta Shura openly broke off and established a rival council called the Rasool Shura after its first leader, Mullah Mohammad Rasool.
• Half of the Peshawar Shura split off in protest at plans to bring the group back under Quetta's control.
• The defectors from the Peshawar Shura set up the Shura of the North, with headquarters in north-eastern Afghanistan.
• The Mashhad Office, established as a liaison office in 2013 to coordinate Taliban camps in Iran, declared itself autonomous in 2014 when the Quetta Shura broke off relations with Tehran.

Unity efforts

After receiving new funding flows from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Mansour made efforts to reunite disparate Taliban elements in 2014-15.

He achieved a reconciliation with the Haqqani network -- Sirajuddin Haqqani was named as his deputy -- and also with the remaining half of the Peshawar Shura.

Contested leadership

Mansour was killed in a US drone strike in May 2016. His successor Haibatullah was selected by a small number of Taliban leaders, again provoking controversy (see AFGHANISTAN: Mansour killing may strengthen Taliban - May 24, 2016).

Haibatullah then angered many Taliban figures by engaging with the Russian authorities and launching a campaign against Islamic State (IS) (see RUSSIA: Differing aims limit tactical Taliban ties - January 26, 2017).

Haibatullah's leadership is tenuous. He faces demands to step down or convene another leadership selection gathering, at which he would be almost certainly be voted out.

His two main challengers are:

• Obaidullah Ishaqzai, cousin of the late Mullah Mansour and reportedly backed by hardliner figure Abdul Qayum Zakir; and
• Sirajuddin Haqqani, who continues as deputy leader under Haibatullah.

Both position themselves as hardliners, but Haqqani is favourite because he has Pakistani support.

Divergent views and aims

With several groupings claiming ownership of the Taliban and no agreement on its overall leader, the movement is riven with differences of outlook and objective. The main points of controversy are:

Leadership

Parts of the Taliban are happy without an agreement on an overall 'amir', because if they accept someone as leader, they will have to obey him.

The Mashhad Shura and the Shura of the North are content with their own funding sources, chains of command and territorial control.

More ideologically oriented figures such as Haqqani believe the Taliban must unite behind a single leader to bring the jihad to its successful conclusion.

War and governance

Taliban hardliners such as Haqqani argue that effective, committed warfare is all that is needed to achieve military victory, the end goal.

Pragmatists argue that the Taliban must demonstrate an ability to govern as well as fight, and have been pushing for investment in a judiciary, a healthcare system, education and more. Haibatullah is an advocate of this view, as Mansour was before him.

Foreign sponsorship

Most Taliban groups prefer alliances with (and funding from) Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The alternative sources of support, Iran and Russia, are ideologically unpalatable.

Global jihad

Although IS is fighting local wars with Taliban groups in eastern and north-western Afghanistan, this animosity is not shared by other Taliban, who oppose such conflict on principle.

Haqqani, now the real strongman in the Quetta Shura, argues that the Taliban should coexist and even cooperate with IS (see AFGHANISTAN: Islamic State poses limited threat - September 7, 2016). Haqqani has avoided sending fighters against IS, which instead has clashed with other Taliban groups.

While the hardliners insist that jihad supersedes local interests, more pragmatic leaders are happy to position themselves as protectors of Pashtun or even sub-ethnic tribal interests when circumstances require it.