Improvement in US ties with Ankara can only go so far
The Khashoggi affair and Brunson release offer Turkey opportunities, but other problems beset US-Turkish ties
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Saudi King Salman discussed by telephone last night Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance in Istanbul. US President Donald Trump has warmed towards Turkey, which is benefiting from the contrast with Saudi behaviour. Turkish-US cooperation in the Khashoggi affair and the release of US pastor Andrew Brunson have eased bilateral tensions after months of hostile confrontation.
What next
The mooted joint Turkish-Saudi investigation into Khashoggi’s fate will not proceed very far and will end in stalemate. Neither Ankara nor Riyadh is willing to lose face. Turkey may accuse some Saudi diplomats of involvement and try to prevent them leaving, with Saudi Arabia retaliating in kind. The West will back Turkey, but will not want to push Saudi Arabia too far.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Ankara could make things more difficult for Riyadh in the Gulf and tensions with Saudi Arabia may become permanent.
- Turkish-Saudi trade links are not deep and will decline further; Turkey does not depend on Saudi energy.
- Turkey will not break with Iran, and will try to disguise its position on the US-Iranian rift for as long as possible.
- Turkish military and political pressure on the Syrian Kurds will grow despite the US-Turkish easing.
Analysis
Trump's support for "severe punishment" for Saudi Arabia if its officials are shown to have murdered Khashoggi and his appreciation for Erdogan after Brunson's release at a rally in Richmond on October 13, taken together suggest a rapprochement is being attempted between the United States and Turkey.
The US president seems to believe such a thing is still possible. Trump's remarks about Erdogan are just the latest in a series of gestures suggesting he wants to reverse half a decade of deteriorating relations between two countries that are still officially NATO allies, which culminated in the mutual imposition of trade sanctions in July (see TURKEY: Syrian goals will entail further US breach - September 25, 2018).
Victory of sorts
Brunson's release is being hailed as a victory of sorts in Washington and Ankara -- for different reasons. On October 12, Brunson was convicted of spying but received a relatively light sentence, equivalent to the time he had already served in jail. This is a fairly familiar outcome in Turkey in cases where the prosecution collapses, since it immunises the authorities from further action against them.
The government controls most of the media and has told its public (the bulk of whom are probably inclined to regard any Christian missionary as a spy) that this was a triumph for Turkish justice. Many Turks regard the Brunson prosecution as a stand against a 'great power'; they welcome even more the signs that, after two months in the doldrums, the lira is regaining some ground against the dollar (see TURKEY: Crisis will cut profits, add risks for banks - September 17, 2018).
Trump's remarks suggest that, for the moment, Erdogan is being welcomed as a potential partner. That may be premature, as it skirts the long list of serious issues to be resolved between the United States and Turkey, not least the continued detention of US citizens and local consular employees, and Turkish suspicions of US support for the Kurds.
Serious issues remain in US-Turkish relations
US backing on Khashoggi
However, overtures to Ankara have fortuitously been enhanced by Khashoggi's disappearance and likely murder while visiting the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2. Despite close links between the Trump administration and family on the one hand, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Saudi government on the other, Trump (after some initial wavering and reference to US arms sales), has resorted to tough rhetoric, along with all other Western countries, led by the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
The immediate task is to establish what happened to Khashoggi. Here again Washington has assisted Ankara by confirming that its own sources indicate that Khashoggi was probably murdered after entering the Saudi embassy.
This is very valuable to Ankara, for while it does seem to have extensive information about Khashoggi, some of which it says comes from a legitimate source (Khashoggi's own Apple watch), it has also been leaking details to the press that, assuming they are authentic, must come from clandestine surveillance of a foreign mission. This would be embarrassing for Ankara to admit to, let alone elaborate on.
Saudi denials
However, in backing the Turks, the United States irks its close allies and regional partners, the Saudis, who deny murdering Khashoggi, have not been able to offer an alternative explanation and are already issuing threats. A senior Saudi source told the national news agency yesterday that the kingdom would respond with greater reaction to any action against it, adding that its economy played a vital role internationally.
Although nearly a fortnight has now passed and the Saudis have nominally at least offered full cooperation to Turkey in its investigation, it was only yesterday that Saudi investigators arrived and the consulate-general has not yet been opened to Turkish investigators. In the meantime, according to the Turks, the interior of the building has been redecorated.
Investigations would seem to have little chance of successful conclusion
In any case, most forensic evidence has probably disappeared; Turkish sources say Khashoggi's dismembered body was swiftly removed from the country by air. So, without new forensic evidence, investigations are likely to be inconclusive, with the Turks and Saudis reaching conflicting conclusions.
However, Erdogan and the Turkish government are showing no sign of relaxing the pressure over the Khashoggi affair; media coverage has been intense. Trump may have to make a difficult choice between two key allies. The United States is not well placed to act as peacemaker in this dispute.
Interlocking disputes
Ankara is badly at odds with Riyadh on several counts (see TURKEY: Rift with Saudi Arabia will not end soon - January 3, 2018). Mohammed bin Salman and Erdogan dislike each other personally and are regional rivals.
In Syria, Turkey is aligned with Saudi Arabia's enemy Iran, which it sees as an ally. In the Gulf, Turkey protects Qatar against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party is close to the Muslim Brotherhood (as was Khashoggi) and increasingly suspicious of the growth of Wahhabism, the Saudi brand of Sunni Islam, inside Turkey.
Outlook
If Trump is pursuing eventual Turkish cooperation against Iran (as opposed to merely a less chilly Turkey-NATO relationship), his goal may be unattainable. For Turks, the United States is the main factor preventing a Turkish strike on Kurdish enclaves in Syria, their destruction and replacement by 'safe zones', a key Turkish goal.
Erdogan's price will be too high for Washington in Syria
For a full US breakthrough with Turkey, the United States would have to not only allow Manbij to fall but also abandon its Kurdish allies by withdrawing US troops from Syria -- impossible while the conflict with Islamic State continues. As their tweets show, senior US officers regard the Kurds as brothers-in-arms.
In short, a successful US balancing act or mediation between Saudi and Turkish allies may be next to impossible. However, discreet assistance to help Turkey stabilise its economy without going to the IMF might help put relations with the wayward US ally on a better footing. US delivery to Turkey of F-35 fighters is hanging in the balance; much will depend on whether the upturn in relations continues.
