Turkish-EU relations may move to new stage

Ankara has recently sent signals that it would like to improve its relationship with key European partners

Although mistrust between Turkey and its European partners looks set to continue, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said before his formal state visit to Berlin in September that German-Turkish relations were “indispensable” in the light of “dramatic world developments”. For their part, Europeans have reconciled themselves to the fact that Erdogan, imperfect as he may be, is a fixture for the foreseeable future.

What next

A strong sense of mutual interest in several key areas will provide the necessary impetus for maintaining open and frequent channels of communication at the highest levels between EU capitals and Ankara. Assuming this continues, Turkish-European relations may become more predictable, with a more stable strategic framework emerging over the next few months.

Subsidiary Impacts

  • Erdogan will dangle a formal termination of Turkey’s EU process before his own base and nationalists who view the West with animosity.
  • European free speech and human rights advocates will decry the soft line on the increasingly authoritarian Erdogan.
  • Financial markets will expect Berlin and EU to signal willingness to prop up the lira and stave off financial crisis on Europe’s periphery.
  • A climate of sustained dialogue and reduced public friction between Turkey and major European powers would benefit NATO.

Analysis

Turkey is one of the EU's most important partners because of its proximity, NATO membership, population size, economic potential and geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Caucasus.

That said, tensions and mistrust between Ankara and its European partners have steadily grown in recent years (see TURKEY/EU: Relations stall even on transactional basis - March 28, 2018). Turkey's stalled EU accession is one reason; Erdogan's increasingly centralised and authoritarian style of governance is another.

Europeans have also been highly critical of Erdogan's use of the Turkish diaspora in Europe to advance his political objectives.

From its side, the Erdogan administration accuses the Europeans of failing to take a strong stance against the failed July 2016 coup in Turkey. The support of European powers, including France and Germany, for Syrian Kurdish forces fighting Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq is another point of contention.

New framework for cooperation

Despite these overlapping tensions, Turkish-European relations are likely to see incremental progress in the next year, thanks to both foreign and domestic economic factors. Recent signals include Turkey's release in mid-August of two Greek soldiers detained on espionage charges, Erdogan's Berlin visit in September and the Turkish-German-French-Russian summit in Istanbul in late October covering Syria and other issues.

The new strategic framework will be underpinned by a stronger sense of interdependence between Turkey and mainland Europe.

Beyond EU accession

While neither side may formally end EU accession in the short term, the process has stalled in the political conditions prevailing in both Turkey and the EU.

Instead of EU membership as the anchoring strategic logic in the relationship, a push may come for more regular and institutional high-level dialogues running in parallel to the EU accession mechanism. Areas of focus may include defence and security, energy and climate change, scientific cooperation and cultural ties.

The relationship may develop into top-level meetings paralleling the accession process

Both France and Germany are particularly supportive of this approach, as it would bring closer to fruition their vision of a Turkish 'special partnership', instead of membership. However, this will frustrate accession backers on both sides, who will argue that building alternatives to the accession process as the flagship element in the Turkish-EU relationship will weaken both sides in the long term.

Countering 'America First'

The Trump administration's 'America First' approach to global affairs is pushing Europe and Turkey closer together. Trump has threatened to upend the multilateral economic order and has disparaged strategic allies.

Trump's reference to the EU as a "foe" on trade has shaken the foundations of transatlantic relations to the core. The US Treasury's Section 232 national security investigations on steel and aluminium have already resulted in hefty tariffs on both Turkish and European exports. The Section 232 investigation on the auto sector could spell further trouble for an important European export market.

Trump's decision to walk away from the Iranian nuclear agreement is another area where European and Turkish interests converge. Germany and France were both parties to the agreement and are working hard to keep it from total collapse.

US foreign and trade policies are pushing the EU and Turkey closer together

As for Turkey, it considers Tehran a key energy and trade partner, and an ally in countering Kurdish secessionism in the region. It simply cannot afford to alienate the Iranians in order to placate Washington.

Prioritising economic interdependence

The lira's steep mid-year fall seems to have forced Erdogan to recognise the importance of keeping Europe's doors open in case he is forced to seek financial help in the future, particularly in the event that his government's market-oriented stabilisation programme fails to stem further exchange rate weakness (see TURKEY: Meeting fiscal targets needs structural reform - October 22, 2018).

Given the depth of economic ties (the EU is Turkey's largest trade partner by far), the Europeans are worried that economic collapse in Turkey would ripple across their financial system and disrupt trade. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has strongly supported economic cooperation with Turkey, as has French Economy and Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire.

This underscores a growing mutual realisation that economic interdependence is a key element of Turkish-European relations. This is particularly true for Ankara, as it is aware of the EU's importance for modernising its economy, growing its industrial capabilities and helping it escape the 'middle-income trap'.

Turkey needs the EU's economic assistance

Preserving the migrant deal

Merkel's 2015 'Open Door Policy' for refugees fleeing wars and deprivation in the Middle East and Africa has cost her dearly at the polls (see GERMANY: Merkel's departure shows Europe's weakness - November 2, 2018). In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany is now the second-most-popular party after Merkel's centre-right Christian Democratic Union. Far-right groups across the EU have used the refugee crisis to advance the national debate on 'identity politics' in their favour, to the detriment of centrists and moderates.

For this reason, mainstream European leaders such as Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, who is also suffering from low approval ratings, need the one-for-one migrant deal that was struck with Erdogan in March 2016 to hold. The EU has already provided Turkey with 3 billion euros (3.4 billion dollars) in aid, and a further 3 billion is due to be distributed over 2019 and 2020.

As for Turkey, it needs stable financial support to alleviate the massive economic and social pressures it has incurred from having more than 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees within its borders.

Counterterrorism cooperation

The counterterrorism issue is probably one of the trickiest to navigate for Turkish and EU diplomats and politicians.

Turkey and the EU will continue to share intelligence and cooperate against IS and other terrorist threats. However, Europeans will probably want to keep this aspect of the relationship away from the public eye because of Turkey's sweeping crackdown on internal dissent.

The European Parliament's Budget Committee voted to withhold 70 million euros in pre-accession funds for Turkey, citing a lack of improvement in rule of law and human rights conditions.

All roads lead through Berlin?

With the UK decision to leave the EU, Germany's geopolitical and economic influence within the bloc is even stronger. Turkey recognises this fact and the priority for its diplomats will be to repair relations with Berlin.