Shifting Middle East geopolitics risk more instability
Changes in US and Russian policy since 2015 have triggered shifts in the regional balance of power
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said yesterday that Turkey would be looking to restore trust with the United States. Relations between the two NATO allies have been strained because Washington supports Kurdish groups in Syria in its fight against Islamic State (IS), while Ankara regards Kurdish groups as a threat to its security. Their tense relations come amidst wider shifts in alliances and relationships throughout the Middle East.
What next
US policy unpredictability and withdrawal, combined with Russian aims of greater trade but limited commitment, are changing the balance of power in the Middle East. The unreliability of external backers is incentivising regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia to reach out in multiple directions in search for self-protection. These shifting alliances, without creating clear blocs, may increase volatility in regional politics and the chances of inter-state war.
Subsidiary Impacts
- EU interest is unlikely to expand beyond a fairly narrow range of issues including refugees and human rights rhetoric.
- Chinese interests in the region will be overwhelmingly commercial, minimising overt political engagement.
- Iraq will seek to maintain its balance between the United States and Tehran, needing the support of both to maintain stability.
Analysis
The Middle East was a key battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For the two decades from 1990, by contrast, it lived largely under US hegemony. The existence of a few, vastly outgunned hostile governments -- in Iran, Syria and, until 2003, Iraq -- did not detract from the overall picture.
It is since 2015 that three sets of inter-related developments have begun significantly to change the overall balance of power. These are:
- progressive Russian engagement;
- US withdrawal and unpredictability; and
- competing regional hegemonic aspirations.
Russian engagement
At the height of the Syrian civil war in September 2015, Moscow unexpectedly intervened to support Damascus. Despite its limited nature, this intervention turned the tide in the civil war (see MIDDLE EAST: Russia to expand security and trade role - March 13, 2017).
Moscow is looking at ways to disengage from Syria through peace negotiations
President Vladimir Putin has made domestic political capital out of Russia's successful return to 'Great Power' status in the Middle East. Nevertheless, he does not envisage a deep financial or strategic commitment in Syria. Instead, Moscow is probably looking to translate this new status into weapons sales throughout the region.
US withdrawal
At the same time, US policy since late 2016 has become uncertain. President Donald Trump has consistently argued against major troop deployments abroad, putting "America First".
Yet Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is committed to keeping US troops in Syria, and fighting IS by supporting Kurdish forces -- a situation that is bringing Washington into conflict with Ankara, as the latter is fighting against Kurds within Turkey.
Nevertheless, the broad impression is that Washington has withdrawn its political attention, generally resulting in reflexive support for 'core' allies Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Although Trump has shown an occasional burst of interest -- for example, over the April 2017 Syrian chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun -- he has not followed through in the longer term. When Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched a boycott of Qatar in June 2017, the United States (formerly seen as the GCC's patron and protector) sent mixed signals, doing nothing to resolve it.
Trump's Mideast policy seems domestically driven
The areas where Trump has introduced a major Middle East policy change are all more or less incidental. They are driven primarily by domestic political concerns and campaign promises, such as his attitude to the Iran nuclear deal and the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (see ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS: Trump’s speech may help Iran - December 7, 2017).
Regional hegemonic claims
In this vacuum, the hegemonic aspirations of key regional powers have become more overt. In part this is opportunistic, but it also reflects the need for self-protection by countries that no longer trust the United States to fulfil that role. The result has been further to intensify existing rivalries.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have stepped up confrontation with Iran, for example in Yemen and -- less successfully --Lebanon. The increased salience of this issue in part motivated the split with 'neutral' Qatar (see QATAR: Solution is unlikely at Gulf summit - December 4, 2017).
Also, Turkey, while still wary of Iran, no longer trusts the US as a security anchor and is carving out for itself a niche as an independent regional power (see TURKEY: Rift with Saudi Arabia will not end soon - January 3, 2018). Ankara has offered trade and military support to Qatar, as well as engaging in a war of words with the UAE over the Ottoman legacy.
Balance of power
The Russia-Syria-Iran axis that emerged after 2015 has now been reinforced by Turkey (despite ongoing differences of interest on Syria and the Kurds), though that does not place Russia in a Shia bloc -- Moscow still prefers Israel to Hezbollah, for example. Nonetheless, Qatar is increasingly loosely associated with this axis, though it cannot afford to jeopardise the US military relationship.
US regional alliances have loosened
On the other side, the United States clearly stands with Israel, Saudi Arabia (with its satellite Bahrain), the UAE and -- in a different category -- Egypt and Jordan. Tensions over issues such as Jerusalem and Yemen have not destabilised these ties.
However, within the polarised GCC, the efforts of Kuwait and Oman to maintain their traditional neutrality are distancing them from the Saudi-UAE axis with its heightened belligerence towards Iran and Qatar.
Moreover, many longstanding US allies that still depend heavily on that relationship are also simultaneously reaching out to the alternative power centre:
- After the failed Saudi bid to force Beirut to cut ties with Tehran through the detention of Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, the influence of pro-Iranian elements in the country has strengthened.
- Trump's Jerusalem declaration has forced the Palestinians to seek alternative mediation with Israel: many see Russia as a key player.
- To stabilise its northern border, Jordan has been forced to come to terms with the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
- Egypt has repeatedly reached out to Moscow and not taken a strong stance towards Assad or Iran, despite maintaining close ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
- Even the United States' closest ally in the region, Israel, knows that it needs Russian help to manage the situation in Syria, resulting in intermittent high-level dialogue between Putin and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
Implications
A broadly disengaged United States may be held hostage to the agendas of its key regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel. For its part, Russia will talk up its regional role, but in practice, it is looking for opportunities to sell weapons and aims to contract its military footprint and financial obligations.
As the United States, Russia and China are not really interested in the Middle East, less money is likely to flow into the region. This has long-term implications for the stability of those governments that depend on long-standing patronage structures based in part on foreign financing, such as Jordan and Egypt.
