Kim’s hard line puts inter-Korean stability in doubt

Analysis

The new inter-Korean peace process, launched last year after a mostly acrimonious decade since the 'sunshine' era of detente (1998-2007) fell apart, had seemed sincere and substantial.

Kim and Moon met three times in six months, developing an apparent rapport. By contrast the previous 70 years had only ever seen two inter-Korean summits, in 2000 and 2007.

Two detailed accords were signed, at the first summit at the border installation of Panmunjom last April, and at the third when Moon visited Pyongyang in September.

Implementation of these new agreements began swiftly in several areas, including sports exchanges, family reunions and talks about infrastructural and other economic cooperation.

Measures to reduce border tensions included no-fly and no-fire zones near the border and at sea. Since September the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom has been jointly run by unarmed soldiers from both sides.

Sanctions set limits

This detente is constrained by sanctions on North Korea, both multilateral (mainly the UN Security Council) and unilateral, including measures levied by the United States and South Korea itself (see NORTH KOREA: Peace process may hit sanctions roadblock - September 21, 2018).

With almost all supply of goods to North Korea banned, inter-Korean economic co-operation has been a non-starter, to both sides' frustration.

Hopes of reviving two joint ventures in the North -- the Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism at Mount Kumgang, closed in 2016 and 2008 respectively -- remain unfulfilled.

Plans to relink roads and railways across the border, and modernise those in the North, are also blocked. Joint surveys and a notional ground-breaking ceremony were held last year, but actual progress is impossible while sanctions persist.

Video reunions of separated families have been delayed, pending the UN Security Council granting exemptions for the needed equipment to be sent North.

Northern foot-dragging

Sanctions are not the whole story. Even before Kim's recent coolness, since late last year Pyongyang's commitment had visibly begun to wane across the board.

Kim's promised visit to Seoul late last year never happened. On December 30, he vowed to meet Moon "frequently" in 2019, yet there have been no signs of this happening.

A new joint liaison office at Kaesong, opened with much fanfare (and despite sanctions) in September, has never functioned fully, meeting less often than was stipulated. In late March the North abruptly withdrew its entire staff without explanation, though some later returned.

Militarily, since the no-fly zones and disarmament at Panmunjom were implemented no further meetings have been held. The planned joint military committee has not been set up.

Just one round of family reunions was held, last August. No others are forthcoming, though the cohort affected is elderly and will die out within a few years. On April 14, Seoul said it has acquired equipment to send to the North for video reunions, but it is unclear whether Pyongyang is still willing to do this, or even to discuss it.

Future sports cooperation is unclear, including various proposed joint teams and bids to co-host the 2032 Summer Olympics and the 2023 FIFA soccer World Cup.

Biting the hand

Kim's new official title, first heard when the North Korea's rubber-stamp parliament convened on April 11, is 'supreme representative of all the Korean people'. In a sense this is not wholly new; the constitutions of both Korean states have always claimed that each is the sole legitimate government on the peninsula. However, to state this explicitly will antagonise South Koreans, undermine support there for engagement, and weaken Moon, who champions it.

Kim's speech to the parliament on April 12 was hard-line throughout, squelching any hopes of reforms. On North-South relations, though notionally reaffirming his commitment to last year's accords, he negated this by warning that the North faces a decision: whether to "carry on the atmosphere of inter-Korean rapprochement, or to return to the past when the tension spiralled up towards a catastrophe with the danger of war looming larger".

While mainly blaming "arrogant" US pressure and "too perfidious" Southern conservatives (including "hawkish forces" in the military), Kim castigated the "south Korean authorities" for "pos[ing] as a meddlesome 'mediator' and 'facilitator' as they busy themselves with foreign trips". This was on the very day Moon returned from Washington. Without Moon's go-between role a year ago, Kim would never have secured his two summits with Trump.

Moon professed to find positive elements in Kim's speech and said he is ready for a fourth summit, anywhere. That undermines reciprocity: it is Kim's turn to visit Seoul, as no Northern leader has ever done.

Moon's successive concessions do not seem to impress Kim, nor to impress South Korean voters, who have other priorities and view Moon's preoccupation with the North as a distraction.

The resurgent right-wing opposition, which did well in by-elections on April 3, see Kim's humiliation of Moon as confirming their own suspicions of the peace process -- all the more so if that has now stalled (see SOUTH KOREA: Tide turns in favour of conservatives - February 18, 2019).