Nigerian insecurity could worsen after polls
Northern states are being affected by multiple security crises
Ahead of presidential and legislative elections on February 16 and gubernatorial and state polls in March, President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration faces at least three violent fronts across northern Nigeria. Attacks by Boko Haram’s two factions pose the greatest immediate danger, but insecurity from banditry in Zamfara and Sokoto states and inter-communal conflicts across much of the north-central ‘Middle Belt’ could impinge on the elections and after.
What next
Despite public pressure for a credible strategy to halt Boko Haram attacks, Buhari’s administration has failed to announce a substantive plan. While northern insecurity undermines Buhari, it is unlikely to prove fatal to his electoral chances. Nevertheless, it will complicate his re-election efforts, impact several state polls and pose severe challenges for governance and inter-communal relations.
Subsidiary Impacts
- An over-extended military and partisan political divisions will hamper the development of a coordinated counterinsurgency response.
- Journalists and human rights groups could face a growing clampdown over critical reporting on the military.
- Ethnic and religious-inspired Middle Belt clashes risk disrupting polling in rural areas and fuelling worsening cycles of reprisal violence.
Analysis
As with the 2015 polls, the electoral season has been marred by violence in the north, and an incumbent president who frequently downplays the seriousness of conflicts proliferating nationwide (see NIGERIA: Close and contested polls loom - January 24, 2019).
Buhari was elected partly due to his promise to defeat Boko Haram but he has failed to do so. He now faces at least three parallel security crises in northern Nigeria, with little prospect of any of these being solved over the short term.
While the resurgence of Boko Haram in the north-east, especially increasing attacks by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) faction, draws the most international attention, insecurity in potential swing states from banditry (Zamfara) and so-called 'farmer-herder conflicts' (Adamawa, Benue and Taraba) have been just as deadly.
Emboldened insurgents
ISWAP's recent strategy of attacking forward operating bases and depots has put the military on the back foot (see NIGERIA: Boko Haram will expose army's narrow strategy - December 6, 2018). Attacks on bases in December were followed by increasingly brazen offensives throughout January, including one on Rann that displaced 30,000 civilians and destroyed most of its remaining buildings.
Nevertheless, despite their expanded military capacity, there is little evidence that ISWAP intends to return to previous strategies of holding territory as in 2014-15; it has largely abandoned military bases once they have been looted, apparently focusing on building its arsenal.
Meanwhile, the group has further consolidated its control over trade, farming and other economic activities outside the military's zone of control, including much of the territory immediately adjacent to Lake Chad. Although they are likely weaker militarily than ISWAP, Abubakar Shekau's faction has also maintained a significant media presence and continues to launch smaller-scale attacks on civilian targets.
Banditry threat
Meanwhile, in north-western Zamfara State, organised banditry has turned large swathes of territory into 'no-go' areas. The crisis appears to have developed from localised, inter-communal clashes, with the subsequent formation of one or more organised criminal groups with ties to cattle rustling and (allegedly) the trans-Sahel arms trade.
These groups are believed to be led by ethnic Fulanis, but little is known about their structure or leadership. There are now almost daily attacks in isolated rural communities, with the authorities resorting to the use of civilian vigilante groups (a strategy used to combat Boko Haram).
New Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) recruits were inducted in November, and Zamfara's police commissioner announced in January that his office would soon issue plans for official operational guidelines and human rights training.
This CJTF would supplement the 1,600 troops already in the state as part of 'Operation Sharan Daji', which frequently claims to have killed large numbers of combatants yet remains unable to protect many rural areas.
Politicised strategy
Despite the authorities' efforts, the north-west situation remains grim. The federal government has failed to provide an estimate for the number of people displaced by the conflict, but reports suggest that tens of thousands have moved to neighbouring states.
While there is little evidence of links to more organised violent extremist networks, such as those operating in central Mali, unverified reports from neighbouring Sokoto State in December suggested a group of pastoralist 'jihadists' had crossed the border from Niger to terrorise civilians (see WEST AFRICA: Jihadism and counterterrorism face limits - December 21, 2018).
Certain security measures appear to have been initiated to benefit Buhari
Buhari's government has promised new resources to restore security. This includes the expansion of the controversial 'Operation Python Dance' -- previously deployed to combat criminal gangs in the south-east -- to Katsina State (Buhari's home state).
While Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai has said that this decision was based on electoral security, it was likely a political favour to Buhari and the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), given similar resources have not been mobilised to combat more deadly conflicts in Benue, Taraba and Adamawa states.
Electoral impacts
Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, presidential candidate of the main opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP), has campaigned heavily on security issues, but offered few innovative proposals (see NIGERIA: Opposition candidate could unseat Buhari - November 19, 2018). As a result, despite the surge in ISWAP attacks, north-eastern violence is unlikely to imperil Buhari and the APC's electoral chances.
As with the 2015 polls, there is also little evidence that security concerns influence voters outside conflict zones. Where violence is more likely to matter electorally is when it either disrupts voting or causes elite alliances to shift.
The APC is in crisis in Zamfara, where it may not be able to run a gubernatorial candidate after intra-party splits, and the incumbent APC governor's handing of the security situation has been a major point of attack for the PDP.
Meanwhile, the pastoralist crisis has damaged the APC in Benue State, which it won by 7% in 2015. In particular, the PDP has rejected the Buhari administration's plan to allocate land for ranches, something local farmers vehemently oppose (see NIGERIA: Pastoral conflicts could worsen - February 20, 2018).
The religious dimension of the conflicts -- most farmers are Christians, while most herders are Muslim -- has inserted another politically divisive element into state-level campaigns, where local elections have long been polarised along religious and ethnic lines.
Civil society activists in Jos, capital of Plateau State, are increasingly fearful of a rekindling of historic tensions between Fulani Muslims and Birom Christians.
Free and fair?
Unlike 2015, there is no indication that the security situation or other technical issues will delay polling, while there have been no major pre-election clashes between PDP and APC supporters. However, two recent controversies have raised concerns over disputed polls.
Fears are growing over election rigging and intimidation
The first was Buhari's decision to suspend Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen after his recent indictment on ethics and corruption charges over the alleged non-declaration of assets.
Buhari's decision was likely unconstitutional and has been condemned by the US and UK governments, as well as the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. The PDP has denounced the move as it fears a cowed or partisan judiciary will be reluctant to rule against Buhari's government in the event of an opposition legal challenge to the results.
The second was a February 5 statement made by Kaduna State Governor Nasir El-Rufai, a Buhari ally, that foreign electoral monitors risked going home "in body bags" should they try interfering in Nigeria's election. Although el-Rufai and the APC have attempted to downplay the statement, PDP leaders see this as further evidence that Buhari's government intends to win at all costs.
