Islamic State declares 'provinces' for PR purposes

Analysis

IS has increased its focus on more dissipated global campaigns and has been adept at adjusting its actions and messaging (see MIDDLE EAST: IS will use attacks to maintain profile - April 10, 2019).

One broad distinction that may be drawn is between IS operations inside and outside its claimed areas of operation.

In both cases, the 'IS central' command structure can set the overall agenda, advise would-be perpetrators of attacks and -- where there is a sufficiently robust local structure -- commission attacks and channel funding.

A cohesive propaganda machine is key to maintaining a unified 'brand' image, especially as offshoots and 'franchise' operations emerge.

'Outside area' operations

In Western states and countries such as Sri Lanka where IS does not have a declared presence, it encourages and assists terrorist attacks.

Some combatants returning from the Middle East to Europe will abandon violence, but those who remain involved pose a particular risk as trained combatants with battle experience, technical and leadership skills, and the prestige to recruit and radicalise others. The Paris attacks in November 2015 were planned, carried out and given logistical support by returning combatants.

Local recruits inspired by IS actors in person or online appear to present the greater threat. The UK domestic intelligence agency MI5 says 80% of terrorist plots recorded in the United Kingdom last year involved individuals with no contact with IS central command.

In the Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka, a link between 'IS central' and the bombers was established (see SRI LANKA: Attacks put the country’s Muslims at risk - April 23, 2019). The attacks highlighted how local operatives can help deliver IS's aims, raise funds and increase its visibility.

Devolved structures

Although IS no longer governs in its former Iraq-Syria zone, it has enough combatants in place to remain an effective insurgent movement (see IRAQ: IS will rebuild in rural areas of the north - March 5, 2019).

Elsewhere, areas of uncontrolled or poorly-controlled territory provide opportunities for other 'provinces' to maintain operations -- for example, Libya and Egypt's Sinai peninsula (see EGYPT: Cairo will struggle to avoid further casualties - June 5, 2019) and (see LIBYA:Terrorist attack on oilfield may spook investors - May 20, 2019).

In Yemen, IS is among many actors fighting in a multifaceted conflict (see SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN: IS capture may aid Riyadh’s image - June 26, 2019).

An important feature of IS's mutation began when it was at its strongest in 2014-15: the creation of 'provinces' ('wilayah') -- fully managed offshoots outside the core territory with a hierarchy and systems controlled by 'IS central'.

Afghanistan and the Russian North Caucasus were early examples.

The North Caucasus 'province' failed to thrive because of the presence of rival militant groups and because many combatants went off to fight in Syria (see RUSSIA: Islamic State on the wane in North Caucasus - February 2, 2018).

Afghanistan

The status of 'province' gave IS direct control and a unified identity as its Afghan branch, known as IS Khorasan, grew into a guerrilla force to be reckoned with.

From being an 'imported' group it has become a local actor, given purpose and direction and often in better shape than Taliban units because of IS's fundraising, payment and financial accountability systems (see AFGHANISTAN: Islamic State will struggle to relocate - January 17, 2018).

IS Khorasan remains a potent rural force, although its territory is limited to eastern Afghanistan because of attacks by hostile Taliban forces as well as the Afghan army and US aircraft (see AFGHANISTAN: Islamic State courts other jihadists - June 6, 2019).

Members periodically bomb Kabul and other towns. The targets are ethnic Hazara, who are Shia Muslims. The aim seems to be to raise IS's profile among donors, the public and adversaries (the Taliban) as a violently sectarian group (see AFGHANISTAN: Islamic State hits soft targets - March 7, 2019).

Pakistan

In May, IS announced the creation of separate provinces for Pakistan and also India -- areas where IS Khorasan's name was previously attached to attacks (in the latter case, for Indian-administered Kashmir).

The announcement of IS Pakistan followed attacks on a hotel in Gwadar claimed by Baluchi separatists and on police in Quetta, reportedly the work of the Pakistani Taliban. Aspiring Pakistani militant organisations enter a crowded field, and IS may have felt impelled to stake out a definitive presence.

If the new 'province' is taking over from IS Khorasan in Pakistan, it may inherit the latter's local structures and funding mechanisms, and come to resemble it as a functioning IS offshoot.

Questionable 'provinces'

IS has announced the creation of large new 'provinces' -- in India, Asia and Africa. In most cases the designation is less plausible, covering a range of local jihadist actors aligned themselves with IS but lacking the tight command systems and structured existence of IS Khorasan.

Africa

IS leaders and media are paying more attention to the handful of affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa that have established a foothold over recent years. In practice, this often means aligning with pre-existing local jihadist groups and appropriating responsibility for their attacks.

The largest affiliate is IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), established after part of the Nigerian-based Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the caliphate in 2015. Though ISWAP has suffered internal splits, it remains a significant force with operations in the Lake Chad Basin, affecting Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad (see NIGERIA: Bolstered ISWAP will stretch army resources - June 5, 2019).

A distinct Boko Haram exists alongside ISWAP. Its leader, too, continues to pledge allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was formed in 2015 but has only recently begun to feature in IS core media reporting. Its activities along the Mali-Niger border area and into Burkina Faso have seen a small spike in activity of late (see NIGER: State faces delicate security balancing act - May 21, 2019).

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), IS media have since April attributed attacks by a long-standing local group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), to IS Central Africa Province. Though the ADF are well established and dangerous, their operations are limited to a small area in eastern DRC.

In Somalia, a small cell of IS-linked jihadists in northern Puntland has weathered aggressive attempts by al-Qaida-linked al-Shabaab to crush it and has begun to attract US air strikes. Though its operations remain limited, it has shown surprising resilience.

Though most of these groups look likely to remain a feature of the African jihadist landscape, their influence is dwarfed by that of al-Qaida-linked groups such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its Malian offshoot the Group of Support for Islam and All Muslims (JNIM) (see MALI: Keita may struggle to reinvigorate peace process - October 17, 2018)

'East Asia Province'

The Philippines and Indonesia have seen an increase in jihadist activity. Here too, the range of groups and geographical spread make the existence of an 'East Asia province' questionable (see SOUTH-EAST ASIA: Jakarta will lead in counterterrorism - February 14, 2019).

Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, the main IS-affiliated group in Indonesia, has been under pressure since suicide bombings in Surabaya last year.

In the Philippines, IS activity has been typical of the group attaching itself to long-standing jihadist groups and their agendas -- in this case the 2017 battle for control of the town of Marawi, recaptured by government troops after a protracted campaign.