Pyongyang will press its advantage at Trump summit

Analysis

A recent speech by US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun has added some clarity to the US position.

First, Washington appears open to pursuing the Singapore Summit goals "simultaneously and in parallel". This would presumably involve both sides linking the peace and denuclearisation processes through a 'roadmap' of mutual concessions.

Second, the US side now defines its position on denuclearisation as "the complete declaration and elimination of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and their means of delivery and production". To verify this process, Washington will demand a list of all of North Korea's nuclear production facilities and eventually their opening to international inspectors. (Pyongyang has so far only declared willingness to reopen its plutonium facility at Yongbyon.)

In return, Biegun offered a peace treaty to bring a formal end to the Korean War, normalisation of diplomatic relations, and trade and investment that will ensure a "bright future" for North Korea.

While the US position is maximalist in demanding North Korea's complete and verifiable denuclearisation, Washington is nevertheless showing greater flexibility on the negotiation process.

Pyongyang will almost certainly refuse to declare its full nuclear arsenal, claiming that doing so would create vulnerability to a pre-emptive first strike. Full nuclear disarmament is equally implausible, as the North Korean government sees nuclear weapons as fundamental to regime survival.

The US side has made significant concessions in suspending its annual military exercises with South Korea, weakening alliance preparedness and deterrence.

Kim has used talks with the United States to improve his image abroad and bring the regime out of international isolation. UN sanctions still stand but now rest on weaker foundations.

In contrast, the Trump administration has achieved few concrete results. Optimists in the White House tout Pyongyang's agreement to dismantle its nuclear and missile testing facilities at Punggye-ri and Tongchang-ri -- yet neither site is critical to the development of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, Kim reportedly promised during his December meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that North Korea may be willing to close all of its nuclear production facilities provided the United States took "corresponding measures". This pledge remains to be corroborated by Pyongyang.

There are few signs, however, that the North is prepared to take these steps -- and, crucially, to do so in the presence of inspectors.

For example, the partial dismantlement of Punggye-ri by explosions in May 2018, in the presence of foreign journalists but not professional nuclear inspectors, prevented the United States from confirming that the site is now inoperable. Punggye-ri is once again on the agenda in Hanoi. Washington has often accused Pyongyang of 'selling the same horse twice'.

UN Panel of Experts

Adding urgency, a recent leaked report from the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea alleges that Pyongyang is dispersing its ballistic missile forces to reduce vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike.

The report also alleges that Pyongyang's nuclear and missile forces remain fully intact and that it is secretly using civilian infrastructure, such as airports, for assembly and testing.

The Panel's findings will not surprise US intelligence agencies, which have long dismissed the likelihood of North Korean disarmament. Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats directly contradicted Trump on this point when presenting the Worldwide Threat Assessment to the Senate on January 29.

Sooner or later, Washington will have to choose between tacitly accepting a nuclear-armed North Korea -- possibly with capped capabilities -- or reverting to confrontation, as in 2017.

Inter-Korean initiatives

On December 30, Kim wrote to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, with whom he met three times in 2018, that he hopes for frequent talks in 2019.

Washington appears to have softened its demand that full denuclearisation must precede all sanctions relief, recently easing restrictions on humanitarian aid to North Korea. Trump may offer wider relief in order to strike a deal in Hanoi, or shortly thereafter.

If sanctions are relaxed, Moon is keen to pursue inter-Korean economic cooperation. Topping the agenda is North Korea's transport infrastructure, for which Kim has already requested assistance. The two Koreas held a groundbreaking ceremony (thus far notional) to reconnect cross-border roads and railways in December.

The White House is perturbed by the North-South rapprochement, privately insisting to Seoul that the inter-Korean dialogue must remain tied to the core question of denuclearisation.

In one example of alliance tension, the US State Department opposed the new Inter-Korean Liaison Office north of the inter-Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), opened in September following the Moon-Kim 'Panmunjom Declaration'. The new office has become a venue for discussing bilateral road, rail, forestry and medical cooperation. Washington fears that if such cooperation agreements are implemented this would violate sanctions and undercut its talks with Pyongyang.

For its part, Seoul is concerned by the possibility of rash concessions by the Trump administration, particularly any action that would weaken US extended deterrence.

One worry is that Trump may settle for a 'small deal' whereby the direct ballistic missile threat to the continental United States is mitigated (some have mooted the missiles' transfer to China, which is unlikely), while leaving other nuclear and weapons of mass destruction facilities intact, threatening South Korea and Japan.

The current tension between those two allies, which Washington is doing nothing to try to ease, also works to North Korea's advantage (see SOUTH KOREA: Compensation verdict will roil Japan ties - October 31, 2018 and see NORTH KOREA: Kim will gain from diplomatic momentum - January 15, 2019).

Seoul's fears of US 'abandonment' have intensified as Trump questions cost-sharing agreements for US forces in South Korea. An agreement on this was reached this month, with great difficulty; but unlike the previous five-year deal it will apply for one year only and will then need to be renegotiated.

The US security guarantee has become more important to Seoul as regional instability has risen in recent years and China has become more assertive.

That said, the Moon administration (somewhat contradictorily) also resents any attempt by Washington to rein in its dealings with Pyongyang. If in Hanoi Trump agrees to support some sanctions relief -- which would require action by the UN Security Council -- that could break the impasse.