Analysis

By conventional standards, the Party Congress should not have any surprises. Xi is likely to get a second five-year term as general secretary (the Party's top leadership post). Premier Li Keqiang is almost certain to be reappointed as well.

Yet Beijing is gripped by uncertainty.

Uncertainty over succession

Besides the line-up of the Party's top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee, the most significant unknown is whether a clear successor to Xi will be appointed.

If a successor were named at the Party Congress, Xi would be at risk of becoming a lame duck during his next five-year term.

If the wrong man were picked (and it will certainly be a man), Xi's legacy would be at risk. When Xi himself was made the successor in 2007, he was a compromise candidate and appeared to be a safe choice. Nothing in his unadventurous career before then suggested the radical changes he would quickly introduce as leader.

Xi may be reluctant to let go of power partly because he fears his freedom may be at risk. However, Xi's purges have spared Jiang Zemin (who headed the Party 1989-2002). This upholds a precedent that may give Xi some protection in retirement.

A more serious concern is the fate of Xi's followers, who are much younger and could be purged the way Xi purged Jiang's.

Xi's revolution

Today, five years after Xi ascended to the top post, it is clear that he has overturned the political order established by his predecessors following the crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

On the domestic front, Xi's revolution began with a ferocious and sustained crackdown on corruption. In his first three years in office, 750,000 officials (roughly one in ten) were punished with warnings, probation, demotions and expulsions, and 35,600 of them prosecuted.

Many rivals and threats to Xi were destroyed in this anti-corruption fight-cum-purge. Of the 205 sitting full members of the Central Committee (the most senior body in the Party after the Politburo), 17 have been arrested and jailed, including Sun Zhengcai, a Politburo member seen as a potential successor (see CHINA: Purge puts orderly leadership handover in doubt - July 20, 2017).

Those hit hardest appear to be allies of the former President Jiang. The 'Youth League faction', the power base of former President Hu Jintao, has suffered fewer casualties.

Xi's war on corruption has consolidated his power but breaks an implicit mutual security pact among the post-Mao ruling elites that effectively banned large-scale purges.

Xi's revolution has also reshaped the regime's relations with society.

After the death of Mao, the Communist Party followed a reactive strategy to defend its rule. A 'soft authoritarian' regime allowed limited space for civil society. Human rights lawyers, labour activists and pro-democracy intellectuals could operate as long as they observed implicit red lines.

The state usually deployed its fearsome and increasingly sophisticated repressive apparatus only when confronted with organised, clear and present danger, as it was in 1999 when members of the religious group Falungong besieged the headquarters of the Party in Beijing.

Xi, however, has implemented a new survival strategy that favours repression, not liberalisation, as the foremost instrument for maintaining power. There has been a relentless crackdown on the internet and social media, arrests and imprisonment of human rights lawyers and activists, and intensifying ideological re-indoctrination.

Foreign policy

Xi has replaced the post-Mao strategy of keeping a low profile on the international stage with an assertive and expansionist approach.

He is promoting China-centric alternatives to the US-dominated Western international order. His signature move is the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR), which if successful will reroute global commerce and strengthen Beijing's economic leverage (see ASIA: Belt and Road could remake strategic map - September 11, 2017).

Xi has moved China closer to Russia, a useful partner in countering the United States.

On the security front, Xi's government began building fortified artificial islands in the South China Sea, solidifying Chinese claims and testing US resolve.

Risks Xi faces

Xi's initiatives have already had game-changing impacts, but his revolution is unfinished. For example, his blueprint to reform the economy remains largely on paper (see CHINA: State sector braces for creative destruction - December 4, 2013).

His attempt to remake the Party into a more disciplined and ideologically pure organisation also faces resistance from the rank and file, who have no desire to return to a puritanical era reminiscent of China under Mao.

OBOR could turn out to be too costly and impracticable, and the rush to expand China's international influence risks a premature showdown with the United States.

Securing Xi's legacy

Xi's top priority for the forthcoming Party Congress will be to take steps to ensure the completion of his revolution and safeguard its legacy.

The surest way may be to break the implicit two-term limit observed by his predecessors. Otherwise, his reforms might unravel soon after his retirement in 2022. If he appoints a successor at the Party Congress, as his predecessors did, he will risk becoming poltically diminished over the next five years.

Based on speculation in Beijing, only one person of the right age (under 55) to succeed Xi is likely to join the Politburo Standing Committee this time -- Hu Chunhua, a Politburo member and current party chief of Guangdong. He is most likely to be named executive vice premier and therefore a potential successor to Li as premier in 2023 -- but not to Xi.

At the moment, the odds favour Xi winning the succession battle and promoting supporters to the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

However, he cannot accomplish these objectives without bargaining and trading favours with other powerful leaders and groups, especially the Youth League faction. Youth League faction members on the Politburo such as Hu, Wang Yang (a vice premier), Zhao Leji (head of the Organisation Department) and Liu Qibao (propaganda chief) are well-positioned to advance to more senior posts, so the stakes for the faction are high.

In all likelihood, the Party Congress will further strengthen Xi's power, but not without significant compromises.